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Abstract 
R. A. Butler was one of the most influential and yet 
enigmatic of twentieth century politicians. He did more than 
anyone to stimulate the revival of post-war Conservatism, 
which led to three consecutive general election victories. 
He was a powerful figure in all Conservative Cabinets from 
1951 to 1964, serving in each of the three main offices of 
state, and he nearly became Prime Minister twice. 
This thesis seeks to challenge the commonly held belief that 
the post-war Conservative policies developed by Butler 
represented an acceptance of the mixed-economy welfare-
state, as established by the Labour Government between 1945 
and 1951. The weakness of the Conservatives' electoral 
position had led Butler to accept the need for state 
intervention in the economy and social policy in the late 
1940s. However, in the various positions occupied by Butler 
after 1951, he pursued a distinctive course in economic and 
social policy. He sought to reclaim a far greater role for 
private enterprise, individual initiative and responsiblity; 
the traditional themes of Tory philosophy. This involved the 
creation of a free-enterprise economy and an 'opportunity' 
as opposed to a 'welfare' state. Butler's reputation for 
ambiguity, evasiveness and indecision obscured this 
political achievement at the time - playing a part in his 
failure to gain the Party leadership - and his record has 
not been recognised 
subsequently. 
by biographers and historians 
List of Contents 
List of Contents i 
Abbreviations iii 
Acknowledgements iv 
Author's Declaration v 
Introduction 1 
Notes for Introduction 26 
1. 'Setting the People Free' 
Butler as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 1951-1954 28 
Introduction 28 
The ROBOT plan 32 
The battle to develop a distinctive Tory social policy 47 
Industrial relations: the perils of free wage bargaining 58 
Grass-roots discontent 60 
Climbing the 'greasy pole' 63 
Conclusion 67 
Notes for Chapter 1 71 
2. 'United for Peace and Proqress'? 
Butler under Eden, 1955-1957 78 
Introduction 78 
Butler's final year as Chancellor 79 
Butler's removal from the Treasury 93 
The Conservatives' 'thinker without portfolio':1956 97 
Butler's role in foreign policy under Eden 109 
Conclusion 121 
Notes for Chapter 2 124 
3. 'Onwward in Freedom' 
Butler under Macmillan, 1957-1959 131 
Introduction 
Butler as Home Secretary 
Butler's role in policy making 
Cabinet crisis: the Chancellor's resignation 
Recovery 
Conclusion 
Notes for Chapter 3 
i 
1 31 
135 
145 
1 50 
1 58 
1 61 
1 64 
4. 'Tomorrow Our Responsibility' 
Butler under Macmillan, 1959-1962 
Introduction 
The Conservative electoral dilemma 
Welfare versus tax cuts 
'The middle-class revolt' 
'From three hats to one' 
'The great reappraisal' 
'The night of the long knives' 
Conclusion 
Notes for Chapter 4 
5. The Tory Leadership Crisis, 1962-1964 
Introduction 
Europe and Empire 
The Profumo scandal 
The waiting game: June-October 1963 
Complacency at Blackpool 
'Customary processes' 
Foreign Secretary under Home 
Butler and the 1964 general election 
Conclusion 
Notes for Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
Notes for Conclusion 
Bibliography 
ii 
169 
169 
171 
176 
182 
185 
1 91 
195 
201 
203 
209 
209 
210 
216 
219 
223 
227 
234 
243 
247 
251 
258 
267 
268 
Abbreviations 
The following abbreviations appear in the text and notes: 
CAB 
cc 
cco 
CPA 
CPC 
CRD 
DSND 
ED 
EEC 
GNP 
HAIS 
KLMR 
MHLG 
NEDC 
NHS 
NIC 
PPS 
PREM 
PRO 
PSG 
RAB 
RPM 
se 
SELO 
SWIN 
T 
TPC 
Cabinet Papers and Memoranda 
Cabinet Conclusions 
Conservative Central Office 
Conservative Party Archive 
Conservative Political Centre 
Conservative Research Department 
Papers of Lord Duncan-Sandys 
Ministry of Education Files 
European Economic Community 
Gross National Product 
Private Papers of Lord Hailes 
Private Papers of Lord Kilmuir 
Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
National Economic Development Council 
National Health Service 
National Incomes Commission 
Parliamentary Private Secretary 
Papers of the Prime Minister's Office 
Public Record Office 
Policy Studies Group 
Private Papers of R. A. Butler 
Resale Price Maintenance 
Steering Committee 
Private Papers of Lord Selwyn-Lloyd 
Private Papers of Lord Swinton 
Treasury Files 
Taxation Policy Committee 
iii 
Files 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis is the culmination of a long-term interest in 
the Conservative Party and post-war British politics. It 
would not have been possible without the aid of a part-time 
Research Assistantship from the University of Plymouth, 
which enabled me to carry out work at the institutions 
listed below. I am very grateful to my Director of Studies, 
Dr Kevin Jefferys, for his support and advice and also to 
my additional supervisors, Dr Nick Smart, and Dr Stuart Ball 
at the University of Leicester, for their helpful and 
constructive comments on successive drafts of the thesis. 
I would also like to express my thanks to the library and 
archive staff of the following institutions for their co-
operation and assistance: the Wren Library, Trinity College, 
Cambridge; Churchill College Archives Centre, Churchill 
College, Cambridge; the Modern Papers Reading Room in the 
Bodleian Library, Oxford; the Public Record Office, Kew; the 
National Newspaper Library, Colindale; the Heslop Room in 
the University of Birmingham Library; the University of 
Leeds Library. 
Finally, a very big thank you to my parents who have given 
me such wonderful support and encouragement throughout the 
duration of this project. 
iv 
Author's Declaration 
At no time during the registration for the degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy has the author been registered for any other 
University award. 
This study was financed with the aid of a part-time Research 
Assistantship from the Faculty of Arts and Education, 
University of Plymouth. 
Relevant historical research courses, conferences and 
seminars were attended at the Institute of Historical 
Research and at the Institute of Contemprary British History 
in London. 
. ~<d.~ rohL-S1gned .................... . 
Date ••• -~~~. J.~ .. \~"Y\> .. 
V 
l_ -
Introduction 
Richard Austen Butler, popularly known as RAB throughout his 
career, was one of the most eminent British statesmen of the 
mid-twentieth century. A junior Minister between 1932 and 
1945, he was the key figure in the revival of post-war 
Conservatism, playing a major part in shaping Conservative 
policies which contributed to three successive general 
election victories. From 1951, when the Conservatives were 
returned to power, until 1964 Butler held every senior 
ministerial post including the Exchequer, the Home Office 
and the Foreign Office. On at least two occasions, in 1957 
and 1963, he had a chance to become Prime Minister. This 
thesis provides a reappraisal of this most important period 
in his career, in the history of the Conservative Party and 
in post-war British politics. 
There have been a number of biographies of Butler. Anthony 
Howard's RAB The Life of R. A. Butler, an authorised 
biography, provides a graphic insight into the high 
political context of Butler's entire life. It is 
particularly strong on the enigmatic aspects of his 
personality. D. R. Thorpe's chapter on Butler in The 
Uncrowned Prime Ministers concentrates on the reasons why he 
did not become Prime Minister. Patrick Cosgrave in R. A. 
Butler: An English Life gives a brief but perceptive 
analysis of Butler's character. Butler's own autobiography, 
The Art of the Possible, which earned him widespread praise 
and respect for its apparent self-revelation and criticism 
in contrast to many self-serving memoirs, was in fact 
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largely ghost-written.(1) However, these works cover 
Butler's entire career and are therefore not able to provide 
a detailed analysis of the period from 1951 to 1964, when 
his career was at its height. They have not been able to 
take advantage of newly released Government papers at the 
Public Record Office, Kew, the Conservative Party Archive at 
the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and the private papers of 
other leading politicians of the time. Most importantly, the 
literature on Butler accepts the widely held view of him as 
the leading Conservative advocate of the 'post-war 
consensus'. 
Given the above it would seem relatively straightforward to 
reassess Butler as a consensus politician - to argue that he 
was either more or less a politician of that sort. However, 
such uncomplicated revisionism comes up against a 
problem. The term 'consensus', which his career has 
major 
been 
measured against, is itself hotly contested and a moving 
target. 
The long-running 'consensus debate' provides an inescapable 
context for any reconsideration of Butler's later career, 
and so must be considered in some detail. Broadly speaking, 
two schools of thought have developed over the past twenty 
years. Paul Addison in his 1975 book, The Road to 1945, was 
the first to achieve prominence by explaining post-war 
politics in terms of a war-generated elite consensus 
consisting of a broad commitment by all parties to a mixed 
economy of state owned and private enterprise, full 
employment, and a state health, social security and 
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education system (the welfare state). He believed that the 
Labour Government of 1945-51 'completed and consolidated' 
the proposals of the coalition, which were positively 
embraced by the Conservative Party in government after 1951. 
The war had inaugurated a period of closer party eo-
operation, later sustained by growing economic prosperity 
and popularly known as Butskellism.(2) According to Addison, 
in their different ways the two main parties (now) 
lacked ideological purpose.'(3) Although he modified his 
terminology - later preferring the phrase 'post-war 
settlement' to consensus - Addison's general thesis came to 
dominate interpretations of post-1945 politics and has found 
many adherents.(4) 
Rodney Lowe, for example, has endorsed this general line in 
relation to the welfare state, by defining consensus as 
an historically unusual degree of agreement ••• 
in the full range of social and economic policies by 
which post-war government sought to fulfil its 
positive commitment to promote the welfare of all 
its citizens. 
However, he qualifies this by asserting that the consensus 
was constantly shifting and that it was passive rather than 
active, dictating what could not rather than what could be 
done by the state. He accepts that it co-existed with bitter 
adversarial party politics but, 'public opinion, 
particularly as perceived at elections, demanded social 
security and 'full' employment.' He regards the resignation 
of Peter Thorneycroft as Chancellor in 1958, over the level 
of public spending, as evidence that the consensus was 
maintained primarily for electoral reasons.(5) 
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In addition, Keith Middlemas has extended Addison's thesis 
to focus on the continuity in industrial policy. In his 
view, the 1944 White Paper on Employment formed the basis of 
a new social contract between the trade unions, the 
employers and the government. He contends that this 
'corporatist' form of economic management, in which the 
overriding goal was the maintenance of full employment, was 
accepted by all governments between 1945 and 1974.(6) 
The persuasiveness of the case for consensus was such that 
it quickly found its way into textbook accounts of the 
period. In their study Dennis Kavanagh and Peter Morris 
contend that consensus politics was inextricably linked with 
policy-making as an elite process. There were discernible 
and significant continuities in policy within, 
a set of parameters which bounded the set of 
policy options regarded by senior politicians and 
civil servants as administratively practicable, 
economically affordable and politically acceptable. 
They identify five main planks of the consensus: commitment 
to a mixed economy, full employment, state welfare, 
conciliation of trade unions, and agreement on 
decolonisation, nuclear defence and NATO (although the 
consensus debate has in the past tended to focus on domestic 
policy). They argue that any differences were ones of 
rhetoric rather than substance, with the Tories emphasising 
freedom of opportunity, private enterprise and a 'property 
owning democracy', while Labour stressed equality and 
economic planning.(?) 
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In a further textbook study, David Dutton argues that, 
'Disputes were less about absolutes than questions of 'more' 
or 'less'.' The question was not whether there should be 
state welfare but the level of benefits and the range of 
entitlements. With regard to public ownership the question 
was the extent of state regulation. Both parties contained 
wings which dissented from the ruling orthodoxy, but the 
left-wing Conservative and right-wing Labour leadership 
remained committed to the 'middle ground' of politics. They 
calculated that the voters would punish parties that veered 
too sharply from the main aspects of the consensus. Dutton, 
in common with many writers on consensus, makes much of the 
invention of 'Mr Butskell', a combination of Butler and his 
Labour predecessor as Chancellor, Hugh Gaitskell, designed 
to indicate the cross-party commitment to the mixed economy 
and Keynesian management techniques to maintain full 
employment and the welfare state. Before the 1959 general 
election a public opinion poll revealed that almost 40 per 
cent of voters believed that it made no difference which 
party was in power. There was widespread contentment at 
growing prosperity and so elections became a choice of men 
rather than measures. This seemed particularly true in 1961 
when the Conservative Government moved towards the Labour 
policy of more planning and controls to encourage economic 
growth and increased spending on welfare. Dutton feels that 
the election manifestoes of the two parties in 1964 were 
closer than at any time in the previous forty years. He 
concludes that Labour probably won on the successful 
projection of an image rather than on an alternative set of 
policies.(8) 
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Many scholars, however, have cast doubt on the consensus 
argument as outlined by Addison and his supporters. Hence 
over the past decade there has emerged a second school 
thought, comprising some who question the existence 
consensus at all. Ben Pimlott makes the point that a 
different picture emerges if consensus is defined as, 
not when people merely agree, but when they are 
happy agreeing, are not constrained to agree, and 
leave few of their number outside the broad 
parameters of their agreement. 
of 
of 
very 
While acknowledging that the wartime coalition represented a 
'remarkably innovative' episode in British politics, Pimlott 
argues that the notion of a consensus is, ' ..• a mirage, an 
illusion that rapidly fades the closer one gets to it.' He 
believes that the consensus thesis is as much about the 
present as the past; indeed the phrase was not popularised 
before the 1970s. It was used in a negative sense by the 
'New Right' to underline the shift towards a more 
adversarial age when Margaret Thatcher was attacking key 
aspects of the post-war settlement, which they held 
responsible for Britain's economic decline, and by Labour 
left-wingers who blamed consensus for the failure of Labour 
governments to achieve a socialist society. At the same 
time, the idea of consensus was viewed positively by 
Conservative 'wets' who rejected the extremes of 
Thatcherism, and by Labour right-wingers who despaired of 
their Party's shift to the left in the early 1980s. Pimlott 
argues that they, and historians, have made the mistake of 
seeing more agreement in the past than was actually the 
case. There was little sign that leading politicians 
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regarded themselves as part of a consensus at the time, nor 
by some accounts did this seem true of the electorate. He 
points to evidence suggesting that, despite electoral 
stability, there were high levels of party identification, 
class-based voting, and an insignificant centre. Pimlott 
concludes that events after 1945 were shaped as much by 
dispute as by co-operation.(9) 
Others have focused on particular periods or administrations 
to modify the notion of consensus. From his work on the 
wartime coalition Kevin Jefferys claims that, apart 
from the recognition that particular issues would have to be 
tackled, the parties were in many ways as far apart on 
social issues as they had been before 1939.' The proposals 
which the coalition did devise, mostly in the form of white 
papers, were not intended as binding commitments upon a 
future government and were sufficiently ambiguous as to be 
open to differing interpretations. They represented 
compromises between the maximum concessions which the 
Conservative Party was prepared to make and the minimum 
demands which would satisfy the Labour Party. Only 
legislation on education and family allowances reached the 
statute book before the end of the war. There were major 
differences between the parties which revealed themselves in 
the bitterness of the 1945 general election campaign. While 
the Conservative Party was committed to introducing the 
White Paper reforms, it envisaged only a gradual extension 
of the state's powers and the retention of a major place for 
private over public enterprise. Jefferys concludes that 
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while a consensus did emerge in the 1940s it cannot be 
explained by wartime experiences, but by other factors such 
as the landslide Tory defeat of 1945 and the narrow Tory 
victory in 1951. Both sides arrived at 'consensus by 
default' . ( 1 0) 
Concentrating on events after the war, Harriet Jones and 
Michael Kandiah have argued that far from meekly accepting 
Labour's reforms after their landslide defeat, the Tories in 
opposition devised an alternative programme which decisively 
rejected the notion of the state acting as an agent for 
redistribution. Economic inequality was felt to be necessary 
both to generate new wealth and to preserve individual 
freedom. The acceptance of the need for full employment and 
a welfare state reflected the Tories' concern at what they 
perceived to be fragile electoral support among the 'working 
class two-thirds' necessary to win an election. Kandiah 
asserts that, the focus on final outcomes rather than 
on the reasons for and situations behind those results ... 
has concealed more than it has revealed.' There was no 
transformation of Conservative Party policy but a 
confirmation of past practices. Harriet Jones goes further 
in suggesting that after 1951 the aim of Conservative policy 
was to reduce public expenditure and taxation. In the 
National Health Service (NHS) this involved the adoption and 
extension of charges for specific services; elsewhere it 
meant a shift towards means testing in social security, the 
defence of tripartite selective education, and the 
encouragement of home ownership. She concludes that, 
by cutting taxes and reorienting the social 
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services around the question of need, 
controls and returning to a broad 
consumerism and the free market, the 
were rejecting the values that had 
country during the war and the Attlee 
by lifting 
emphasis on 
Conservatives 
governed the 
years.(11) 
Finally, one sceptic on consensus has focused particularly 
on post-war economic policy. Neil Rollings laments the lack 
of an agreed working definition of consensus or Butskellism, 
terms which he says have too readily become interchangeable 
in the historiography of the period. He defines the latter 
term as a broad similarity in economic policy and beliefs 
based around the use of Keynesian demand management to 
maintain full employment. Rollings makes the case that 
although the Labour Government began the process of removing 
controls, it remained committed into the 1950s to the 
maintenance of certain direct economic controls such as food 
subsidies and import/export quotas. In contrast, the 
Conservative Government enthusiastically removed subsidies 
and controls and subjected the economy to market forces. The 
steel and road haulage industries were denationalised at the 
same time as Labour made plans for further nationalisation. 
The Conservative commitment to full employment was limited 
to the extent that it fitted in with other more traditional 
Tory concerns such as free enterprise, balanced budgets, 
confidence in sterling and convertibility. In fact, Rollings 
believes that government policy had little to do with the 
maintenance of full employment which owed more to global 
expansion. He feels there was a greater degree of apparent 
similarity in the nature and objectives of Conservative and 
Labour economic policy than was actually the case.(12) 
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After outlining the two main schools of thought, it is 
tempting to agree with the recent view that the consensus 
debate is in danger of becoming bogged down, partly because 
of the lack of an agreed definition. Consensus is clearly an 
amorphous concept, elusive and constantly changing over time 
(and perhaps between different policy areas}. One can 
therefore sympathise with the view that 'consensus obscures 
as much as it illuminates'.(13} Yet, tempting though it is 
to conclude that the notion of consensus is itself at fault, 
in the absence of other labels to characterise the operation 
of post-war politics, it is as difficult to avoid its usage 
as it is to separate it from Butler's career. 
It has been convenient to argue that Butler was a consensus 
politician in a government of a markedly non-consensual 
nature. However, Butler's reputation as hitherto understood 
by his biographers obscures the reality of much of his work. 
By examining the nature of his contribution to policy-making 
from a broader perspective than just his departmental 
responsibilities, drawing together work 
disciplines including political science, 
from several 
economics and 
social policy, this thesis shows that Butler's natural home 
was in the vanguard of traditional Conservatism. 
In office, as Chancellor, Leader of the House ·of Commons, 
Home Secretary, and to a lesser extent as Foreign Secretary, 
Butler was at the heart of the policy-making process. 
However, he rarely used his influence, it is 
order to perpetuate the type of society Labour 
10 
argued, 
sought 
in 
to 
create after 
constraints of 
1945. 
the 
Rather, within the 
time, he attempted to 
considerable 
pursue, with 
varying degrees of success, more distinctively Conservative 
policies giving a renewed and updated emphasis to free 
enterprise and individual initiative. In assessing the 
specific imprint of Butler's influence, any continuities in 
policy during the 1950s are best explained by economic or 
electoral constraints (to be highlighted below) rather than 
by any genuine convergence of views between the parties. If 
the above is adopted as a definition, then what 
characterises British politics and Butler's career at this 
time was a superficial, constrained, even tactical regard 
for the 'centre-ground', subsequently labelled 'consensus' 
by some historians. If it is true to say that Butler's image 
as a consensus politician was imposed upon him, it was one 
that his own personality did nothing to dispel and much to 
confirm. 
As a major concern of post-war historians in recent years, 
the 'consensus debate' inevitably colours any 
reconsideration of Butler's career. Yet this problem is 
compounded by another major theme in what follows: the 
effect of Butler's enigmatic and evasive personality on his 
changing fortunes within the Conservative hierarchy after 
1951, which can only be understood by briefly outlining his 
earlier career. 
Butler was not a natural 'progressive'. His credentials in 
that respect are open to question. He was born in 1902 into 
a middle class family with a long record of public ·service, 
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and had a privileged education at Marlborough and Cambridge. 
Marriage to Sydney Courtauld, the textile heiress, brought 
him the necessary wealth to pursue a political career. He 
was elected Member of Parliament for Saffron Walden in Essex 
in 1929, a seat he held for 36 years. Butler seemed to make 
an almost effortless rise up the political ladder, which did 
not endear him to all Tory MPs. His loyalty to the 
leadership of Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain 
secured him appointments as Parliamentary Secretary at the 
India Office from 1932 to 1937, and then at the Foreign 
Office from 1938 to 1941. He was therefore preoccupied with 
external affairs for most of the 1930s, but in all things he 
showed himself to be an orthodox Party man a 
characteristic which Butler retained throughout his career. 
In a brief spell at the Ministry of Labour in 1937-8 Butler 
was unwilling to consider the radical solutions to the 
unemployment problem put forward by his contemporary, Harold 
Macmillan, in his book, The Middle Way. From 1932 to 1935 he 
was assailed by the Party's right wing for his willingness 
to concede moves toward self-government for India, and 
thereafter as much by the left as the right for his 
stonewalling defence of the appeasement of Nazi Germany. 
It was in this last cause that Butler revealed an 
equivocal side to his character, which led David Lloyd-
George to call him the 'artful dodger'. At the same time he 
acquired a reputation for being notoriously indiscreet which 
blurred his political stance. Harold Nicolson observed that, 
He is a curious man. I have a suspicion that he does 
not really agree with the appeasement policy and has 
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all along been on our side.(14) 
Yet the scandal over Butler's reportedly defeatist comments 
to the Swedish Ambassador in June 1940 seemed to indicate 
the opposite. His Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS), 
Henry 'Chips' Channon, himself an enthusiastic appeaser, 
reflected that, 
He treats 
all. He 
ingenuous, 
deceived. 
PM.(15) 
everyone as an oriental and plays with us 
sometimes looks and appears as most 
even naif, but only a fool would be 
If he had more outward gifts he might be 
This particular aspect of Butler's character proved to be a 
double-edged sword. While it eased his climb up the 
political ladder and enabled him to survive and prosper 
under a number of Tory leaders, his evasiveness and 
ambiguity aroused suspicion of his motives and made it 
impossible to know where he stood on certain issues. A 
favourite parliamentary story told, 
how Rab, if asked the time, would congratulate 
the honourable member on his question, discuss 
different measurements of time, heavily endorse the 
importance of time keeping, but fail to actually 
give the answer.(16) 
As a result he attracted detractors as well as admirers at 
all levels and from all sides within the Tory Party. In 
particular, the 'Munichois' stain on his character was held 
against him by those Tory MPs whose post-war reputations 
were founded on resistance to appeasement in the late 1930s. 
Winston Churchill, the leader of the war-time coalition, was 
not overly impressed. In 1941 he moved Butler to what he 
regarded as the political backwater of the Board of 
Education. Butler turned this apparent snub to his own 
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advantage. As Chairman of the Party's Post-War Problems 
Central Committee he was among the first in the Conservative 
Party to come to terms with the increased demand for social 
and economic reform engendered by the war. His apparently 
progressive instincts reflected compelling electoral 
arguments rather than an ideological commitment. It was 
significant that Butler followed the maxim that politics was 
the art of the possible rather than the art of the 
desirable. Labour MP Richard Crossman asserted that, 
The art of government, in his view, is to yield to 
the forces of change and then to harness them in 
time to prevent the disintegration of authority.(17) 
This was particularly true of the 1944 Education Act, which 
was largely based on proposals made before the war. The 
essentially cautious measure was portrayed as an example of 
Conservative commitment to social reform, and it made Butler 
into a national figure. The Butler Act did nothing to 
integrate the public schools within the state system and, by 
establishing selection at eleven, ensured a better education 
for a minority in grammar schools while the majority had to 
make do with secondary modern schools. All the same the 
Labour Government did not seek to change it after 1945 and 
it remained the basis for the country's education system for 
a generation.(18) 
Butler's reward was to be appointed as Minister of Labour in 
Churchill's caretaker administration of May-July 1945. For 
the Chamberlainite arch-appeaser it had been a 'good war', 
and the apparently effortless ease with which he switched 
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loyalties was perhaps galling for those Tory MPs, such as 
Harold Macmillan and Duncan Sandys, whose post-war 
reputations were founded on resistance to appeasement in the 
late 1930s. Yet by harnessing the forces of change Butler 
had advanced his own interests and those of his Party. This 
was not true of other areas of social policy where the 
Tories had not been so active during the war years. 
After 1945 the Labour Government's social policy legislation 
was introduced amidst much controversy. The Conservatives 
were reluctant to embrace the new mixed economy/welfare 
state, at least in the form it was intended by Attlee's 
ministers. An internal debate went on inside the Party, led 
by Butler as Chairman of the Conservative Research 
Department (CRD), which saw the development of a distinctive 
set of ideas about how the economy and welfare state should 
be managed. Here the grounds of consensus are sometimes 
discerned, but neither Labour nor Conservative politicians 
were conscious of a convergence of their policies at the 
time. Butler later recalled that his aim had been to give 
the Party 'a painless but permanent facelift', which relied 
more on impressionism than substance. Michael Fraser, 
Director of the CRD for many years, felt that, 
The real position was like that of two trains, 
starting off from parallel platforms at some great 
London terminus and running for a time on broadly 
parallel lines but always heading for very different 
destinations.(19) 
By 1951 the Conservatives, as another critic of the 
consensus school of thought - Howard Glennerster - has 
argued, were in the process of developing a clear and 
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coherent alternative. Labour maintained its belief in 
council house building as the primary means to solve the 
housing shortage, while Conservative policy was prepared to 
give a much larger role to the private sector. On health and 
social security, the Tory Party opposed the principle of 
universal benefits given regardless of need, and instead 
advocated means testing and charges for specific services. 
In economic policy, the Industrial Charter of 1947 sought to 
reclaim a major role for traditional Conservative themes 
such as individual initiative and private enterprise, which 
were repeated in the 1950 and 1951 manifestoes. The Party 
strongly opposed steel and road haulage nationalisation and 
pledged itself to reverse any such measures once in office. 
It was also able to take advantage of a new mood in the 
country for an end to wartime austerity and controls, and 
high taxation. 'Set the People Free' seemed a convincing 
electoral slogan for the Tories, and they went into the 
general election of October 1951 with a distinctive social 
and economic policy, which did not merely accept passively 
the Labour Government's reforms.(20) 
Back in office for the fist time since 1945, and for the 
first time as the single party of government since 1929, the 
Conservative majority of sixteen, and a smaller share of the 
vote than Labour, induced a modicum of caution. As Party 
analysts saw it, they ran a risk of confirming the 
continuing deep suspicion of the Party among a large section 
of the working classes, who feared a return to the 'laissez-
faire' conditions of the 1930s. Equally, they feared 
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antagonising the middle classes, whose votes had ensured the 
Tory victory, and who expected a rolling back of the state 
and lower taxes.(21) Thus Butler, whose good work had led to 
his promotion as Chancellor, faced a dilemma. He was 
expected to perform a balancing act between pushing ahead 
with radical policies and seeking to maintain the support of 
working class voters, many of whom seemed content with the 
domestic 'status quo' as bequeathed by Labour. Such a task 
was clearly difficult, and as a consequence Butler confirmed 
his unfair reputation among his colleagues for indecision 
and equivocation: policy and personality were to come 
together in ways that help to explain his failure to climb 
to the very top of the 'greasy pole'. 
How then are the twin themes of the place of consensus and 
changing personal fortunes developed in what follows? 
Chapter One examines Butler's role as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer from 1951 to 1954. Butler later expressed surprise 
at his appointment to arguably the most important job in the 
Government, but it reflected the credit given to him for 
transforming the Conservative Party's fortunes, and made him 
indispensable to its maintenance. By 1954, as we have seen, 
he had been labelled 'Mr Butskell' to indicate his 
similarity 
Gaitskell. 
differences. 
in policy terms to his Labour predecessor, Hugh 
Yet it is argued here that there were important 
Butler reintroduced the use of Bank Rate to 
regulate supply and demand, something that Labour 
Chancellors had consistently refused to do. In addition, his 
willingness to consider the ROBOT plan to let sterling find 
its own value in the market place instead of being fixed by 
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the Government, would have had important consequences for 
wage and price stability, and may well have induced a 
'flight of capital' and even threatened full employment. If 
nothing else, it confirmed that Butler's image of consensus 
was imposed upon him by more cautious colleagues, including 
Churchill, Eden and Woolton, who arguably were better 
candidates for the consensus label. 
In other areas Butler's Conservatism showed more signs of 
success. The Labour Government may have started the process 
of scrapping controls and subsidies, but Butler set about 
the task with gusto. Although the majority of the 300,000 
houses per year target were built by local authorities for 
rent, Butler was concerned at the level of Government 
spending. On housing he successfully argued in Cabinet for a 
shift in the emphasis of policy towards the production of 
unsubsidised houses by private builders. On health and 
education Butler restricted spending to the minimum required 
to maintain services. He committed himself to the 
introduction of health charges and to the defence of 
selection in education, opposing any move towards 
comprehensive schools, a change which was finding increasing 
favour in Labour ranks.(22) 
At the same time Butler was able to make two reductions in 
income tax in 1953 and 1955, which largely benefited 
salaried workers and those on fixed incomes. It seemed that 
Butler, 
managed 
despite a difficult juggling act, 
to 'set the people free' while at 
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had successfully 
the same time 
maintaining the welfare state. It may not have been 
unconnected but the Conservatives, led by Sir Anthony Eden, 
were returned to power with an increased majority of sixty 
seats in May 1955. Butler became the new heir apparent. 
Chapter Two deals with Butler's last months as Chancellor 
and his time as Leader of the House of Commons under Eden's 
Premiership from 1955 to 1957. The period marked a low point 
in his career. With a secure majority Butler had hoped that 
he would be able to make progress towards a more distinctly 
Conservative economic policy and hence lower public 
spending. His concern for the long-term economic situation 
appeared fully justified as he lost control of the economic 
boom culminating in a balance of payments crisis in the 
second half of 1955. Butler wished to embark upon radical 
changes in policy, but his colleagues overruled him, with 
the result that his autumn Budget did little to effect a 
substantial reduction in Government expenditure or deal with 
inflationary wage increases. He was removed from the 
Treasury in December 1955. 
Despite an uneasy relationship with Eden and the damage done 
to his reputation by his last months as Chancellor, Butler 
sought to reassert his influence over policy as Leader of 
the House of Commons. He was extremely concerned at the cost 
of excessive wage settlements, and he chaired the Cabinet 
committee which in March 1956 published a white paper 
emphasising the need for voluntary wage restraint. In 
addition, Butler's chairmanship of the Cabinet's Social 
Services Committee in 1956 found that welfare spending as a 
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proportion of Gross National Product (GNP) had fallen from 
40 per cent to 36 per cent by 1958.(23) However, any credit 
he may have gained for reasserting his influence over policy 
making was lost in the controversy surrounding Butler's 
doubts about the Government's response to the Suez crisis. 
Although his public statements supported the Government's 
position, his manner and private comments seemed to indicate 
the opposite. This was the decisive factor in Butler's 
failure to win the succession from Harold Macmillan. 
Chapter Three discusses Butler's rehabilitation and recovery 
between January 1957 and October 1959. Macmillan soon 
established a dominance in his relationship with Butler, by 
refusing his request to become Foreign Secretary and 
consigning him instead to the Home Office, where his reforms 
antagonised Tory traditionalists. However, he maintained an 
influential role in policy-making, and often deputised for 
Macmillan when the Prime Minister made his frequent trips 
abroad. 
The resignation of the entire Treasury team in January 1958, 
due to the Cabinet's refusal to agree to further cuts in 
spending, 
sell-out 
has been interpreted by some commentators as a 
to the demands of those Ministers seeking to 
appease the working classes, whose support seemed crucial to 
Conservative electoral prospects. Even if it were true, it 
did not affect Butler very much. Although he was quick to 
rejoice in their going, there is no evidence that he took 
the lead in pushing the Treasury team out. Besides in policy 
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terms Butler had rarely been an advocate of high spending; 
he was just more pragmatic about how, when and where cuts 
should be made. 
In fact, Butler sought bold changes in economic and social 
policy. In a memorandum to Macmillan in Febraury 1958, he 
wrote of wanting to develop an 'opportunity' as opposed to a 
'welfare' state, in which state intervention encouraged 
individual responsibility and effort by such means as tax 
reductions. Butler's vision was reflected in Government 
action. New council building was drastically reduced in 
favour of private building, and rented private property at 
economic rents. In the field of social security, graduated 
national insurance contributions and a 
provision targeted benefits to those most 
contracting out 
in need, while 
those who could afford to were encouraged to make their own 
arrangements. The Government maintained its commitment to 
selective education with a major scheme to improve standards 
in secondary modern schools.(24) 
Chapter Four reappraises the period from October 1959 to 
July 1962. Economic prosperity had helped to ensure a third 
Conservative victory in the general election of October 
1959. Party analysts believed that to hang on to the votes 
of affluent workers the Government needed to embark upon an 
expensive 'modernisation' programme in the education and 
health services. However, Butler, having stalled such 
measures as Chancellor, was never happy with such a 
materialist emphasis and was rather dubious about the 'new 
approach'. As Party Chairman after 1959 he stressed the need 
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for individual responsibility as well as opportunity by 
emphasising the 'spiritual' side of politics. His concern 
appeared justified as economic difficulties made it 
increasingly difficult to increase spending and cut taxes at 
the same time. 
Butler's loss of influence was confirmed by Macmillan's 
shift towards more planning in the economy, most notably in 
the establishment of the National Economic Development 
Council (NEDC), and a permanent incomes policy to restrain 
labour costs and inflation.(25) As the Chancellor who had 
'set the people free' Butler was disappointed that the 
Government had admitted that Conservative 'freedom' no 
longer appeared to work, and had instead adopted a policy 
similar to that of the Labour Party. It is ironic that at a 
time when the period quality of consensus was at its most 
pronounced during the years 1951-64, Butler was increasingly 
isolated and out of step with Government policy. 
Dissatisfaction with these changes encouraged a so-called 
'middle class revolt' among Tory supporters in local and 
by-elections. Butler was forced to take responsibility for 
this downturn, which was none of his making, in his 
humiliating removal as Party Chairman and Leader of the 
House of Commons in October 1961. He was to suffer further, 
being removed from the Home Office in the 'night of the long 
knives' in July 1962. 
The changes marked the beginning of Butler's move away from 
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home affairs. Chapter 
Butler's ministerial 
Five examines the final 
career from July 1962 
stage of 
to the 
Conservatives' election defeat in October 1964, during which 
time he was gradually excluded from any influential role in 
policy making. As Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary 
of State, Butler was even more closely subordinated to 
Macmillan. His appointment to oversee other key aspects of 
the 'modernisation' programme -Britain's application to 
join the European Economic Community (EEC), and the 
withdrawal from imperial commitments such as the peaceful 
abolition of the Central African Federation - were, no 
doubt, essential acts of public service. They nevertheless 
involved him in radical changes in Conservative policy which 
aroused the hostility of the right wing and the suspicion of 
the left wing of the Tory Party. 
Butler's own ambivalence about the application to join the 
EEC was well founded in the light of President de Gaulle's 
veto, which together with the poor handling of the Vassal! 
and Profumo spy scandals in 1963, increased speculation 
about Macmillan's leadership. They also highlighted Butler's 
waning influence. However, he still hoped to emerge from a 
large number of candidates as the automatic choice for the 
succession. Macmillan's determination that Butler should not 
succeed him and Butler's refusal, in Enoch Powell's words, 
to 'pull the trigger', ensured his ultimate failure in the 
leadership crisis of October 1963.(26) 
Despite his disappointment Butler hoped to retain influence 
as the elder statesman of the Government. His appointment as 
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Foreign Secretary by Sir Alec Douglas-Home, the new Prime 
Minister, accelerated the process of marginalisation begun 
by Macmillan. Butler's warnings about the dangers of relying 
on a reflationary boom to ensure a fourth Conservative 
election victory were ignored despite their validity. No 
major role was envisaged for Butler after the Tories' 
election defeat in October 1964, and in January 1965 he left 
politics for the Mastership of Trinity College, Cambridge. 
Butler was a far more complex figure than his portrayal as 
one half of the 'Butskell' double act would suggest. As a 
leading member of the Conservative Governments after 1951, 
Butler's career is one lens or medium through which the 
whole concept of consensus can be refined or even rejected. 
This thesis accepts that a sort of consensus or enforced 
middle ground existed in the 1950s, to the extent that the 
Tories felt themselves bound by a number of restrictions, 
which militated against a decisive break from the past. 
Within these constraints Butler's relationship to consensus 
was tenuous in the extreme. Throughout he pursued a 
distinctive agenda in economic and social policy, based on 
the traditional Tory themes of individual responsibility and 
free enterprise. In addition, a link needs to be made 
between consensus and the effect of its association with 
Butler on his position within the Conservative Party. 
Although Butler pursued radical policies, this was not the 
perception of many Tories, nor of the country at large which 
saw him as the guarantor of the Tory acceptance of the mixed 
economy/welfare state. This was an unfair reputation which 
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F3titie:r~· s enigmatic pe·rsona~ity did! litt~e to· •correct, and 
indeed' ;see"illed ,to refnforce ,. .to the detr.iment of .his own 
leadetsili:p ,ambi.tions:. 
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1 
'Setting the people free' 
Butler as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1951-1954 
Introduction 
The Conservative victory in the General Election of 26th 
October 1951 propelled Rab Butler into one of the key 
positions in the Government, that of Chancellor of the 
Exchequer. Victory and his new position gave him the chance 
to show that the Conservatives were not only the party of 
individual freedom and free enterprise, but that these 
virtues could be combined with the preservation of full 
employment and the welfare state, as outlined in the 
Conservative manifesto, Britain, Strong and Free. 
The strength of the Labour performance (polling more votes 
if fewer seats) showed that there continued to be a large 
body of voters who were not convinced by Tory propaganda and 
who remained suspicious of the Conservative Party. Harold 
Macmillan recorded in his diary that, 
The truth is that the Socialists have fought the 
election (very astutely) not on Socialism but on 
Fear. Fear of unemployment; fear of reduced wages; 
fear of reduced social benefits; fear of war. These 
four fears have been brilliantly, if unscrupulously, 
exploited. If, before the next election, none of 
these fears have proved reasonable, we may be able 
to force the Opposition to fight on Socialism. Then 
we can win.(1) 
However, victory had been secured by the support of the 
middle classes who oppposed high levels of Government 
spending, and the high taxes necessary to pay for it.(2) The 
Government would have to perform a very delicate balancing 
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act in order to conciliate these two contradictory and 
incompatible sources of support. 
Butler was primarily appointed as Chancellor for his 
political skills. Geoffrey Lloyd, a fellow MP, was probably 
correct when he observed that, 
Rab's position was much strengthened by the 
result. In these circumstances it would have 
more than ever dangerous to have the other 
(Oliver Lyttelton) at the Treasury.(3) 
narrow 
been 
fellow 
Both Winston Churchill and Anthony Eden thought he would be 
better than his right wing rival, Oliver Lyttelton, at 
handling the House of Commons, and in dealing with threats 
to the pound without resorting to harsh domestic measures. 
The Manchester Guardian declared that Butler was, 
rather more suave in manner and is more closely identified 
with the Welfare State.' If the Government had to take 
difficult steps, Butler would take them ' with the best 
bedside manner.' (4) In fact commentators tended to complain 
that Conservative policy was indistinguishable from that of 
the Labour Party, leading to the use of the terms 'Mr 
Butskell' and 'Butskellism', devised by The Economist in 
1954. 'Mr Butskell' was, 
a composite of the present Chancellor and the 
previous one [Hugh Gaitskell] •... Whenever there is 
a tendency to excess Conservatism within the 
Conservative Party - such as a clamour for too much 
imperial preference, for a wild dash to 
convertibility, or even for a little more 
unemployment to teach the workers a lesson - Mr 
Butskell speaks up for the cause of moderation from 
the Government side of the House; when there is a 
clamour for even graver irresponsibilities from the 
Labour benches, Mr Butskell has hitherto spoken up 
from the other.(5) 
The Economist article did Butler a lot of harm among those 
Conservatives who had always suspected, wrongly, that he was 
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a 'milk and water socialist'. It was a label which was to 
hang like a millstone around his neck for the rest of his 
political career, and it almost certainly blighted his 
leadership ambitions. 
These perceptions have become entrenched in the 
historiography of the period, notably in Anthony Howard's 
biography of Butler.(6) Traditionally Butler has been 
portrayed as the leading Conservative advocate of the post-
war 'consensus', the mixed economy -welfare state, as 
established by the Labour Government of 1945-51. However, 
the evidence suggests that Butler was not the consensual 
figure that he has widely been portrayed as being. In his 
memoirs Butler asserted that, 
Both 
spoke 
with 
of us (Butler and Gaitskell), 
the language of Keynesianism. 
different accents and with 
emphasis. 
it 
But 
a 
is true, 
we spoke it 
differing 
They shared common methods, but their ends were very 
distinct. Butler was convinced that Keynesian economic 
policy offered a secure foundation for competition, 
individualism, and the survival of capitalism, whereas 
Gaitskell was convinced that the same means could secure the 
purposes of socialist collectivism. Butler accepted the 
argument put forward by The Economist that he needed to do 
more than simply keep the Socialist policy he inherited on 
an even keel.(?) 
The paradox was that those who sought to impose constraints 
upon Butler, to prevent him being too progressive, proved to 
be vigorous defenders of the status quo themselves. 
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Although Butler was committed to the maintenance of full 
and a welfare state, he wanted to develop a 
Conservative policy which, in the short term, 
employment 
distinctive 
might have had an adverse electoral impact. However, most of 
his Cabinet colleagues wanted no changes that might threaten 
their 
the 
fragile hold on power. They saw the preservation of 
status-quo as the only path to electoral success. This 
has been the dominant view of the Conservative Governments 
of 1951 to 1964. Robert Hall, Director of the Economic 
Section at the Cabinet Office, observed that, it was 
rather sad to see how difficult it will be for the Tories to 
do what is needed without breaking most of their election 
pledges.'(8) 
Butler had become in Macmillan's view the third person in 
the political hierarchy, but he was officially placed fifth 
in the Cabinet pecking order, behind Eden, Lord Woolton, 
Lord Salisbury, and Sir David Maxwell-Fyfe. He managed to 
obstruct the appointment of Sir John Anderson as Treasury 
'overlord', but he was forced to accept the appointment of 
Sir Arthur Salter as Minister of Economic Affairs, and the 
establishment of a Treasury Ministerial Advisory Committee 
including Butler's critics, Woolton and Salisbury, to 
'assist' him. Seldom can a Chancellor have been subject to 
so many potential constraints. However, Butler and his 
Treasury officials proved more than a match for these 
checks.(9) A far more serious threat to Butler's authority 
was the appointment of Lord Cherwell as Paymaster General to 
provide Churchill with independent economic advice. His 
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influence was to prove decisive during a critical period in 
February 1952 when Butler unsuccessfully advocated the ROBOT 
plan, a radical change in economic policy which would have 
forestalled the creation of any myth of Butskellism. 
In fact, Butler did make progress towards a distinctive 
economic policy, as shown by his flexible use of monetary 
policy to regulate supply and demand, his enthusiastic 
abandonment of wartime controls and subsidies, and his 
success in reducing taxation. In social policy there was a 
shift away from universal towards means-tested benefits and 
charges for specific services. Butler managed to restrict 
spending so that it was reduced as a proportion of the gross 
national product (GNP), although in money terms it continued 
to increase. These policies would have been more strident 
had it not been for Ministers' overriding concern with the 
fragile electoral situation. Self-evidently it reinforced 
Butler's belief that politics was the art of the possible. 
Sir Edwin Plowden, the head of the economic planning staff, 
believed that he was forced to put off making difficult 
decisions which might have jeopardised Tory electoral 
prospects.(10) Butler recognised that such a course was 
failing to resolve Britain's long-term economic problems. 
However, in the short-term his success in managing the 
economy raised him to the third position in the Government 
hierarchy and potential leader of the Conservative Party. 
The ROBOT plan 
The new Government was faced with an external balance of 
payments crisis, rising prices, and increasing unemployment. 
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Labour prophecies of doom seemed all too likely to be 
realised. The balance of payments deficit had been caused by 
the Korean War and the subsequent heavy rearmament 
programme. The focus on rearmament meant that raw materials 
generally used for export goods were in even shorter supply, 
and as exports fell so the balance of payments deficit 
increased. It was estimated that unless adequate emergency 
measures were taken British reserves might fall to as little 
as 50 million pounds, the level at which the pound was 
devalued in 1949. In an early memorandum on the situation 
Butler warned the Cabinet that, 'We are in a balance of 
payments crisis worse than 1949 and in many ways worse than 
1947.' The economy was in a critical state, and a collapse 
greater than in 1931 was a distinct possibility as 'blood 
drained from the system'.(11) 
Butler's response to the crisis in October 1951 was 
pragmatic and followed much of the advice given by his 
Treasury officials. The short-term measures he implemented 
were not particularly contentious, and would have been 
implemented by the Labour Party had it been in office. Over 
the next three months Butler sought savings of 600 million 
pounds from Britains's overseas expenditure by means of a 
series of cuts in import quotas, the introduction of labour 
controls, a slowdown in strategic stockpiling, a three month 
moratorium on all building work, except for housing, hire 
purchase restrictions on a range of consumer goods, and a 
review of all Government expenditure. Macmillan felt that it 
might have been wiser to take all these measures at once, 
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but there was an understandable reluctance not to inflict 
more pain than was needed to stabilise the situation.(12) 
After criticising the Labour Party's attachment to controls, 
it was strange for Conservatives initially to clamp down 
controls still tighter. On the 'Any Questions' radio 
programme in November 1951 Labour MP Richard Crossman took 
some satisfaction from, 
••• a certain amount of disillusionment of 
voters who thought that in some mysterious 
a Tory Government came to power it would 
Britain from the stranglehold of 
controls.(13) 
some Tory 
way when 
liberate 
Socialist 
Butler was not temperamentally happy at having to impose 
import controls, but the crisis demanded fast action. They 
gave him some breathing space in which to formulate more 
adequate remedies. In the long term Butler needed to develop 
a distinctive Conservative economic policy. As Lord Hailsham 
pointed out in reply to Crossman: 
control is the right way of dealing with 
scarcity, the trouble is it isn't the right way of 
creating abundance. And that is the dilemma in which 
the Government find itself.(14) 
Robert Hall did ' not see how they can get on without 
controls unless they use much more severe monetary measures 
than they could afford politically.'(15) 
One of the immediate changes Butler was able to make, to 
indicate a clear difference between Conservative and Labour 
policies, was in the field of monetary policy. He believed 
that the Government should use all the policy levers 
available to manage the economy, and that manipulation of 
interest rates could be especially beneficial, by damping 
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down borrowing and spending and encouraging saving. In 
opposition Conservatives had attacked the Labour Government 
for not moving the Bank Rate up and down, a course that was 
urged by Treasury officials. However, once the Conservatives 
were in office Butler and his officials did not have an easy 
task in convincing his colleagues of the wisdom of a rise in 
the Bank Rate, the one immediate policy which could be shown 
to be different from what their predecessors had done. This 
paradox can be attributed to the Conservatives' fragile 
position and their determination not to be responsible for a 
return to the slump conditions of the 1930s. Ministers 
feared that the policy could only be effective at the 
expense of severe hardship. One Minister asked Plowden, 
How would you like to get up on the hustings and say 
that one of the first things you had done was to put 
up the Bank Rate and thereby raise Council House 
rents? 
Plowden concluded that, 
Nobody wanted to be blamed for resurrecting the 
misery and waste of the pre-war years, especially a 
Conservative Party which had only just rid itself of 
an image as the Party of unemployment.(16) 
However, Butler expressed the view that only a small 
increase would have a 'valuable psychological effect' since, 
There had been no movement in the Bank Rate since 
1939 and salutary results would flow from the mere 
knowledge that the Government were prepared to use 
the monetary instrument for countering 
inflation.(17) 
Ministers reluctantly accepted an increase from 2 per cent 
to 2.5 per cent. 
The increase in the Bank Rate achieved one of Butler's aims 
in that it was, at the time hailed as, 'the most significant 
change in monetary policy since the beginning of the 
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war.'(18) The Labour Party certainly saw it as a decisive 
change, and they were quick to exploit its propaganda 
potential. They portrayed the measure as a Tory pay-off to 
their financial backers - the great London central banks 
at the expense of the taxpayer. This view gained momentum 
and reflected a still widespread suspicion of Conservative 
motives. Labour propaganda on Tory 'broken promises' was 
taken seriously by Party managers.(19) 
Conservative supporters throughout the country were 
extremely worried about Socialist propaganda and the 
Government's failure to effectively explain its actions. 
Their morale was very low. Patrick Buchan-Hepburn, the 
Conservative Chief Whip, warned Butler that, 
our people desperately want a statement on what 
was found in the cupboard when we got in, that the 
general public do not realise how critical the 
situation is, and that the "bouquets" ••. which the 
Opposition has been receiving seem inconsistent, 
that the unpleasant steps which are being taken must 
be just to help the Tories, the City, etc .. (20) 
Conservative MPs were particularly worried about cuts in 
food, while wines, petrol and tobacco were not affected. 
Those from industrial constituencies were increasingly 
inclined to talk about the 'impossibility' of tolerating 
more unemployment. However, they were divided about how to 
respond to the situation.(21) 
By the end of January 1952 it had become clear that the 
first emergency measures had not been able to contain the 
position sufficiently. The drain on the reserves continued 
even more intensely. Some Conservative backbenchers were 
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restless in the face of the Government's caution. Ralph 
Assheton, Chairman of the Conservative Finance Committee, 
and others including Richard Law, Lord Hinchingbrooke and 
Tory supporters in the country, wanted Butler to institute a 
more distinctive, Conservative 'laissez-faire' economy, with 
cuts in Government spending and taxation. The Economist 
believed that the 1952 Budget was Butler's, 
opportunity 
something worthy 
economic policy 
projection of 
Gaitskell.(22) 
to 
of 
and 
Sir 
demonstrate 
the name 
that he 
Stafford 
that there is 
of Conservative 
is not simply a 
Cripps and Mr 
It was in these circumstances that the ROBOT plan was, 
somewhat hurriedly thrust at Ministers by the Treasury.'(23) 
The congruity of policy with the Labour Party would not have 
seemed so marked had the ROBOT plan, to float the pound and 
make it convertible with the dollar, been adopted in the 
spring of 1952. The proposal originated from George Bolton, 
a director of the Bank of England, Leslie Rowan and Richard 
'Otto' Clarke, of the Overseas Finance division of the 
Treasury, and had been canvassed as early as 1950. The plan 
was named ROBOT after its architects, and was meant to 
indicate its role as an automatic regulator of the economy's 
performance, and a move away from Labour's system of direct 
controls.(24) 
In the situation of an unceasing outflow from the reserves 
Butler saw the plan as a way of escape from the nightmare of 
always having to live with the possibility that the reserves 
might run out. If Britain was going to have to float or 
devalue in any case he wanted to make a virtue out of 
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necessity and gain convertibility into the bargain. As 
Butler recalled in a later interview: 
I backed it because I thought, in my innocence, that 
if the pound went down then the politicians would 
get together and take the necessary measures to 
restore and re-establish the economy •.•. We thought 
it would be a way of ensuring that anti-inflation 
measures were not taken, and also we thought we 
could avoid devaluation.(25) 
Yet innocence was not the only factor which made Butler 
susceptible to the proposal. The idea of floating the pound 
and convertibility had a history of support in the Party, 
and it had come into office in 1951 in favour such a move. 
The ROBOT plan could be presented as confirmation of the 
Conservative pledge to 'set the people free' .(26) 
The Budget date was brought forward from April to 4th March, 
1952, so that the plan could be introduced with the minimum 
of warning. However, the opposition of Cherwell and a number 
of Treasury officials, and the delaying tactics of Woolton 
and Eden resulted in the postponement of the Budget by one 
week to 11th March, despite Churchill's support for the 
plan.(27) 
The issue finally came to a head in Cabinet meetings on 28th 
and 29th February. Butler made it clear that ROBOT was the 
only cure for Britain's long-term economic problems. He 
argued that even if existing measures resolved the immediate 
crisis the situation would still be very precarious, and the 
reserves were so inadequate that they would collapse at the 
first adverse turn of events. The Government needed to take 
action before the situation deteriorated beyond its control. 
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He rejected all the alternative measures, including 
devaluation to a fixed rate, further rises in interest 
rates, cuts in imports and public spending, as unpalatable 
and unlikely to halt the crisis. However, Butler could not 
give any indication of how far the exchange rate would have 
to fall before a level was reached at which Britain could 
pay its way. This would mean that, 
the basic idea of internal stability of prices 
and employment, which had dominated economic policy 
for so long will not be maintainable. It will not be 
possible to maintain stable internal prices and 
wages; it will not be possible to avoid 
unemployment. There will be a continuous process of 
change and readjustment and much of this will 
be painful! ..•• This plan will fail unless increased 
import prices are immediately passed on to the 
consumer. It will equally fail if we regard it as an 
excuse not to take action to right our internal 
position by reducing the load which our existing 
policies place upon our balance of payments.(28) 
By emphasising the adverse domestic consequences Butler 
hoped to shock Ministers into a rapid acceptance of the 
plan. He played greatly on the idea that any efficacious 
medicine had to taste nasty. This method of presentation was 
a clever gamble and nearly paid off. Robert Hall, one of the 
chief critics of the plan, wrote that to his horror Butler, 
fully appreciated all that this meant, that it would 
end the Conservative Party, but that it had to be done.'(29) 
However, the prolonged discussions ensured that Butler's 
presentation of the argument probably guaranteed Ministers' 
rejection of the plan, due to their preoccupation with the 
fragile electoral position. Lord Cherwell regarded the plan 
as a 'reckless leap in the dark.' He stressed the dire 
consequences at home, including an increased trade deficit, 
a devalued pound, rising wages and prices, industrial 
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closures and unemployment. In a memorandum to Churchill on 
'setting the pound free' he doubted, 
whether the electorate or Members of Parliament 
for industrial constituencies (even Conservatives) 
would swallow such a programme, however strongly 
recommended by the Bank... [which] would put the 
Conservative Party out for a generation.(30) 
At a four hour Cabinet on 29th February Butler's proposal 
was supported by Lyttelton, Harry Crookshank, and Woolton, 
who feared that the Government would fall if it was forced 
to devalue. However, most Ministers eventually decided that 
the risks were too great. Eden came down firmly against the 
plan, as did Churchill who had become increasingly sceptical 
due to the opposition of his two special appointees, 
Cherwell and Salter. He concluded that as the Cabinet was 
not united it would be better not to proceed with the 
plan.(31) 
Once Butler saw the nature of the opposition he let the 
matter go. The issue exhibited all of Butler's essential 
characteristics - his natural creativity and boldness of 
mind combined with an attachment to the art of the possible. 
He was prepared to fight the Labour Party and the economic 
world, but not opposition from within the Conservative 
Party.(32) It must be remembered that senior Ministers had 
reservations about Butler's appointment, because of his 
alleged progressive credentials, and therefore he did not 
feel secure enough in his position to press his case. The 
paradox was that these traditional Tories opposed him on an 
issue which would have displayed his right wing credentials, 
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because the preservation of the status quo suited their 
perception of the electoral position. 
Butler was very disappointed at this failure. Robert Hall 
observed that, ' .•• R.A.B. was exceedingly distressed as he 
had regarded the thing as his own child to save the 
country.' In the wake of the rejection of ROBOT he felt 
isolated within the Government, and even within the divided 
Treasury. He believed he was not getting the support he 
deserved, and he remarked to Harold Nicolson, 'Winston is so 
brave in war and so cowardly in peace.'(33) He believed that 
the Prime Minister should have backed him on the ROBOT plan, 
which he continued to defend. Butler's discontent manifested 
itself in a letter (probably not sent) to Churchill in 
August 1952. He maintained that, 
if we did not take the plunge early into the 
freedom of the price mechanism - even in the 
external field - we should go on without the 
benefits of full planning or of the discipline of 
the Rate. As against my original recommendation 
there were ranged very powerful arguments which 
prevailed. These I had no reason to resent .•• [but] 
I still regret the original decision since I think 
that our policy lies between two stools and that we 
as a team, and I latterly, have lost elan. 
Butler's perception of his failure was reinforced by press 
speculation, notably an article by A. J. Cummings in the 
News Chronicle, suggesting that Butler had lost all battles 
in the Cabinet to Cherwell, and that he had not been allowed 
to produce the budget he wanted, resulting in its 
postponement for a week. Cummings was in fact ignorant of 
the ROBOT controversy; it was kept very secret. Churchill 
was furious at the implication that he had not loyally 
supported his Chancellor - perhaps it was too near to the 
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truth. He told Sir Edward Bridges that, no Chancellor 
had ever had such support as ••. [Butler] had had.'(34) The 
reality of the situation was that Churchill refused to 
countenance controversial measures that might antagonise the 
public. 
The rejection of the ROBOT plan has come to be regarded as 
evidence of the Conservatives' commitment to full employment 
by means of Keynesian demand management. A Party devoted to 
decontrol and encouraging private markets decided firmly in 
favour of control and management, because it did not want to 
become the Party of dear food and mass unemployment. Paul 
Addison has reflected that, 
This, perhaps, was the point at which his 
[Churchill's] enthusiasm for market forces (which 
ROBOT allegedly represented) was overridden by his 
desire to maintain the politics of the Centre.(35) 
Churchill confided to his Private Secretary, John Colville, 
that the programme of the Conservative Party had to be 
'Houses, and meat and not getting scuppered,' a view with 
which most of his Cabinet colleagues agreed. Therefore, it 
is right to conclude, as John Ramsden does, that if 
Butskellism existed at all, it was imposed upon Butler by 
the Cabinet, and reinforced by an upturn in the country's 
economic fortunes.(36) 
The extent of Butler's defeat should not be exaggerated. By 
advocating such a radical solution to the economic crisis, 
he got his Cabinet colleagues to agree to a far more drastic 
package of 'orthodox' deflationary measures to deal with the 
immediate crisis than might otherwise have been the case. In 
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his Budget on 11th March Butler imposed further import 
restrictions, raised the bank rate, increased a number of 
indirect taxes, and cut food subsidies by 160 million 
pounds. At the same time he sought to soften the blow with 
alterations in earned income tax relief, which benefited 16 
million people, and 2 million people were relieved of 
paying income tax altogether.(37) Robert Hall concluded 
that, 
The 
he [Butler] is very much of a politician .•• a 
man who thinks of things primarily in terms of 
votes, seats, divisions in the House, and who is not 
at all worried by minor inconsistencies in policy if 
they conflict with political desiderata. I don't 
mean that he has no principles, but that he thinks 
first in these terms and not as Dons do, first in 
terms of logical consistency.(38) 
Budget received a rapturous reception from Tory 
backbenchers, and its reception in the domestic press and 
overseas market was good. The Economist rejoiced in the ' 
bold prospectus of a revolution in economic policy.' Public 
opinion seemed equally impressed, with a Gallup poll 
recording 62 per cent of its sample (41 per cent of Labour 
supporters) as thinking that the Budget was fair and 
satisfactory. However, the attempt to reconcile traditional 
Tory supporters on fixed and middle incomes was less 
successful. Generally, the Budget was regarded as less 
severe for the ordinary worker than anticipated, but 
somewhat more severe from the point of view of businessmen. 
Industrialists complained about the end of cheap money and 
the vindictiveness of the new Excess Profits Levy. Party 
reports on public opinion reflected disappointment that the 
Government had not pursued a thoroughly Tory policy. 
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Conservative supporters were beginning to wonder if the 
Government had clear cut aims or was merely following a 
vacillating policy of expediency. There was a widespread 
feeling that the Cabinet was out of touch with the Party and 
public opinion generally.(39) 
As a result of these perceptions the electoral implications 
of the Budget were not promising. The local elections in 
April and May showed a big swing to Labour, and would have 
meant a Socialist majority approaching 1945 figures if 
applied nationally. Lord Woolton, the Party Chairman, 
advised Churchill that, it may be due to a lot of our 
members refraining from voting because they are not pleased 
with us at the moment.' The Economist warned that, 
A government trying to prove that Tories are no 
longer Tories is defeating itself. If the British 
electorate decides again that it prefers Labour 
policies, it will vote Labour however much stealing 
of clothes has been done. The only type of success 
open to the Government is to show that there is a 
modern Tory policy which can in time get the country 
out of the frustrations of the past six years.(40) 
The Economist need not have been too concerned. Butler had 
not abandoned his ultimate aim of convertibility as a long 
term solution to the problems of sterling. When the ROBOT 
plan was defeated again in June 1952, Butler reverted to an 
evolutionary strategy in the 'collective approach' to 
convertibility, despite the continuing opposition of 
Cherwell. This was a less drastic plan providing for 
convertibility at a floating rate, to be achieved by 
international agreement. Gradual moves were made towards 
this end over the next few years. Macmillan noted that, 
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It was certainly a notable triumph for Butler. The 
'collective approach' avoided the main pitfalls and 
seemed at least to make some forward steps on the 
uphill, winding road.(41) 
The major drawback was that much damage was done to the 
economy in the meantime, as the long term problem remained 
unsolved. Economic recovery gained ROBOT's opponents a 
period of delay, during which Britain had most of the 
drawbacks of sterling convertibility without any of the 
prestige which Ministers were so anxious to preserve. Butler 
recognised that the decision not to free the pound was a 
fundamental mistake: 
The absence of a floating exchange rate robbed 
successive Chancellors of an external regulator for 
the balance of payments corresponding to the 
internal regulator provided principally by Bank 
rate. If such a regulator had existed, and a 
floating rate been accepted, Conservatives would 
have been saved some of the uncertainties and 
indignities of 'stop-go' economics and Socialists 
the traumatic experience of a second formal 
devaluation.(42) 
Events, rather than a new policy initiative, came to the 
Government's aid. There was a favourable shift in the 
international terms of trade, with a fall in commodity 
prices due to the ending of the Korean War. The balance of 
payments stabilised as the import bill dropped, and the 
drain on gold and dollar reserves eased. The Government 
claimed the credit and the electorate made the Conservative 
Party the beneficiary of the economic improvement. The 
result of the High Wycombe by-election in the autumn of 1952 
was a harbinger of better things to come for the Tories. 
They not only held on to the seat, but increased their slim 
1750 majority by 350 votes.(43) 
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Butler's personal standing also rose as the economy began to 
prosper. In September 1952 Butler took charge of the 
Government for the first time. This was a significant sign 
of his political progress and Churchill's growing confidence 
in him. Butler was the star of the Conservative Party 
Conference in Scarborough according to 
which detected a shift in his placid, 
to a formidable and tough politician. 
newspaper reports, 
academic personality 
The Economist noted 
that, 'Not everyone wants to go where Mr Butler is leading, 
but all are delighted that he can lead so strongly.' Butler 
was seen as the coming man of Tory politics, and was named 
politician of the year by Maurice Webb in Reynolds News, and 
by Frederick Ellis in the Daily Express.(44) 
As a result Butler felt more confident in his position as 
Chancellor, and this was illustrated by the departure of 
Salter, Churchill's special appointee, 
The appointment of Reginald Maudling, 
from the Treasury. 
who had been one of 
Butler's acolytes at the Research Department after 1945, as 
Economic Secretary was according to Robert Hall, 
entirely 
himself 
to.'(45) 
Butler's 
at the behest of the Chancellor who is now feeling 
much stronger in relation to the PM than he used 
This increased security of tenure encouraged 
radical inclinations, and his determination to 
effect decisive changes in domestic policy. He had learned 
from the ROBOT experience, that such changes would have to 
be carefully planned in advance, necessitated the support of 
his colleagues, and must not have an adverse impact on the 
Conservatives' electoral position. This was a tall order. He 
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had to overcome a situation in which, 
the rapid economic recovery from the 1951-2 
crisis bred a dangerous complacency, discouraging 
any critical review of the nation's position in the 
world, and encouraging the belief that the economic 
base of the country was fundamentally sound.(46) 
The foremost victim of this complacency was to be Butler 
himself, despite his persistent warnings to the Cabinet, as 
events in 1955 were to show. 
The battle to develop a distinctive Tory social policy 
While the economic position had improved, Butler still had 
to resolve the long term contradiction in Conservative 
economic policy between cutting taxes and maintaining the 
welfare state at the same time. At this stage he could not 
rely on economic expansion to achieve this aim. Butler was 
in a dilemma - he perceived the economic need to change 
social policy in order to curb rapidly rising expenditure, 
but he was hampered by the force of public opinion which 
desired freedom from food rationing and other controls, but 
was still firmly behind the ideals of the welfare state. 
Therefore, Butler made persistent demands for cuts in 
private whilst publicly defending the level of Government 
spending. This strategy weakened his hand in his dealings 
with spending ministers. Greater economic expansion than 
expected reinforced the Cabinet's desire to avoid 
controversial measures that might cost votes.(47) Against 
such a background Butler's efforts to develop a distinctive 
social policy were all the more impressive. 
In 1952 Government civil expenditure was 50 million pounds 
less than the previous year. This was a definite achievement 
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when taking into account rising prices. Spending on the 
National Health Service (NHS) was down by 5 million pounds, 
education expenditure had been reduced by nearly 8 million 
pounds, food subsidies had been cut by 160 million pounds, 
and other social service savings amounted to 14 million 
pounds. In response to the pressure for more cuts from 
traditional Tory supporters, Butler declared that he, 
•.• did not believe that we shall achieve success in 
living within our means by panic slashing of this or 
that service.(48) 
However, there was more to be done. The Government was 
still spending more in social service benefits than Labour 
had done. Whereas the Conservative Government's social 
service benefits totalled 135 million pounds a year, those 
of the Socialists only came to some 53 million pounds.(49) 
Privately Butler was concerned that, nearly all of the 
changes of which I am aware show a worsening of the 
position.' He expected an increase of 175 million pounds in 
civil expenditure, and an increase in defence spending of 
between 50 and 200 million pounds for 1953, with only a net 
increase in tax revenue of 40 million pounds. The remainder 
would have to be covered either by reduced expenditure or 
increased taxation, contrary to Tory election pledges.(50) 
Butler advised Ministers that, 
It will not be sufficient to look merely at the 
smaller and less controversial items. Necessary as 
reductions here are, they do not contribute in total 
a sum relevant to the need. We must reconsider the 
bigger matters even though major questions of policy 
will be involved. 
His guiding principle, as told to Minister of Education 
Florence Horsbrugh, was that a greater proportion of the 
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cost of social services should be made by direct payments 
for the services rendered.(51) 
Butler advocated cuts in defence, schools expenditure, 
lightening the housing burden on the Exchequer, and the 
establishment of an enquiry into the cost of the NHS as a 
whole. He informed Churchill that the scope for further cuts 
in food subsidies would soon be exhausted. Therefore, he 
regarded the need for substantial savings in other areas as, 
••• fundamental to our policy as a Party. We believe 
that the country can never be put on its feet again 
by rigorous controls and bureaucratic direction from 
the centre.(52) 
Butler felt with some justification that the housing 
programme put too great a strain on the economy, and 
sacrificed other priorities more fundamental to the 
reconstruction of the economy, such as road construction. 
However, Churchill almost invariably backed Harold 
Macmillan's plans for more finance in order to achieve the 
Conservative housing pledge to build 300,000 houses per 
year. Reginald Bevins, Macmillan's Parliamentary Private 
Secretary, recalled that Macmillan had three nocturnal talks 
with Butler, which set a precedent for their future 
relationship: 
He 
and 
has 
more 
came down at 2 o'clock into the smoking room and 
said 'It's all over Reg, I've got my own way, 
I simply report to the Prime Minister that Rab 
agreed with me.' Rab was tired; Macmillan had 
stamina!(53) 
If Butler had little immediate success in restricting 
Government spending on housing, he did initiate a long-term 
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shift in the purpose of its policy. The decisive factor in 
Butler's success was political, even ideological. Housing 
was the clearest area of social policy in which the 
Conservatives developed a distinctive policy. Tory leaders 
were convinced that home ownership eroded support for the 
Labour Party, and led to wider electoral support for the 
Conservatives, by giving people a stake in society and 
creating a 'property owning democracy'. 
Government concentrated on encouraging the 
unsubsidised houses by private builders, 
subsidised houses by local authorities.(54) 
Therefore, the 
production of 
rather than 
The Government also sought to resurrect the private rented 
property sector, and encourage the maintenace of private 
rented property, which was hampered by the continued 
existence of a large pool of council houses at frozen rents. 
The aim was to achieve a reduction in the level of housing 
subsidies, and to produce conditions in which rents 
approximated far more nearly to an economic level.(55) 
Comparatively little effort was put into slum clearance to 
benefit the poorest in society. The Conservative housing 
programme in the early 1950s was aimed at the upper echelons 
of the working class and the middle classes - Conservative 
voters or potential supporters. In the year from November 
1952 to October 1953, the Government fulfilled its pledge to 
build 300,000 houses per year. Hugh Dalton, Macmillan's 
Labour predecessor, described the achievement as the 
beginning of the age of affluence.(56) It helped to secure 
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two further election victories. It also made Macmillan's 
reputation, and should have made Butler distinctly wary of 
him as a rival in any future leadership contest. 
In education, the architect of the 1944 Act showed no 
mercy. Butler considered radical proposals, which were 
contrary to the provisions of his own legislation, including 
the raising of the age of entry into education, lowering the 
age of leaving, 
teachers, and 
proposals were 
and a consequent reduction in the number of 
the introduction of school fees.(57) These 
highly contentious, and the Government 
retreated from the electoral implications. G. N. Fleming, a 
civil servant at the Ministry of Education, pointed out that 
standards for the next ten years were going to be so bad 
that the demand was far more likely for the improvement of 
educational standards. Education spending during these years 
contained nothing for improving services; the service was 
only just 'getting by' according to Horsbrugh. The school 
building programme was, in the view of civil servant T. 
Weaver, restricted to the bare minimum necessary to maintain 
the education system, ' ••• at the scarcely tolerable level 
of 1950.' (58) 
Butler achieved cuts in the cost of school meals and school 
building despite the 'bulge' in the birth rate and the 
creation of huge housing estates. This meant that 
overcrowding in large classes became more common after 1951 
and old slum schools remained in use. Nothing was done to 
reduce the disparity between secondary modern and grammar 
schools. The Government committed itself to the defence of 
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selection at eleven, and opposed any moves 
comprehensive schools on a widespread basis.(59) 
towards 
Butler had less success in cutting or saving expenditure in 
the NHS. In 1952 charges had been introduced in accordance 
with the Tory belief that priority should be given to those 
in real need. They reduced the Treasury's liability by 20 
million pounds a year, but ' financially, it was like 
trying to hold water in a sieve.' Butler proposed the 
establishment of 
health service 
a committee to look into the cost of the 
as a whole, in the hope that it would 
recommend substantial savings. 
of the Guillebaud Committee 
However, the very existence 
was to act as a brake on 
Treasury pressure for savings in the NHS. Iain Macleod, the 
Minister of Health, successfully argued that it would be 
improper to embark on policy changes while the Committee was 
still sitting. As it sat from May 1953 until January 1956, 
when its report was published, it effectively became a suit 
of armour against any suggestion of radical reform of or 
cuts in the health budget.(60) 
Butler 
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achieved sufficient savings to enable him to steer a 
course, in the short-term, between tax cuts and 
spending. The favourable economic weather gained Butler ' 
an invaluable breathing space.' He was able to take 
advantage of the slack that had developed in the economy as 
a result of the earlier contraction. He put off taking 
drastic measures in the hope that events might make them 
unnecessary. Such political considerations were taken as 
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evidence of weakness by Robert Hall who observed that, 
The weeks before the Budget were made almost 
unpleasant by the apparent hesitations and wavering 
of the Chancellor ••• it is a most unpleasant trait 
and shows a strong streak of moral cowardice.(61) 
Butler prevented any increase in civil expenditure for 1953-
4 from the previous year's level, but he believed that more 
drastic reductions would have to be attempted for 1954-5, 
involving defence, housing, and the social services. The 
Economist warned that, 
The Conservatives are deluding themselves - and will 
pay heavily for the delusion - if they think that 
they have saved the country by a policy that has 
done its work and can now be relaxed •••• The tasks 
of establishing solvency on surer foundations and of 
moving from convalescence to true economic health 
still remain.(62) 
However, the 1953 Budget, announced on 16th April, was 
designed to encourage expansion. It was the first since 
World War two to contain no proposals for new taxes or 
increases in existing ones. Instead he took sixpence off all 
rates of income tax, and reduced by one quarter every level 
of purchase tax, to stimulate consumption, although food 
subsidies were further cut. They represented a total 
increase in consumers' expenditure of 150 million pounds, 
and largely benefited the salaried and fixed income groups, 
who felt dispossessed by the trade unions' collective 
bargaining success. Butler told the House of Commons that, 
The path of restriction has been so firmly fixed in 
peoples' minds that it tends to be regarded as the 
inevitable line of conduct. But we can look to a 
more hopeful way. We can tighten our load and 
liberate our energies.(63) 
The Budget was a great success. The newspapers were almost 
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all enthusiastic, although some pointed out that there were 
elements of risk. Macmillan called it a Capitalist 
Budget. But then we believe in Capitalism as the best 
instrument for the prosperity of the people.' Voters seemed 
to agree. In the Sunderland South by-election of May 1953 
the Conservatives, in spite of a Liberal intervention, 
converted a Labour majority of 306 into a Tory majority of 
1 ,175. The result represented a vote of confidence in the 
Conservative Government and an endorsement of Butler's 
policy. Conservative supporters were in the main content to 
count their blessings.(64) 
This confidence was not shared by Butler who decided not to 
publish a policy document, 'Onward in Freedom', for the 1953 
Party Conference. It was a progress report on Conservative 
achievements since 1951, which applauded the apparent 
achievement of the impossible - tax reductions and the 
maintenance of the welfare state. Peter Thorneycroft, the 
President of the Board of Trade, wrote to Butler that it 
was, 
far too complacent and self-satisfied about the 
existing situation. You and I know the dangers too 
well to be complacent, and we realise how quickly 
and how savagely the tide could turn against us. 
Some of the statements in this document would look 
very strange if that did happen. Moreover, the basic 
assumption of this document is that our policy 
should go on unchanged. We are not quite sure that 
this could or should be the case.(65) 
Butler maintained his strategy of defending expenditure 
levels in public, in the hope that economic growth would 
continue, while at the same time demanding drastic cuts in 
Cabinet in case it ceased. At the 1953 Conservative Party 
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Conference he responded to calls for further cuts in 
national expenditure, by restating his aim to reduce 
taxation. However, he served notice on the Party that the 
main hope of achieving this lay not so much in cutting 
expenditure as in broadening the basis of national wealth. 
In contrast he had reported to the Cabinet in July 1953 
that, 
The Budget prospects for next year are menacing. The 
general background against which I have to work is 
one of continuing anxiety about the fundamental 
soundness of our position.(66) 
He was very worried about the Budget for 1954 and even more 
so for 1955, because revenue would be falling and expenses 
rising, unless a stand was taken against increasing 
expenditure, especially on defence. Butler warned Ministers 
that this meant thinking in terms of major changes in policy 
as well as of 'constant pruning'. There was a general 
feeling that in economic terms things were unlikely to go as 
well for the Government in 1954 as in 1953.(67) 
Butler tried to shake his colleagues out of their 
complacency, and he warned them that they had not, 
fully grasped the seriousness of the situation 
In such a situation the acceptance of new or 
deliberately increased commitments is unthinkable 
unless corresponding savings are made. Nonchalance 
about expenditure will not do: my colleagues must 
face the reality that unless we economise in all 
fields we shall fail to achieve the objectives which 
we as a Government have set for ourselves, namely, 
to reduce burdens on industry and the taxpayer.(68) 
A Cabinet Committee was established under Butler, to look 
into proposals to reduce Government expenditure, but it 
produced inadequate and belated results in his opinion. 
After three years in Government Ministers were experienced 
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defenders of their budgets. Butler was forced to accept the 
view that, 
Unless we are to slash the social services - and I 
do not think any of my colleagues want to - the 
reduction in the burden of Government expenditure 
can only come about slowly. 
The Government could only hope that provided that the actual 
cost of expenditure was not allowed to rise and, 
provided we can keep the economy on an even keel 
and promote a steady increase in productivity, the 
real burden of Government expenditure will be 
reduced as productivity and the national income 
increases. This is a long, slow grind. We have made 
a start but we have got to go on with it for years 
and years. This is not a pleasant prospect, but it 
is the only course open to us.(69) 
In these circumstances there was little scope for great 
relief in taxation levels in the Budget on 6th April, 1954. 
There were no new taxes or tax reductions, but Butler did 
introduce a new 'investment allowance' to encourage further 
industrial expansion. Butler described it as a' ••• carry-on 
Budget; a Budget conceived as reaffirming our basic policies 
rather than as making any major change of emphasis or 
direction.'(70) 
In the aftermath of the failure of the Budgetary review for 
1953-4 to produce substantial savings, he made a fresh 
attack on the problem in order to get some satisfactory 
results in time for the next election. Forecasts showed a 
potential deficit of over 330 million pounds for 1955-6, due 
to increased expenditure and reduced revenue. Butler 
concluded that, 
we must at all cost avoid the need to impose 
fresh taxation, and particularly direct taxation in 
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order to fill this gap; indeed our aim should be to 
secure some much needed reduction of taxation.(71) 
This view was supported in the Cabinet by Thorneycroft and 
Woolton, and the backbench Conservative Finace, Trade and 
Industry Committee stressed the public's interest in the 
matter • ( 72 ) 
As a result two committees on civil and defence expenditure 
were established under the chairmanship of Lord Swinton in 
March 1954 to make recommendations for savings. In July 
Butler welcomed their proposals as representing traditional 
Conservative ideals. He told the Cabinet that, 
It was 
continue 
Exchequer 
bread and 
wages. 
not, in his view, 
to contribute £85 
as subsidies to 
milk at a time of 
good social policy to 
million a year from the 
keep down the price of 
full employment and high 
Here was an opportunity to move away from State control and 
'set the people free'. However, Churchill poured cold water 
on the proposals as, 
a buoyant mood had been created in the country 
by the Government's success in restoring the 
solvency of the national finances and raising 
production and employment to their present high 
level. There was in consequence no popular sense of 
imminent crisis or even of the need for economy.(73) 
Satisfaction with the existing situation became the excuse 
for inaction, and the Cabinet deferred any decision on the 
measures. They did not want to unduly arouse political 
controversy. Having thwarted Butler's warnings, the Cabinet 
seemed prepared to accept, as the price for electoral 
success, the verdict of Sir Norman Brook, the Cabinet 
Secretary, that, 
• • • a 
least 
which 
Conservative Government 
is powerless to alter, 
the Socialists set 
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must perpetuate, or at 
the pattern of society 
out deliberately to 
create.(74) 
Industrial relations: the perils of free wage bargaining 
Butler's doubts about the economy also focused on the 
problem of excessive wage settlements. In his 1954 Budget he 
warned against increasing costs as, 
We are near the point - and in some cases we may 
have passed it - where further increases in wages 
and profit margins will price us out of our export 
markets.(75) 
The commitment to full employment remained an important 
constraint - figures approaching 400,000 were a cause for 
alarm, as was an inflation rate above 5 per cent. Butler 
doubted that the aim of full employment and low inflation 
could be combined for long, but in the final analysis full 
employment was the top priority for electoral reasons. 
In opposition Butler had taken the lead in drawing up the 
Industrial Charter and the Workers' Charter, and many 
Conservatives wanted the incoming Government to act against 
restrictive practices, unofficial strikes, the closed shop, 
and to encourage joint consultation and eo-ownership. 
However, the Conservatives came into office with no detailed 
plans on how to enact these measures, since the Charters had 
been deliberately vague, and Butler did not seek to 
translate them into a legislative programme. Brendan Bracken 
complained to Lord Beaverbrook that Butler, 
has a stronger digestion than the toughest of 
ostriches. He has evacuated his charters with no 
sign of a blockage.(76) 
Butler's attachment to the art of the possible led him to 
prefer the flexibility of slow, incremental changes, which 
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would be 
than by 
formalised in procedures and conventions rather 
legislation. In view of their small majority the 
Conservatives were anxious to prove that they could get on 
with the trades unions, and that they were not in the 
pockets of big business.(77) 
Butler was keen on instituting a policy which would have 
moderated the level of wage settlements, but only with the 
full agreement of the unions. In May 1952 he suggested to 
the National Joint Advisory Council (NJAC) that a tripartite 
body be established, consisting of employers, trade unions, 
and the Government, to link wage increase with productivity. 
The Trades Union Congress (TUC), stregthened by the presence 
of full employment and labour shortages, responded with a 
blunt negative. Prices had risen by 13 per cent since 
October 1951 so the pressure for wage increases was on. 
Butler returned to the theme in July 1953 when he warned the 
NJAC about the adverse impact of wage increases on British 
exports. His warning fell on deaf ears, and he did not push 
the matter because the existing policy remained viable while 
the economy was expanding. Wages and salaries, it was 
calculated, rose by about three times as rapidly as output 
in 1953-4.(78) 
This was largely due to Butler's acquiescence in the policy 
of conciliation with the unions pursued by Sir Walter 
Monckton, the Minister of Labour. Wherever possible Monckton 
referred disputes to a court of inquiry, which became a 
euphemism for concession to avoid strike action, and all too 
often he settled direct. In 1953 Monckton made a settlement 
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with the railwaymen, behind Butler's back, which forced the 
Transport Commission to contravene their statutory 
requirement to break even. Butler recalled that, 
we really had no wages policy. Wages were often 
settled by Churchill and Monckton together. I 
remember one morning when I came to my office, 
Churchill sent for me and said "Never mind, old 
cock, we settled the rail strike last night without 
deciding to keep you up -on their terms".(79) 
The Economist called it the Government's 'Munich'. However, 
in general settlements ' ••• would be welcomed with relief as 
"another damaging strike averted" and be criticised as soon 
as the euphoria wore off.' This policy was described as one 
of industrial appeasement, but Harold Watkinson, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Labour from 1952 
to 1955, declared that, ' ••• it did not seem so to me or to 
anyone else at the time.'(BO) 
In retrospect Butler felt that, weaknesses were often 
shown and too many concessions were made on wage increases.' 
However, the short term electoral and economic advantages of 
such a policy outweighed the disadvantages in the final 
analysis. He was concerned about the effects of wage 
inflation, but he was unwilling to impose an alternative to 
the system of free collective bargaining, a view which was 
dominant throughout the 1950s. He admitted that, 
the reward was that we had very good industrial 
relations; the difficulty was that the inflation 
came in 1955, which I really couldn't avoid.(81) 
Grass-roots discontent 
If the Government was prepared to accept the results of its 
policies on public spending and wage settlements, 
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its supporters were not. The One Nation group of Tory MPs, 
Butler's natural allies within the Party, argued for urgent 
changes in economic policy in a pamphlet, Change Is Our 
Ally, in May 1954. Tory grandee Brendan Bracken complained 
that, 
The middle classes ••• are bitterly disillusioned. 
They are the victims of an ever increasing cost of 
living but they have none of the power of the T.U.C. 
or F.B.I. to compensate themselves for the ravages 
of inflation.(82) 
Taxes were much higher than they had been in the 1930s: 
9/6d. compared to 4/6d. Industrialists warned that the 
burden of taxation made their effort no longer worthwhile. 
One disgruntled supporter, Mr G. Sills, complained: 'Is it 
not time the Conservative Party stopped squeezing the 
salaried black-coated worker.' Such statements were typical 
of the views of a great number of mild supporters. 
Conservative Party leaders realised that they did not have a 
strong case. The Government was conscious that taxation 
remained too high and replied to another complainant that it 
was, 
The 
almost inevitable if we are 
present levels of defence and 
expenditure. Security is so often 
incentive.(83) 
to maintain the 
social security 
the antithesis of 
Government was extremely fortunate that Butler's 
forecast of economic expansion was achieved, as it served to 
stifle discontent amongst the Tory Party's supporters. 
Economic prosperity meant that there was enough money, both 
to maintain and increase Government expenditure and reduce 
taxes. Statistics revealed that as a percentage of 
Government spending the cost of the social services had 
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risen from 39.2 per cent in 1951 to 43.0 per cent in 1955, 
yet as a proportion of Gross Domestic Product Government 
expenditure fell from 39.4 per cent in 1951 to 35 per cent 
in 1955, thereby pleasing both sections of the electorate 
whose votes the Conservative Party needed.(84) The 
Government had confounded Labour's dire predictions, and its 
faith in market forces appeared justified. 
Flushed with the apparent success of his policy, Butler 
became strident in its defence. He rightly felt that this 
progress was a cause for congratulation, but he did not wish 
to rest on his laurels. In a speech at Gloucester he 
declared, 
This is the march to freedom on which we are bound. 
And the pace must quicken as we go forward .••• our 
aim is freedom for every man and woman to live their 
own lives in their own way and not have their lives 
lived for them by an overweening State.(85) 
At the 1954 Conservative Party Conference in Blackpool 
Butler told Tory activists that, 
the motto of our policy should be: 'Invest in 
Success' ••• I can see no reason why, in the next 
quarter of a century, if we run our policy properly 
and soundly, we should not double our standard of 
living in this country. 
This was intended as a warning that people should hold back 
from taking all the material benefits of prosperity at once 
for fear of overburdening the economy. Butler's belief that 
the opportunities created by prosperity were not purely 
materialist in form, was a message that he was to repeat 
many times over the coming years with mixed success. 
However, the explicit appeal to the granting of consumerist 
aspirations in the future ensured he received a rapturous 
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reception. ( 86) 
The apparent success of Butler's policy lifted him to a new 
pinnacle of public prestige. It was perhaps suprising, 
therefore, that the Government chose not to capitalise on 
its success by holding a general election. However, 
Woolton advised Churchill that Conservative Central Office 
had considerable doubts about the prospects of our 
success if we had an Election in 1954.'(87) This was largely 
due to the question mark hanging over the Conservative 
Party's leadership, which included speculation about 
Butler's future leadership prospects. 
Climbing the 'greasy pole' 
Butler's successful handling of the economy markedly 
increased his standing in the Conservative Party. Press 
speculation on his leadership prospects was given foundation 
when in June 1953 Butler took charge of the Government, 
because both Churchill and Eden were incapacitated by 
illness. For three months he was Chancellor, acting Prime 
Minister, and acting Foreign Secretary in the House of 
Commons. It was, as Butler later admitted, an onerous task, 
but as Enoch Powell declared, he was a horse for all 
work, and one of immense pulling power.' Lord Moran, 
Churchill's doctor, observed that, 
He has more staying power than Anthony, but at 
present he lacks what people call the 'common 
touch'. They complain, too, that he will back a 
horse both ways. He seems none the worse for the 
grind while the PM and Anthony were away ill. He 
does not get worked up like Anthony. He is aware of 
the danger of racing the engine, but he says he has 
"a normal family life" and does not feel the 
strain.(88) 
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However, he was armed with virtually no authority, as the 
public were not informed of the seriousness of Churchill's 
illness (he had suffered a stroke), and Churchill was 
determined that 'Dear Anthony' should not be denied the 
Premiership. It seemed that Butler willingly conspired in 
concealing the true extent of Churchill's illness. He 
appeared to agree that, 'Anthony must have his chance.'(89) 
This did not prevent a certain amount of 'kite flying' by 
Butler in correspondence with backbench MPs, which revealed 
that he did not lack for support. There was considerable 
pressure from Tory backbenchers for him to exert himself. 
They drew a parallel with the unexpected successions of 
Bonar Law and Stanley Baldwin as leaders of the Tory Party. 
Pleasing though such comments were, Butler remained silent. 
Instead he concentrated his efforts on the smooth running of 
the administrative machine. His unselfish loyalty earned him 
'high favour' with Churchill, who was most impressed with 
his gentlemanly behaviour.(90) 
Yet it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that his loyalty 
was very much taken for granted during the crisis. Had he 
wished he could have made things very awkward. Lord Cherwell 
reflected that if Butler had demanded more formal powers, 
even the office of Prime Minister, the Cabinet could not 
have refused in such a crisis.(91) There were no other 
viable contenders who could have taken over on a permanent 
basis. Here was concrete evidence that Butler lacked the 
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'killer instinct'; he never quite knew when the opportunity 
presented itself how to deliver the knock out blow. Butler 
may have recognised that his time had not yet come, and that 
his past was a problem. John Colville noted that, 
He 
and 
not 
[Butler] says he will serve loyally under 
that anyhow some of the Conservative Party 
want him as PM because of Munich.(92) 
Eden 
might 
However, events had undoubtedly placed Butler in the third 
position in the Government as heir to the heir apparent, 
Anthony Eden. 
At the age of eighty Churchill was no longer up to the task 
of leading the Government and Party. Harold Macmillan sensed 
that the Government was drifting in home affairs, and needed 
a new programme now that economic recovery had been 
achieved. In fact it was Butler, rather than Eden, who came 
nearer to resigning in the summer of 1954 over the thorny 
issue of MPs' salaries. Robert Hall noted, 'R.A.B.'s view 
that the PM has been there far too long and is now 
inhibiting action.'(93) Balanced against this view was the 
question of his own future career prospects. 
It was an indication of Butler's authoirity that he was 
called upon to act as an intermediary between Churchill and 
his designated successor, Eden. He recalled that, 'I was 
continually brought in to witness and to help with this 
distressing and distracting transition.' After the events of 
1953 Butler accepted Eden as Churchill's successor, but his 
acquiescence in Churchill's determination to carry on for as 
long as possible, to preserve Party unity, irritated Eden, 
who noted in his diary ' that Rab would give no help.' In 
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contrast Eden's regard for Butler's chief rival, Harold 
Macmillan must have increased by the way in which he 
eventually took the lead in persuading Churchill to go.(94) 
This raised the question of whether Butler's own interests 
lay in the Prime Minister 'playing it long'. In later years 
he was ready to assert that, 'Winston doubted that Anthony 
was adapted to be Prime Minister .••• You know, in his last 
months, he often made funny advances to me.' Lord Moran 
noted Churchill's increasing reliance upon him, and Woolton 
observed that, 'Butler ••• is the only person to whom he 
[Churchill] talks now in the Cabinet.'(95) Butler may have 
feared losing what authority and influence he had over 
policy under Churchill, since there was no certainty that 
this would continue under Eden. It was possible that, from 
Butler's point of view, the continuance of Churchill in 
office increased his own chances of succeeding him. It gave 
more time for a strong alternative heir to emerge, hopefully 
himself, and for the doubts about Eden's suitability and 
health to be reinforced. Robert Hall recorded a discussion 
with Butler in which he said, 
The crucial problem au fond is to hold the party 
together which he could do if he had some time. I 
asked him if he were really the man to take the 
course he had sketched. He said that he had 
considered the problem in general for years and 
specifically for 6 months and thought he was though 
he could see my point •••• if he has thought of it so 
carefully perhaps he is.(96) 
The Daily Mirror proved to be more accurate when it declared 
that, as the Tories ran their Party on public school lines, 
Butler was not cad enough to challenge Churchill's choice of 
Eden as head prefect. Lord Moran observed that, 
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Rab Butler is sitting on the fence with one leg 
dangling on each side. He likes cricket similies. He 
is trying to keep a straight bat he says. He is not 
trying to make runs.(97) 
From his own point of view Butler was content to play a 
waiting game. 
Conclusion 
Butler had managed to steer the economy towards recovery by 
a mixture of luck, fine judgement and pragmatism. One 
economic commentator declared, 
Things thus far had gone very happily for Mr 
Butler's conduct of affairs. Each year seemed better 
than the one before, as if by some golden law of 
progress •••• Continued immunity could not but breed 
growing confidence in continuing prosperity.(98) 
This success satisfied the diverse nature of Conservative 
support needed to maintain their small majority and retain 
power. A delicate balancing act had been achieved in the 
belief that the Tories needed the support of a proportion of 
working class voters, who demanded the maintenance of full 
employment and the welfare state, and traditonal middle 
class Tory supporters who wanted tax and spending cuts. 
However, it would be wrong to assume that this achievement 
involved the maintenance of the 'post-war settlement' as 
established by the Labour Government of 1945-51. It is 
unfair to describe Butler as a 'Mr Butskell' whose policies 
were not very different from those of his Labour predecessor 
as Chancellor, Gaitskell. The Labour Party certainly did not 
regard him as such. Labour MP Richard Crossman argued that 
Butler was 'the ideologist of inequality', in that he had 
taken Labour's post-war settlement and used it to promote 
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traditional Conservative themes such as individual freedom 
and opportunity.(99) 
As Chancellor, Butler instituted distinctive policies which 
were aided by external forces outside his control. His 
willingness to use the bank rate gave Butler an additional 
instrument with which to manage economic policy. Despite the 
failure of the ROBOT plan, Butler progressively eased 
exchange control and moved towards the early attainment of 
sterling convertibility. Restriction and austerity were 
replaced by expansion and prosperity as the Government swept 
away the machinery of socialist planning in favour of 
Conservative freedom. Productivity increased as thousands of 
industrial controls were removed and building licenses 
ended. Price controls and subsidies were gradually lifted 
from everything but milk, bread and coal. In July 1954 
ration books, the final symbol of wartime austerity, were 
abolished and consumption rose to record levels. In social 
policy Government spending was kept to the minimum that was 
electorally possible. Home ownership was encouraged at the 
expense of subsidised council house building, selective 
education was maintained, and charges for specific health 
services were introduced and increased. 
In public Butler took a reasonably optimistic view of the 
position, but privately he was extremely concerned about the 
long term prospects. The Economist declared that, 
The miracle has happened - full employment without 
inflation, and this despite the heavy burden of 
defence, the rising burden of the social services, 
and some reduction of taxation. But 'the miracle' 
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must not 
forecasts 
necessary 
be followed by disillusionment. The 
for 1955-56 ••• do not show the margin 
for further reliefs.(100) 
It was likely that he felt the time was right to take more 
difficult decisions, beyond the tentative steps he had 
already taken, to ensure a viable long-term economic policy. 
This seemed more likely to happen under a new leader, 
possibly himself. However, when Eden eventually succeeded 
Churchill, his health was fragile and he was ill-equipped 
temperamentally for the Premiership, Butler was exhausted, 
the economy had taken a turn for the worse, and attempts to 
develop new policies were diverted by the Suez crisis. 
As early as 1956 a biographer of Butler wrote, 'In 
retrospect, 1954 appears as the high water mark of Butler's 
public reputation at the Exchequer.' As the year ended there 
were disturbing signs of strain, both in the economy and in 
Butler himself. Macmillan reflected, 
The economic crisis which we had inherited in 1951 
seemed pretty well to have faded out by the end of 
1954. What perhaps we had failed to realise is that 
it was not merely an epidemic attack, but that there 
were endemic weaknesses and dangers which might 
recur.(101) 
There were renewed symptoms of inflation as the rise in 
prices and wages accelerated, imports increased, and a 
balance of payments deficit loomed. Butler's faith in 
monetary policy to bring the economy under control was to be 
rudely disabused. In 1955 he learned to his cost that, 
trying to guide an economy was rather like an 
amateur trying to steer a ship, the time lags are so 
great, the detailed consequences often 
so unpredictable. You turn the wheel in one 
direction and for a long while the vessel does not 
appear to respond at all, then suddenly it does, and 
when it does you realise that you are already too 
late to make the correction of course that has 
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a'l!ready bec.ome necessary .,(,102:) 
:eutler ''s luck ar\dl fine ·Ii:udgement deserted him, aJ.!be]}t in 
.niitigatirig .circumstances. For three years he had ,sustained 
. . 
an a1ill!ost ovetwfle]Jm·il19 our.deh of 'work, combined wlth the 
immense persona'l .strain .of coping with his wife, 'Sydney's 
tei.'!llct.:hal illness: arid .. eVentual death i!n D.eceniber ,1954. These 
factors combined to make 1955 an 'annus horribilis' f.or 
But fer ,;if not for the Cons.er.Va tiV:e ~ar.ty. 
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2 
'United for Peace and Progress'? 
Butler under Eden, 1955-1957 
Introduction 
Butler's speech to the 1954 Conservative Party Conference at 
Blackpool marked the peak of his success as Chancellor of 
the Exchequer. His rallying appeal to 'Invest in Success' 
earned him a rapturous reception from the Conservative rank 
and file. He was given the credit for what, in retrospect, 
appeared to be a brief 'golden age' which saw two years of 
stable prices, balance of payments surpluses, the removal of 
post-war restrictions and the maintenance of full employment 
and the welfare state.(1) It seemed that Conservative 
freedom really did work. Yet within a few months it was 
regarded as a false dawn, and for the first time in many 
years Butler suffered personal and political setbacks which 
were to mark a turning point in his career. 
Butler was privately concerned about the economic outlook, 
which required new and potentially unpopular policies. He 
hoped that the succession of Sir Anthony Eden to the 
Premiership and a subsequent election victory, would create 
an opportunity for moving away from the post-war 
'consensus'. His priority was to remove the Government's 
responsibility for exchange rate management and subject them 
to market forces, as representing a symbol of Conservative 
freedom. However, deteriorating economic circumstances, and 
a poor working relationship with Eden scuppered Butler's 
plans. His removal from the Treasury in favour of Macmillan 
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signalled a shift in the balance of power away from Butler. 
Contrary to the popular opinion that he was marginalised in 
Government circles, Butler maintained his influence and 
authority, 
Leader of 
in private if not in public. 
the House of Commons with 
In his new role as 
responsibility for 
policy formulation, Butler made some progress towards a 
distinctive Conservative domestic policy. He sought to 
ensure that public expenditure was restricted, and to sound 
a warning about the dangers of wage inflation. He pursued 
his policy of incremental change in the hope of retaining 
the new broad based support for the Conservative Party. Yet 
all this good work counted for nothing in terms of his 
leadership ambitions. Butler's responsibilities also 
involved him in international affairs, where he showed that 
his political touch was less sure. In particular, his 
ambivalent and ambiguous attitude in the the Suez Crisis 
revived memories of his defence of appeasement in the 1930s, 
and arguably cost him the Premiership in 1957. 
Butler's final year as Chancellor 
In Butler's personal life, the death of his beloved wife, 
Sydney, in December 1954 after a long and painful battle 
against cancer, was a tragic blow. Lady Cynthia Jebb, a 
close friend, felt that her very abrupt, forthright and 
strong influence was, just what Rab's character 
needed.' There has been widespread speculation as to the 
extent of Sydney's influence on her husband's political 
career, but Butler's colleague at the Treasury, John Boyd-
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Carpenter, believed that with her death, some of his 
fire went out and never burned up again.' Butler later wrote 
in his memoirs that, 
No doubt I should have been wise to take a longish 
time off for reflection, since the domestic shock 
was not at once fully apparent but gained increasing 
force during the year. 
He implicitly admitted that the economic decisions taken by 
him, on behalf of the Government, involved risks but, ' •.• 
considerable benefit accrued at any rate to the party as a 
result of the decisions taken.'(2) They helped to maintain 
the Conservative Party in office, but brought Butler's 
tenure as Chancellor of the Exchequer to a dismal end, with 
his political judgement and reputation severely dented. 
Butler's actions should be seen in the political context of 
Churchill's resignation, Eden's succession, and the decision 
to call an early general election. Churchill eventually 
resigned on 5 April, 1955, and Eden entered into his 
inheritance the next day. After all the tensions and 
anxieties of the previous few months the changeover passed 
off remarkably smoothly. There were high expectations of 
Eden's success as Prime Minister. He was a glamorous figure, 
was trusted and respected in the country, and was 
identified, alongside Butler and Macmillan, as representing 
new progressive Conservatism. The widespread view that he 
was ignorant of and uninterested in domestic affairs has 
been exaggerated with the benefit of hindsight. Butler moved 
up to the number two position in the Government with the 
reasonable expectation of succeeding Eden at some point in 
the future, despite his distrust of Harold Macmillan as a 
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rival candidate. Any doubts he may have had about 
maintaining his influence in the new regime were hidden 
behind his confident assertion to John Boyd-Carpenter, who 
recalled that, 
Rab commented in his discursive 
Prime Minister's limitations. 
[us] ••• that these would not 
least in home affairs he (Rab) 
from behind".(3) 
way about the next 
But he reassured 
matter because at 
would "manage him 
At the end of 1954 there were unmistakable signs of economic 
strain, with 'over-full' employment and a sharp rise in 
imports not matched by a similar rise in exports, resulting 
in a weakening of the balance of payments, and a strain on 
the gold and dollar reserves. The cost of living started 
rising again, and the Government was faced with a worrying 
series of wage claims and major labour disputes. An 
unpublished Treasury forecast emphasised the inflationary 
economic situation.(4) Butler stood by his belief that if 
Britain priced itself out of export markets through high 
costs and wages, 
we should be taking a short cut to national 
bankruptcy because our competitive power would be 
disastrously weakened and the consequent worsening 
of the balance of payments would destroy for the 
time being any chances of a further improvement in 
the standard of living.(5) 
Butler hoped that the fiscal and monetary measures 
implemented in February 1955 would deal with these 
difficulties in the short term. Bank Rate was increased in 
two stages from 3 to 4.5 per cent, and a mild series of hire 
purchase restrictions were introduced. However, the long 
term situation was uncertain. Butler realised that if things 
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went wrong monetary and fiscal means could not bring the 
economy under control quickly enough without a measure of 
overkill. He told the Cabinet that while a credit policy 
could contribute towards a balanced economy, the battle 
against inflationary tendencies had to be fought mainly in 
other areas of economic policy, such as public expenditure 
and industrial relations.(6) 
Therefore, Butler was cautious about the opportunity for 
reductions in taxation, despite the renewed optimism of 
Treasury officials that the February measures had done the 
trick. It was his intention to deliver a cautious Budget, 
although he played down the warnings of impending 
difficulties. In these circumstances Butler's preference was 
for an early election, and he made this clear to Eden. 
Privately Butler felt unsure about how much longer he would 
be able to maintain the delicate electoral balancing act of 
the previous three years. A policy of tax cuts and increased 
spending could not go on forever, and an election would 
hopefully give the Conservatives a more secure majority with 
which to develop new policies. Robert Hall noted that, 
'Until an election has taken place there is bound to be 
uncertainty both about Government policy and about the 
result of the election.'(7) 
The paradox was that the decision in favour of an early 
election increased the pressure for a favourable Budget 
which would exacerbate the problems. Hall wrote that, 
almost 
politically 
question of 
everyone felt that it would be 
impossible to do nothing: it was a 
how to make it look as little like 
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bribery of the electorate as possible and also not 
taking too many risks with the economy.(8) 
Butler attempted to follow this delicate balancing act in 
his Budget which he announced on 19 April. He took 6d. off 
the standard rate of income tax and raised personal 
allowances, thereby relieving 2.4 million people from paying 
income tax, in the, as it turned out, vain hope that this 
would encourage savings instead of consumption.(9) 
Butler believed that he could get away with a tax cutting 
Budget, as the effective use of monetary policy would cancel 
out the effect of Budget concessions in the short-term, and 
new policies would be implemented after the election. 
Significantly he suggested that all might not be well and 
that greater restraint might be needed later on. He was 
careful to ensure that the Conservative Manifesto, United 
For Peace And Progress, carried as few spending commitments 
as possible. He warned that, 
Any country pursuing a policy of economic expansion 
and full employment faces a constant danger of 
inflation. The risk is that home demand may take 
away from the export trade and swell the import 
bill.(10) 
Butler was keen to stress another more human side to 
Conservative policy, such as equality of opportunity and 
freedom of choice. He felt that the press had done less than 
justice to this theme in the Tory programme. Yet it was not 
just the press which was preoccupied with economic 
prosperity. The Manchester Guardian reported that some Tory 
candidates, 
threw all caution to the wind; to read 
speeches one might think that the country had 
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their 
only 
to return a Conservative government to be assured of 
everlasting prosperity.(11) 
It was unfortunate for Butler that he did not make his 
warnings in more forthright terms, so as to attract greater 
attention, but this would have had adverse electoral 
consequences. The Economist recognised Butler's dilemma: 
To have given nothing would have proved Mr Butler 
too much of an economist to survive in politics; to 
have given the lot would have shown him too much of 
a politician to have charge of the national economy 
Politics is the art of the possible, and Mr 
Butler has done about as much as a Chancellor with 
so exiguous a majority could have done. 
The Budget was generally well received - it certainly did no 
harm to the Conservatives' electoral prospects, and the 
Gallup polls predicted a small swing in the Conservatives' 
favour.(12) 
The final result in the general election on 26th May was a 
resounding victory for the Conservative Party, with 49.7 per 
cent of the vote and a majority of 59 over all other 
parties. It was the first time in over ninety years that a 
political party had been re-elected with an increased 
majority. Butler's Budget had contributed in no small way to 
the success. Robert Hall wrote that the Tory victory, 
isn't big enough to make the Tories feel 
overconfident and in fact I should think it confirms 
both RAB and the policy he worked for of going as 
far as he could towards welfare state ideas. His 
personal standing with the PM must have gone up.(13) 
There is no doubt that a sense of well-being pervaded the 
country, for which the Conservatives were given the credit, 
as Tony Benn, the Labour MP, testified in his diary. 
Conservative reports showed that there had been a distinct 
decline in voters' interest in political matters and a 
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corresponding increase in material ones. Most people, 
especially wage earners, were distinctly better off, but 
there was concern that, despite the favourable economic 
conditions, the Tories had not done better. If prosperity 
was rapidly driving the working classes into middle class 
habits of consumption, Party managers feared that it was 
only very slowly driving them into middle class attitudes of 
voting. Many of those in the working classes who turned away 
from Labour abstained rather than vote Conservative, because 
of an underlying suspicion of Tory intentions. Therefore, a 
Research Department report in June 1955 concluded that, 
Too many people still had a prejudice against voting 
Conservative. The three and a half years of 
Conservative Government with its splendid leadership 
and progressive policies was too short politically 
to dispel that feeling.(14) 
On the other side of the Conservative electoral equation 
there was an early warning sign that many of the traditional 
Conservative supporters in the middle classes felt 
aggrieved. Research Department reports showed that half a 
million people who voted Conservative in 1951 did not vote 
in 1955. Martin Redmayne, a Conservative Whip, expressed the 
fear that, 'I am not sure it will be a very comfortable 
majority.' Butler's hopes for a more decisive policy looked 
in doubt as the Government continued to regard itself as a 
prisoner of the diverse nature of its electoral support.(15) 
Butler's fears about the economy were realised within weeks 
of the election. The April tax cuts had given a further 
boost to demand, resulting in soaring imports and a balance 
of payments deficit, which amounted to 456 million pounds 
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for the previous six months. Furthermore, 
appeasement minded industrial policy 
the Government's 
resulted in the 
concession of inflationary wage settlements as the price of 
industrial harmony. In his attempt to pursue new policies, 
Butler lost the confidence of the Prime Minister and was 
removed from the Treasury, his reputation severely damaged. 
Butler ruefully pointed out in his memoirs, 'If I had been 
less scrupulous about the economy I would have retired in 
May.'(16) 
Butler's long term aim was to set the pound free, as part of 
his vision of a free market economy. He had made further 
informal moves towards making the pound convertible with 
other currencies. When his decision to support 'transferable 
sterling' in the market was announced to the House of 
Commons on 24th February 1955 Hugh Gaitskell, 
Chancellor, commented that, ' ••• it meant 
the 
in 
shadow 
effect 
convertibility by the back door.' It was a measure of 
Butler's success that by the time Eden became Prime Minister 
he was suprised at the extent of the progress towards this 
end. Yet his reaction that, having done so it seems 
that the best course is probably to go completely 
convertible,' may have given Butler the expectation of 
Eden's support for the development of new economic and 
social policies.(17) 
However, rumours that the pound would be allowed to float 
and made fully convertible in July 1955, put the pound under 
constant assault as holders of sterling sold heavily in 
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expectation of its devaluation. At the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Conference at Istanbul, in September 
1955, Butler was forced to formally abandon all hope of 
making the pound fully convertible in the immediate future. 
In a minute to the Prime Minister he wrote, 
To adopt convertibility in September at a time of 
weakness, and without having secured any of the 
measures which we have always announced will 
accompany convertibility (e.g.,a standby credit) 
would be unwise and expose us to strong 
criticism.(18) 
The difficulties of moving towards convertibility whilst 
maintaining a fixed rate of exchange of $2.80 and high 
levels of Government spending, convinced Butler of the need 
for delay. However, he did not rule out full convertibility 
at a later date, possibly in the spring of 1956.(19) 
Butler's failure to gain the Cabinet's support for the 
policies to enable this to happen was largely due to the 
unwillingness of the Cabinet, and Eden in particular, to 
support any measures that might antagonise potential sources 
of Conservative electoral support in the working classes. 
Butler could be criticised, with the benefit of hindsight, 
for not dampening down economic growth sooner and more 
decisively. The deflationary measures implemented by Butler 
reflected his continuing reliance on short term monetary 
measures. In July 1955 he found it necessary to restrict 
lending even further, strengthen credit and hire purchase 
restrictions, and slow down investment in the nationalised 
industries. However, Butler recognised that the banks and 
the public could not be expected to accept the need for 
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credit restrictions, unless they were also applied to 
Government expenditure. He was prepared to grasp this nettle 
but he declared in his memoirs that, 
after the successful election Ministers and, 
particularly, the party in the House were not in a 
mood for self-immolation.(20) 
Eden's stipulation that, 'Any changes must be fair and seen 
to be so; we had to have a balanced plan,' in order to avoid 
adverse electoral consequences, resulted in a damaging 
disagreement with his Chancellor. Butler suffered first hand 
experience of Eden's high handedness, irresolution, frequent 
bursts of temper, and intolerable, often senseless, 
interference with Ministers' work.(21) He was prevented from 
implementing the necessary measures, yet the blame for their 
poor reception fell on Butler rather than Eden, whose wishes 
they most clearly reflected. 
The measures eventually proposed by Butler, in September 
1955, included cuts in local authority expenditure, 
especially on housing, defence cuts, the abolition of the 
bread subsidy, and a reduction in the subsidy on school 
meals. On the fiscal side he proposed increases in the tax 
on distributed profits, and in purchase tax to boost 
exports. He also suggested an appeal to industry to do 
their utmost to avoid increases in dividends, profit 
margins, and prices, so that there was a balance between 
consumers and producers. Butler gave a veiled warning to 
Eden about the implications of not accepting his proposals 
in their entirety: 
My judgement is that, provided that the scheme is 
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adopted in its entirety, wholeheartedly and 
promptly, it should prove sufficient. But my 
judgement might well be different if we had recourse 
to half measures and some parts of the scheme were 
to be neglected and others modified or 
postponed.(22) 
Butler's proposals failed the crucial test of fairness. The 
widespread view in the Cabinet was that the plan was not 
sufficiently balanced between the various sections of the 
community, or between consumption and investment. It was 
felt that further restraint was needed on profits and 
dividends, otherwise the pressure for higher wages would not 
be reduced, and the Government would probably incur massive 
unpopularity.(23) 
Eden therefore proposed the introduction of a capital gains 
tax to balance the demands made on all sections of society. 
Butler successfully resisted this demand to impose an 
additional burden on those companies and individuals, whose 
performance he probably regarded as the basis of any 
economic recovery. He argued that the administrative 
difficulties in the way of introducing such a measure were 
'insuperable', and did not believe there would be any 
immediate benefit. Eden's irritation was clear and he noted 
in his diary that, 
We must not appear like the the hard faced men of 
1918. All this I told him [Butler] on Monday and he 
appeared to agree - or at least he said he did - but 
when it comes to action the result is poor.(24) 
Eden was more successful in resisting Butler's proposals for 
spending cuts. The Cabinet felt that the other measures 
proposed, whilst 'mopping up' purchasing power, might be 
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represented as an attack on working class living standards, 
and stimulate the pressure for higher wages, 'not all of 
which can be resisted.' They might also have led to demands 
for increases in national assistance and pension rates, 
thereby raising prices and boosting inflation. Accordingly, 
Ministers decided against abolishing the bread subsidy.(25) 
Butler felt strongly enough to write in September 1955 that, 
'I could not get my way and, no doubt, should have 
resigned,' the only occasion on which he committed such a 
view to paper. What stopped him was probably a desire to see 
through the current economic difficulties and salvage some 
of his reputation as Chancellor. The psychological impact of 
the abolition of the bread subsidy would have been greater 
than the savings earned, but it would have shown the 
Government's determination to put its own house in order, 
thereby inspiring confidence in the markets. Without it, 
there was an absence of measures to effect a substantial 
reduction in Government expenditure.(26) 
Butler had intended to present his proposals in one package 
at the end of September, which meant the early recall of 
Parliament. It would have come soon after his firm 
declaration at Istanbul, and, therefore, had the maximum 
effect in terms of confidence. Unfortunately the long and 
arduous Cabinet discussions on the proposals denied Butler 
his wish for prompt and speedy action. The recall of 
Parliament was postponed to 17th October, and then to 25th 
October, as originally planned. It was felt that an early 
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recall would weaken confidence instead of restoring it, but 
the delay led to a loss of confidence and a serious 
deterioration in the reserves. On 25th October Butler told 
the Cabinet that, 
The inevitable delay in announcing the Government's 
measures to deal with the economic situation had 
unfortunately meant that an atmosphere had been 
created in which the Government's proposals might 
not be well received.(27) 
Butler presented his autumn Budget to the House of Commons 
on 26th October. He was subjected to a heated attack from 
Hugh Gaitskell, the shadow Chancellor and aspirant to the 
Labour leadership, who accused Butler of deliberately 
deceiving the country about the state of the economy in his 
spring Budget, in order to secure the Conservative election 
victory. The attack deeply wounded Butler, probably because 
there was some truth in it, but he made a spirited defence 
of his policy, explaining the need for the measures in order 
to protect full employment, an aim which Labour could hardly 
attack. Butler put up a good performance. The Manchester 
Guardian reported that, 
It was one 
made in the 
judging by 
begetter of 
be reckoned 
of the most effective speeches he has 
House of Commons, and the Opposition, 
its restrained attitude, knows the 
the New Conservatism is still a force to 
with.(28) 
However, there remained an undercurrent of dissatisfaction 
on the Conservative backbenches. Michael Fraser, director of 
the Conservative Research Department, believed that the safe 
Government majority had removed Conservative inhibitions 
about being critical of the Party leadership. There was 
profound concern at the Government's credit squeeze, which 
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was hitting hardest those who had no opportunity to increase 
their incomes.(29) In December 1955 the Tories nearly lost 
the 'safe' seat of Torquay in a by-election. It marked the 
first sign of a Liberal resurgence at the expense of 
Conservative candidates in suburban strongholds, and the 
beginnings of what became known as a 'middle-class 
revolt'.(30) 
Party workers were also concerned that the other half of the 
electoral equation was under strain. It was feared that the 
working classes were upset at deflationary measures which as 
far as they could see were not needed in the prosperous 
economic conditions. Fraser concluded that, 
••• we must be careful to keep the balance in policy 
between the interests of the new broad based Party 
which we now have and those of the vocal and 
important middle-class minority groups which i~clude 
many of the Party's zealots and feel that their 
standards are still deteriorating and that they are 
missing a share in the country's growing wealth.(31) 
It seemed that the Conservatives' electoral balancing act 
was falling apart yet the Government did not have a positive 
response, having rejected Butler's proposals. 
The whole Budget episode had a very bad effect on Butler's 
political reputation, but his future had already been 
decided. There was a widespread feeling at the time that 
Butler was 'tired and depressed' after a four year slog at 
the Treasury. Eden considered that he had 'temporarily lost 
his grip,' a view shared by Robert Hall at the Treasury, and 
he was determined to move him as soon as opportunity 
allowed. Eden's private consultations with Macmillan on the 
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state of the economy was an early indication of his lack of 
confidence in Butler and the Treasury.(32) 
Butler's removal from the Treasury 
Eden had first suggested the possibility of 'a change of 
bowling' at the Treasury 'in the summer', an offer which was 
formalised in September. Eden ' ••• wanted more political 
leadership in the Commons, more handling of the Party,' and 
offered Butler the Leadership of the House of Commons, with 
the responsibility for Conservative Party fortunes in the 
country. Patrick Buchan-Hepburn, the Chief Whip, attributed 
Butler's reluctant response to his concern to ensure the 
maintenance of his economic policy. Butler was not keen to 
leave the Treasury before dealing with the current economic 
difficulties which had dented his reputation and his 
leadership hopes. According to Eden's Press Secretary, 
William Clark, he was also concerned that he might not have 
enough to do in his new post and was reluctant to give up 
the power of the Treasury, to deal with a lot of 
dunderheads in Parliament •.. ' Michael Fraser, Butler's 
confidant in such matters, warned that, 
any other arrangement occurring between now and 
the next Budget would seem to me to be bound to be 
taken by the press and by the Opposition as an 
opportunity for saying that the Government is 
discarding your policies and that this is the 
"oubliette". That would be very damaging both to you 
and to the Party. 
However, it soon became clear that Eden would not be moved 
on the timing of any changes.(33) 
The timing of any move was dependent on Butler's intended 
successor at the Treasury, Harold Macmillan, who was furious 
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at his enforced removal from Eden's own sphere of interest, 
the Foreign Office. As a result, he laid down terms which 
verged on the insubordinate, and had a direct impact on 
Butler's position and future. In a letter to Eden he 
demanded 
•.• an unchallenged control within my own sphere •••• 
As Chancellor, I must be undisputed head of the Home 
Front under you .••• I could not agree that he 
[Butler] should be Deputy Prime Minister.(34) 
Macmillan also stipulated that it should be, in the words of 
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, ' ••. a step towards and 
not away from the Premiership.' The Prime Minister 
reluctantly agreed to these terms, which was remarkable 
considering that Macmillan was three years older than Eden, 
who was only eight months into a possible five year term. 
Butler was eight years younger than Macmillan and there was 
no equivalent temptation to hurry things along. He was 
denied the title of Deputy Prime Minister, which Fraser had 
pressed him to demand as the price for any move, but he was 
empowered to preside over the Cabinet in Eden's absence, as 
before. Macmillan's demand and Eden's acceptance showed how 
far the balance of power had shifted in favour of Macmillan 
and against Butler.(35) 
Eden's Press Secretary, William Clark, testified to the 
difficulties of giving guidance to the Press on the 
reshuffle, which finally took place on 22 December. The 
changes were given a tepid reception, and were judged by The 
Times as 'unimaginative and too long delayed.' Butler was 
'deeply hurt' at the suggestion that he had to give up the 
Treasury because he was over-tired and had not recovered 
94 
from his wife's death. Henry Fairlie, in The Spectator, 
argued that he had not really been given a proper job to do: 
Mr Butler has been removed to a post which I do not 
believe exists. There is a great myth in British 
politics about non-departmental supervisory 
Ministers. (The myth is usually spread by the 
woolly-minded who want to find a spot for a woolly-
minded friend).(36) 
Above all, Eden's actions had upset his two most senior 
colleagues. 
The Government reshuffle encouraged speculation that there 
was now a two horse race for the succession to Eden, with 
Macmillan making all the running. An old colleague, Lord 
Beaverbrook, predicted that Macmillan ' •.. will live to 
perpetrate great mischief,' Butler was warned as an 'old 
friend' by the outgoing Leader of the House, Harry 
Crookshank, that he was, ' ... committing political suicide 
if he left without doing another Budget,' but this may just 
have been sour grapes at losing his own job.(37) 
Butler's term as Chancellor of the Exchequer had come to an 
end on a low point, with his reputation damaged by the 
economic difficulties of 1955. In four years at the Treasury 
he had shown himself to be willing to develop a distinctive 
economic and social policy to 'set the people free' from 
excessive state controls and high taxation, and at the same 
time still maintain an adequate provision of services by the 
state for those sections of the community that wanted them. 
Some progress was made towards this aim by the gradual 
abolition of food subsidies and controls, the introduction 
of charges in the NHS, and the encouragement of private 
95 
housing, all of which enabled Butler to cut taxes. However, 
these changes were incremental, since the Cabinet was 
unwilling to accept the adverese electoral consequences of 
floating the pound and making it convertible, or 
implementing massive spending cuts proposed by Butler. 
Political considerations were as important as economic ones. 
The Tories believed that they had to perform a delicate 
balancing act between traditional supporters who demanded 
spending cuts to finance tax cuts, and a large body of 
working class voters who remained suspicious of the 
Conservative Party's 'laissez faire' tendency. A favourable 
shift in the international economic climate made most 
Ministers content to preserve the status quo, and meant that 
Butler did not always manage to persuade colleagues of the 
necessity of his proposals. Robert Hall, one of his closest 
advisers, regarded this failure as evidence of Butler's 
reluctance to confront urgent economic isssues. He observed 
that, 
I think on the whole he was a weak Chancellor who 
came on at a time when the tide was running in his 
favour and was clever enough to give it a chance .•.• 
Yet he did his party a great service in getting them 
to accept the welfare state and the country to 
believe that it had been accepted.(38) 
In fact, Butler recognised the need for decisive changes, as 
his proposals in 1955 showed. The tragedy for him was that 
despite the Government's increased majority, the Cabinet was 
still unwilling to support him. 
Butler tried to look on the bright side. He had not been in 
the House of Commons much over the past four years, and he 
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told diplomat Sir Gladwyn Jebb that being Leader of the 
House, would be good training if he were to become 
Prime Minister.' He was attracted by the idea of a wider job 
to develop Conservative policy. Fraser believed that the 
main advantage of the proposed move was that, 
By freeing yourself from the trammels of day to day 
administration you could once again raise your eyes 
to the horizon and play a leading part in the 
planning of future policy. 
He suggested that this role would be very important when it 
came to planning for the next election. Butler tried to 
reassure himself and according to Clark he kept repeating, 
'I've been very calm.'(39) 
The Conservatives' 'thinker without portfolio': 1956 
The new year heralded a new opportunity for Butler. The 
Times optimistically declared that the pace, temper and 
effectiveness of the new Parliament would be very much down 
to Butler. As Leader of the House of Commons he would be 
the key to the fortunes of the Conservative Party and the 
Government. The Observer noted that it would be interesting 
to see if Butler attempted to rebuild his standing in 
Parliament and the Party.(40) 
There were three strands to his new role - first, to steer 
Government legislation through the House of Commons 
sucessfully; second, to develop a new, distinctive 
Conservative programme for the years to come, in his 
continuing role as Chairman of the Conservative Research 
Department; and third, to be responsible for the 
Government's publicity and public relations in his new role 
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as Chairman of the Liaison Committee.(41) In these roles 
Butler should have influenced many aspects of Government 
policy and cultivated good relations with the Prime 
Minister, Conservative backbenchers, and the constituency 
organisations; all useful assets in any battle for the 
leadership succession. Unfortunately it proved to be a very 
frustrating period for him, since he did not receive much 
credit for his work. 
Butler's new role brought him into even closer contact with 
the Prime Minister. William Clark expressed concern that it 
would throw a strain on his relations with Eden, as they 
would be working even more closely together and disputing 
the same territory. Clark's concerns were well founded. 
Butler found himself unable to take Eden wholly seriously, 
and relations had been soured by the experience of the past 
six months.(42) 
Their new relationship could not have got off to a worse 
start. By January 1956 the Government was extremely 
unpopular. The political consequences of the economic 
difficulties were reflected in a Tory slump in the Gallup 
polls. Eden in particular was the subject of vehement 
criticism in the Press. This criticism reached a climax on 3 
January 1956 when the Daily Telegraph demanded 'the smack of 
firm government.' The Observer carried a front page 
headline, 'Eden-Must-Go Move Grows', while The People 
asserted that, 
Sir Anthony Eden is all set to retire. He is to be 
succeeded by Mr Butler. The only decision left to be 
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made is the date of the change-over.(43) 
In his first task as Minister responible for public 
relations, Butler was less than successful in deflecting the 
press criticism and rumours. His hasty assent to the view 
that Eden was 'the best Prime Minister we have,' and even 
more damaging, 'My determination is to support the Prime 
Minister in all his difficulties,' served only to inflame 
the situation. Butler reflected that, 'I do not think it did 
Anthony any good. It did not do me any good either.' Eden's 
immediate denial of any intention to resign, and his 
dismissal of 'cantankerous' press attacks in a speech at 
Bradford showed how hurt he was by the criticism, and it 
showed on his nerves which were never that strong. An over-
protective wife fed his sensitivity. Eden complained to 
Clark, 
Clarissa has been saying to me that my reputation 
has suffered over the Budget far more than RAB's and 
that you oughtn't to favour RAB at my expense. It's 
no good you saying that everyone is all right except 
the Prime Minister, who just dithers.(44) 
It seemed that Butler's reputation had not been so badly 
damaged by the autumn Budget as he had feared. In fact he 
was being equally criticised, but this did not ease Eden's 
sensitivity or make for good relations between the two. 
In his role as Leader of the House of Commons, Butler was 
more successful. In partnership with Edward Heath, the new 
Chief Whip, he quickly achieved a marked improvement in the 
mood of the backbenches. The Economist declared, 
Both are relatively young "new" Tories able to talk 
to their exceptionally young party in contemporary 
terms, and not in the language of the Edwardian era. 
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Between them they successfully defused a number of 
threatened revolts, including the long running debate over 
capital punishment. It was, therefore, suprising that 
Butler's attempts to cultivate personal support on the 
backbenches met with little success. Gaitskell noted that 
Butler had been playing up his position as the man 
representing the backbenchers, but Bob Boothby remarked to 
him in March 1956 that the Tories regarded Butler with 
'contemptuous disdain.'(45) 
Butler continued to be regarded as remote, impersonal, and 
lacking in the inspirational qualities required of a Party 
manager. His appearances in Parliamentary debates were very 
limited. In fact he made only two appearances in debates 
between January and July 1956. Hubert Ash ton, his 
Parliamentary Private Secretary (PPS), was alarmed at his 
demeanour. It was a critical time both for the Party and for 
Butler, and in March 1956 he warned that, 
many of your own good friends are getting more 
and more anxious about you, not in private affairs -
but in public ones especially in the 
House ••. [and] ••• urging the vital necessity of your 
getting to know the Party better. Those who do not 
know you think you are rather aloof and they are as 
anxious as I that they should get to know that this 
is not really so. But they cannot unless you give 
them a chance. 
Ash ton compared Butler adversely with Macmillan's 
willingness to chat with backbenchers in the Smoking Room, 
and concluded, 
I have no doubt we shall weather the 
we are certainly in one now and we want 
hands & officers at action stations.(46) 
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storm. But 
all deck 
Butler may have considered that the position of Leader of 
the House had to be by necessity as non-political as 
possible, with its responsibility for all MPs in the House. 
The heart of the problem was that Butler was unable to 
hide his contempt for 'dunderheads', even if they were Tory 
MPs. Deryk Winterton of The Daily Herald declared that, 
They think he 
without the 
master of 
compliment. 
is too clever by half. An intellectual 
grace to pretend that he is not ••• a 
the dubious phrase and uncertain 
In this respect Butler made no headway in rebuilding his 
reputation. Increasingly Butler seemed a marginal figure. 
Ian Waller of The Daily Mail wrote, 
If the year goes on as it has begun, it will not be 
Sir Anthony Eden but Harold Macmillan who reigns in 
Downing Street in 1957. 
He did not appear to the outside world to be playing a very 
active part in politics, particularly as he was laid low by 
a mysterious illness in the summer of 1956. The Spectator 
felt moved to comment that Butler was ' .•• a horse ready to 
be put out to grass,' and The Daily Mail speculated that he 
might be on his way to the House of Lords.' Butler 
denied this vehemently, but the mere fact that it should 
have been given currency by a Tory newspaper demonstrated 
how far his position had slumped since the days when he was 
seen as the only viable alternative to Eden. Lady Cynthia 
Jebb, a friend of the family, 
thought he seemed in a bad way altogether, 
talking endlessly about himself, his failures and 
difficulties, and recapitulating the recent moves 
and Budgets ••• when I saw him in London in March 
he ••• said, 'Why do people think I am tired and run 
down: I'm very well, aren't I?' I replied that he 
would always give this impression if he talked about 
himself and his difficulties so much. He took this 
well, and wondered why he did so.(47) 
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The problem for Butler was that his job precluded a high 
public profile, thereby encouraging such rumours. His duties 
did not attract great public interest in the way that they 
did at the Treasury. The Economist rightly observed that, 
much of his work will lie unseen in the twilight field 
where government and party merge.' It was undoubtedly the 
philisophic part of his reponsibilities that he relished 
most. His former lieutenant, Reginald Maudl~ng, declared, 
I feel, like the Labour Party, we have exhausted our 
original impulse after 4 years in office and 
something new is now required if we are not to sink 
slowly and steadily to decisive defeat. I am sure 
you will provide the intellectual stimulus we 
need.(48) 
Butler was willing to give this. He wanted to develop a 
distinctive Conservative domestic policy. Drawing upon his 
experience as Chancellor, he pursued his policy of 
incremental change in the fields of social policy and 
industrial relations in the hope of retaining the new broad 
based support for the Conservative Party, and gradually 
shifting political discussion towards a Conservative 
perspective. 
Butler's experience as Chancellor of recurring economic 
crises meant that welfare expenditure came under frequent 
examination. His attempts to limit expenditure through 
annual ecomony exercises had been exhausted, and the events 
of 1955 showed how the Chancellor could be isolated in 
Cabinet when he sought to restrict expenditure. A five year 
review was undertaken by Treasury officials, which showed 
that social expenditure, even under existing policies, would 
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outstrip the estimated increase in GNP. In July 1955 Butler 
had presented a memorandum to the Cabinet which stressed 
that in the Conservatives' previous term of office social 
expenditure had risen by 35 per cent, whilst GNP had 
increased only by 25 per cent, and the gap was expected to 
increase formidably.(49) 
As a result Butler was instrumental in gaining the Cabinet's 
approval for the establishment, early in 1956, of a Social 
Services Committee, under his chairmanship, to examine ways 
of restraining and reducing expenditure. This was the 
opportunity Butler had been waiting for to effect decisive 
change in the Government's social policy, by assigning a 
fixed percentage of GNP to social expenditure, which 
Treasury officials calculated as meaning a cut in projected 
expenditure of 137 million pounds. Butler presented the 
case for expenditure cuts on the basis of the Conservatives' 
belief in the need to avoid higher taxation and if possible 
to reduce it, in order to satisfy traditional Tory 
supporters.(50) 
However, the Committee rejected all the radical Treasury 
proposals, such as hospital boarding charges, increased 
prescription charges, reductions in the ages for compulsory 
school attendance, the introduction of school fees, and 
increased charges for school meals. They felt able to do so 
in the light of their finding that, 
expenditure on the social services, although 
tending to increase each year in absolute terms was 
in fact taking a decreasing proportion of national 
income which was rising more rapidly.(51) 
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From Butler's point of view the Committee had been 
successful in achieving its aim, but this was no cause for 
complacency. He had been an 'enthusiastic supporter' of 
further expenditure cuts in February 1956, particularly the 
abolition of the bread and milk subsidy and reductions in 
the housing subsidy, an argument he had lost six months 
before. This was far more preferable to Macmillan's 
consideration of a capital gains tax and new import 
controls, or his proposal to reimpose the 6d on income tax, 
which Butler had removed before the 1955 election. Butler 
threatened resignation to ensure its rejection, but Robert 
Hall noted that, ' ••• no one knows whether to believe him or 
not.' He regarded such proposals as contrary to the 
Conservative vision of 'setting the people free' and, more 
significantly, a humiliating reversal of his April 1955 
Budget. Eden supported this view, and Macmillan did not 
press his case, as a tax increase would have outraged Tory 
supporters who already resented paying for the prosperity 
of organised labour.(52) 
Butler was also given responsibility for coming up with a 
solution to the growing problem of wage increases that was 
resulting from full employment and the increased power of 
the trade unions. It had become clear to him from bitter 
experience that monetary policy alone was insufficient to 
tackle inflation. With the abrupt curtailment of Eden's 
honeymoon period in May 1955 by industrial action, he 
established a Cabinet Committee to look into industrial 
relations, with Butler as Chairman. However, he warned the 
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Prime Minister, ' ••• it is by no means certain that there is 
any early action the Government can take. ' With this· in mind 
the Committee proceeded to rule out all proposals requiring 
legislation. It did agree to investigate the possibility of 
introducing a legal requirememnt for a period of reflection 
before strike action was taken, plus other measures to 
improve the industrial atmosphere, including profit sharing. 
Little came of these investigations. Butler felt that to 
impose such schemes as a cure-all would be the antithesis of 
the Conservtive vision of free enterprise and market forces. 
He accepted the view of the Research Department that, 
The conditions that go to make good 
relations are indeed too varied and too 
to be brought "within the cramping 
legislation" or quasi-legislation.(53) 
industrial 
intangible 
grip of 
Instead Butler preferred a long-term solution. The Committee 
decided to issue a statement of Government policy in March 
1956, a White Paper on The Economic Implications of Full 
Employment, in an attempt to educate public opinion. It 
stated that prices had increased by 50 per cent since the 
war, as incomes rose faster than output. It highlighted the 
fundamental problem that, 
If the prosperous economic conditions necessary to 
maintain full employment are exploited by trade 
unions and business men, price stability and full 
employment become incompatible. 
In the absence of such restraint the maintenance of full 
employment could not be guaranteed.(54) 
In addition, Butler told a meeting of the Conservative 
Political Centre (CPC), at the 1956 Party Conference in 
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Llandudno, that the Government had been looking at some 
of the proposals contained in the Workers' Charter of 1947. 
One consequence of this was the announcement by I a in 
Macleod, the Minister of Labour, of the introduction of 
contracts of service, 'if necessary by legislation', for 
every wage earner in industry.(55) 
Butler acknowledged that trade unionists had to be made 
aware of the need for sacrifice in order to ensure national 
well-being. His overriding priority was to make British 
goods more competitive abroad and increase Britain's share 
of world trade. He wanted industry to take advantage of the 
'new Industrial Revolution' created by technological 
advances. This meant providing workers with not just the 
material benefits of prosperity but also the right skills, 
even if this created an adverse electoral situation. Butler 
emphasised that, 
the doctrine of 'prosperity politics', and 
voting Conservative because one's own position is 
better or grumbling against the Government because 
one's own personal dividends are reduced, is neither 
satisfying nor satisfactory •••• (56) 
The emphasis on technology was seen by the press as Butler's 
personal achievement. In June 1956 he presented the 
Government's White Paper on technical education, which 
proposed the establishment of eight new colleges of advanced 
technology, all of which later became universities. He 
rejected the idea that 'there should be any difference in 
social status between the technician and the man of the 
arts.' Therefore, Butler called for more flexibility in 
applying his 1944 Education Act in order to achieve equality 
of opportunity. He had, 
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always thought that there should be much 
elasticity of choice and provision for later 
transfer, at least between the ages of 11 and 13 ••• 
[and] ••. had never minded the idea of experiments 
in different types of schools. 
This reflected Butler's commitment to the widest variety of 
choice in school provision, including comprehensives and 
technical schools, whilst vigorously defending the 
maintenance of grammar and public school education.(57) 
However, Butler acknowledged that the restoration of freedom 
of choice to the individual had brought problems with it. He 
believed that some traditional Tory voters had not improved 
their material prosperity, and felt 'dwarfed and 
defenceless' in the face of the power of trade unions. 
Butler stressed that lower taxation, increased pensions, and 
better social services were of great benefit to all sections 
of the community. He maintained that the Conservative Party 
remained the only hope for the continuance and development 
of 'middle-class' values, but they would have to compete 
equally with other interests in the free market. Butler 
believed the Conservatives were a national Party whose, 
policy is to work for the nation as a whole 
town and country, employers and employed, 
professions and Unions, working class and middle 
class - respecting and balancing the interests of 
all, but without subservience to any one.(58) 
The Economist praised Butler's efforts as 'thinker without 
portfolio.' He had set out a clear programme in which 
Conservative policies emphasised the differences with Labour 
policies, such as the commitment to equality of opportunity 
and individual freedom of choice. This, it was argued, 
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differed from Eden and Macmillan's strategy, of ensuring 
that the Tories lacked a distinctive image, which would 
guarantee electoral defeat. Therefore, the real 
message of Llandudno was not "more Conservatism more 
quickly", but "more Butlerism more briskly".'(59) 
In-so-far as they were called on to judge voters confirmed 
the verdict of The Economist. If the middle-class revolt did 
not emerge at the Party Conference, its presence was 
strikingly felt in electoral terms throughout 1956. Mere 
words were not enough to satisfy the middle-classes; they 
wanted more Conservative policies more quickly. There was a 
persistent feeling that the Government should reduce its 
expenditure, and growing resentment that the anti-
inflationary measures were falling heaviest on them, rather 
than on the workers who had the trade unions to protect 
their interests. Early in 1956 the Conservatives nearly lost 
by-elections in Hereford, Gainsborough, and Taunton, and in 
June there was a very close contest in Tonbridge. The seat 
contained a large proportion of middle-class professional 
families, both active and retired. They felt that they had 
become 'the Cinderellas of the economic system,' and they 
showed their discontent by abstaining. The correspondence 
columns of The Times reflected a widespread feeling that if 
the Tories were content to maintain Socialist policies, at 
the expense of the middle-class and fixed income groups, 
then there might as well be a Socialist government too. The 
formation of The Middle Class Alliance and The People's 
League For The Defence Of Freedom were gloomy portents of 
increasing disaffection with the Government.(60) 
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The Government was not complacent about this threat, but the 
scope for remedial action was limited, due to the need to 
appeal to a wider electorate in order to maintain a good 
working majority. The Economist pointed out that a 
Tonbridge-like swing was unlikely at a General Election, as 
disgruntled supporters returned to the fold.(61) Middle-
class discontent would continue to be a cause for concern 
throughout the 1955 Parliament. However, it was hoped that 
the maintenance of a strong foreign policy would encourage 
people to look beyond their own difficulties and take pride 
in Britain's continuing role as a great power. 
Butler's role in foreign policy under Eden 
Butler's duties also involved him in international affairs, 
where his political touch was less sure. The Eden Government 
adhered to Churchill's 'three concentric circles' view of 
foreign policy, in which Britain was the only country with 
influence in the US/Atlantic 'circle', the 
imperial/Commonwealth 'circle', and, least important of all, 
the European 'circle'. It continued to uphold the belief 
that Britain was a great power, and it was felt that if 
Britain committed itself too much to one circle it would 
lose influence in the other circles. However, under Eden the 
validity of the 'concentric circles' model, which Butler 
upheld, was seriously damaged. 
By the 1950s continental Western European countries had 
decided on a policy of integration to rebuild Europe. The 
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Eden Government shied away from any process which required 
supranationality and the pooling of sovereignty. However, 
the discussions at Messina in November 1955, and the 
establishment of the Spaak Committee signalled the Western 
European countries' resolve to create an economic community, 
and they wanted a positive British reaction to take 
part.(62) 
Butler played a leading role in ensuring Britain's 
continued estrangement from Europe. In November 1955 he told 
the Economic Policy Committee of the Cabinet that, 
••. it seemed clear that the UK should avoid joining 
a European common market, at any rate for some time 
to come. 
Ministers agreed with him on the grounds that it would lead 
to a 'division in Europe' and 'to the creation of a bloc 
discriminating against the United States', and participation 
would 'eventually mean the end of the present system of 
Imperial Preference.' However, the Home and Overseas Policy 
Sub-Committee of the Cabinet, chaired by Butler, recognised 
the growing importance of Europe, and that Britain stood to 
gain economically from going in, but the balance of 
advantages was not sufficient to compel any rethink of 
policy.(63) 
Therefore, Ministers decided to make every effort to stop it 
being formed without appearing to be hostile. Butler's 
natural evasiveness and ambiguity came into its own. In 
talks with the Dutch Foreign Minister, Beyen, and with the 
Belgian Foreign Minister, Spaak, in November 1955, Butler 
gave the impression that Britain might change its mind. 
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Beyen certainly left those talks believing that, I ' ••• we 1n 
the UK understood their long term aims and as good Europeans 
we were sympathetic to it.' When the final rejection came 
after Butler's soothing meetings, there was great anger at 
Britain's misleading actions. It was probably decisive in 
the ultimate failure of 'Plan G', Macmillan's radical 
counter proposal for a free trade area attached to the 
Common Market. In later years Butler recognised that a 
mistake had been made, it was in my view a definite 
lack of foresight on the part of myself ••• ' The balance of 
opinion was and is that Britain paid dearly for its decision 
to withdraw from the negotiations which led to the creation 
of the Common Market, but at the time it has to be said that 
there was little support for any other course.(64) As a 
result, Britain was gradually excluded from influence in the 
European circle with the creation of the European Economic 
Community in 1957. 
There were also disturbing signs in Britain's other spheres 
of interest. Within the imperial/Commonwealth 'circle' it 
had become clear that the Empire was in decline as Britain 
was no longer able to maintain its imperial interests. This 
was most clearly illustrated by the outbreak of the Suez 
crisis, in which Butler played an ill-starred role. The 
story of Suez has been told so often that it is only 
necessary to offer a brief sketch of the episode here in-
so-far as it relates to Butler's fortunes. 
The Suez Canal, a vital commercial link for British oil 
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supplies, was nationalised by Egypt in July 1956. From the 
outset Eden, Macmillan, and a majority in the Cabinet were 
heavily in favour of a military solution, not only to regain 
ownership of the Canal but to remove Colonel Nasser, the 
Egyptian leader, from power. At the time this was the 
dominant view in the country at large. By contrast, 
Butler's priority was to achieve the Government's publicly 
stated aim of internationalisation of the Canal by 
negotiated settlement if possible, or by the use of force in 
the last resort. However, he was not in the Prime Minister's 
confidence throughout the crisis, and it was possible that 
he was deliberately kept remote from the decision-making 
process. He was excluded from the all important Egypt 
Committee, although he took to turning up at its meetings. 
Butler was also absent from the early Cabinet discussions 
on the crisis as a result of a virus infection, which could 
possibly have been meningitis. It is cause for speculation 
as to how much it affected his behaviour in this vital 
period. In September Cynthia Jebb noted Foreign Secretary 
Selwyn Lloyd's view that Butler was, 
almost pathological. '(65) 
in a very bad way, 
Butler was extremely doubtful about the nature of the 
military action proposed. The 'Israel Plan', outlined to 
Butler on 18 October, was first put forward by Macmillan, 
its foremost advocate, to the Egypt Committee on 7 August. 
It specified that in the event of a war between Israel and 
Egypt, Britain and France would intervene to separate the 
combatants and occupy the Canal. Butler claimed to know 
nothing of the final arrangements for collusion with Israel, 
11 2 
concluded ' at Sevres on 22nd-24th October, until after they 
were made. He later claimed that he would have preferred an 
open alliance with France and Israel to free the Canal, and 
eventually internationalise it. Butler questioned the 
sanguine expectation of US support or at least benevolent 
neutrality, based on Macmillan's informal communications 
with President Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, the US 
Secretary of State. He was also worried about the possible 
effect on sterling which would follow from a military 
intervention.(66) 
Butler was not alone in expressing these doubts to meetings 
of the full Cabinet. The Minister of Defence, Walter 
Monckton, was an outright opponent of military action, and· 
others such as Derric~ Heathcoat-Amory, lain Macleod, 
Patrick Buchan-Hepburn, and even Lord Salisbury had their 
doubts.(67) Rumours of a Cabinet split reached Tony Benn, 
who concluded that, 'It looks possible that the Cabinet is 
now meeting in two halves and engaged in mortal combat.' The 
prospect of a ceasefire between Israel and Egypt before 
British troops had landed led Butler and others to urge that 
the expedition be stopped. Eden had to threaten to resign 
to finally secure the Cabinet's approval for the military 
operation. With an appeasement past to live down Butler 
hedged his political bets.(68) 
The invasion finally went ahead on 5 November, in response 
to the Israeli attack on Egypt on 29 October. No sooner had 
the troops landed than a ceasefire was called on 6 November. 
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The fighting between Israel and Egypt had ceased and, 
therefore, the justification for the intervention was 
nullified. However, the Canal remained under Egyptian 
control, and Nasser remained in power. Eden's health broke 
down, Butler managed to arouse the hostility of a majority 
of the Tory Party, and Macmillan secured the succession. 
Butler's evasive, and ambiguous support for the Suez policy 
seriously damaged his standing in the Conservative Party and 
cost him the Premiership as, in the words of Reginald 
Maudling, he gave the impression that he was lifting 
his skirt to avoid the dirt.' This soon became clear even to 
Labour MPs. Richard Crossman observed that Butler's defence 
of Government policy was, ' ••• so ingeniously disingenuous, 
such a palpable tissue of prevarications.' Tony Benn noted 
Butler's skill in answering questions on collusion by 
referring to the statements of Eden and Selwyn Lloyd, the 
Foreign Secretary, thus dissociating himself by implication 
from their answers. Such considerations seemed to reinforce 
Robert Hall's view that, 
the great difficulty about his character is to 
know whether he is as straightforward as public 
opinion, taken over the long run compels him to be, 
i.e. he would not act shabbily because it might be 
found out and damage his position, or whether there 
is any more deep principle.(69) 
Butler believed that his position on Suez would win him 
support not lose it, by portraying the image of a man who 
was deeply troubled by the policy, but whose sense of Party 
loyalty and unity impelled him to stay in his post and 
support the Government's policy. He told Cynthia Jebb that, 
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I keep on asking myself, "when could I 
resigned"; I said to my secretary, "I don't 
when I could have been able to resign". 
have 
know 
Lady Jebb reflected that all this was in flat 
contradiction to his speeches in public, whereas in private 
he is quite outspoken in his criticism.' Peter Kirk, a Tory 
MP and an opponent of Suez, predicted that Butler would 
become Prime Minister as a result of the crisis. He remarked 
to Tony Benn: 
You all underrate Rab. When the smoke has cleared 
you'll find him there on top of a mound of corpses 
with his knife dripping with blood and an 
inscrutable smile on his face. 
However Butler was either strangely immune to, or 
underestimated, the hostility felt towards him by many more 
Tories for the divergence between his public and private 
attitudes. He was bound by the ties of collective 
responsibility, so the doubts he expressed semi-publicly had 
a hollow ring, and served only to antagonise potential 
supporters on the backbenches. His indiscretions and 
unfulfilled threats of resignation were regarded as evidence 
of his indecisiveness and disloyalty to his leader in a time 
of crisis. Both the pro and anti-Suez lobby felt he was 
half-hearted towards their cause, and so he gained the 
respect and support of neither. As Butler declared in his 
memoirs, 'Whenever I moved in the weeks that followed, I 
felt the party knives sticking into my innocent back.'(70) 
Butler particularly upset what Maudling called the 'blue 
blood and thunder' group on the right wing of the Tory 
Party, and especially the Suez Group, which contained up to 
30 MPs, who whole-heartedly supported the Government's tough 
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action and were furious that the operation had been stopped. 
His behaviour revived memories of his support for the 
appeasement policies of the 1930s. If there was a Munichois 
stain on Butler he had failed to erase it. Pre-war attitudes 
still cast a long shadow in the Tory Party. It did not seem 
important to them that there was little to choose between 
Butler and Macmillan in terms of political philosophy. They 
organised a campaign by word of mouth and by telephone, 
urging those who opposed Butler's succession to notify the 
Party Whips immediately. Lord Lambton later wrote that, ' 
the campaign against Mr Butler was singularly effective. It 
was the most squalid political manoeuvre that I have ever 
been aware of ••. '(71) 
However, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that 
Macmillan won the leadership, or that Butler lost it, 
because of a small if vocal group of right wing MPs. His 
attitude disturbed many of his natural supporters. Nigel 
Nicolson, one of the most vocal critics of Suez, wrote at 
the time, 
The general feeling in the House is that 
mismanaged his attitude during the past two 
He should have been one thing or the other, 
reluctant apologist. 
Years later he recalled, 
he has 
months. 
not a 
He played a double game, which lost him a lot of 
backing. He would speak up for the Government in the 
House, and then go into the Smoking Room and say to 
everyone how terrible it was. He thought that this 
would gain him support, in fact it did the 
reverse.(72) 
It was doubly unfortunate for Butler that, with the collapse 
in Eden's health and his enforced rest in Jamaica from 23 
116 
November, he was left in charge of the Government, 
with the odious duty of withdrawing the troops, 
reestablishing the pound, salvaging relations with 
the USA and the UN, and bearing the brunt of 
criticism from private members, constituency 
worthies and the general public, for organising a 
withdrawal which was a collective 
responsibility.(73) 
It seemed an impossible task. Oliver Poole, the Party 
Chairman, warned that the Party would not accept a 
withdrawal unless at least some British objectives were met. 
One MP described the atmosphere of November and December 
1956 as, 
rather like going on board a steamer at the end 
of a very rough crossing. There was a slight smell 
of sickness in the Smoking Room and almost everyone 
looked green.(74) 
Butler showed considerable political skill in keeping the 
Government and the Party together during the process of 
withdrawal. However, the majority of people in the Party and 
the country did not understand this. He later recalled, 
they found it impossible to answer the question in the 
pubs, as to why we did not go further down the Canal.'(75) 
Butler's actions merely seemed to confirm the whispering and 
rumour campaign, which sedulously cultivated the myth that 
it was all Butler's fault, that he had used his position to 
undermine Eden and corrode the Party and the Government from 
within. This was a charge which applied more accurately to 
• 
Macmillan whose role throughout the crisis was not generally 
known. In Butler's recollection Macmillan had, 
switched almost overnight from being the 
foremost protagonist of intervention to being the 
leading influence for disengagement. 
The decisive factor in this about-turn was the dire economic 
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situation, in particular the run on sterling that Butler had 
feared, which threatened to bankrupt the country. The USA 
refused to help until a ceasefire was announced and a 
guarantee given of readiness to withdraw from the Canal. 
These terms amounted to 'blackmail'. Britain's influence in 
the US 'circle' was not as great as Macmillan had thought, 
and his priority was to heal the 'schism' that had developed 
as the result of his misreading of the USA's position.(76) 
Macmillan's turnaround was also interpreted by some 
observers as a bid for the Prime Minister's job. He admitted 
in his diaries that after Eden's physical breakdown and 
enforced rest in Jamaica, he realised that Eden ' ••. could 
never return and remain Prime Minister for long.' Butler was 
aware that frequent talks and reunions took place in 
the study at No. 11,' including Thorneycroft, Eccles, 
Lennox-Boyd, and Sandys, who made clear their preference for 
Macmillan in the expectation of Eden's departure. Edward 
Heath, the Chief Whip, later admitted that there had also 
been 'contacts' within the Party. It was hardly suprising 
that Macmillan later chose to celebrate his succession with 
Heath.(77) 
Macmillan's firmness, however self contradictory, was more 
to the Party's taste than Butler's equivocations. While 
Butler took the responsibility for organising the British 
withdrawal, Macmillan kept out of the limelight and made 
sure that when he spoke to the 1922 Committee he was 
ebullient and uplifting. He formulated the 'no apology' 
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approach to Suez, and successfully gave the Party the 
impression that Nasser had been taught a lesson he would not 
forget. He made liberal use of analogies with Munich and the 
1930s, as his way of putting down his claim to the 
succession at Butler's expense. Enoch Powell reflected that, 
'The sheer devilry of it verged upon the disgusting.' 
Macmillan was more aware of the prevailing political 
attitudes, and used Suez to display his toughness and 
realism. He was far more ruthless in his determination to be 
chosen, and allowed rumours of his impending retirement to 
circulate, declaring that he would ' ••. never serve under 
Butler,' according to Brendan Bracken.(78) 
In view of this situation it was highly unlikely that Butler 
was at the centre of moves, possibly involving manipulation 
of the medical evidence, to convince Eden that his position 
was untenable. He preferred to accept Eden's declaration of 
intent to carry on, just as he acquiesced in Churchill's 
determination to carry on in 1954-5, in the hope that it 
would give him time to prepare for a contest on more 
favourable grounds. All Butler's plans and aspirations were 
based on Eden carrying on in the short term.(79) Eden's 
illness and sudden resignation on 9 January, 1957, although 
suprising, did not unduly alarm Butler. His mood was one of 
quiet confidence, since virtually every national newspaper 
predicted that he would be the next Prime Minister. However, 
this view was not shared by the 'king-makers' in the 
Conservative Party.(80) 
The two senior peers in the Cabinet, Lord Kilmuir, the Lord 
119 
Chancellor, and Lord Salisbury, Lord President of the 
Council, neither of them contenders for the post by virtue 
of their positions, asked each member of the Cabinet 
individually for their views on the succession. The 
overwhelming majority favoured Macmillan, with 
Patrick Buchan-Hepburn, definitely for Butler, 
later claimed the support of Walter Monckton 
only one, 
although he 
and James 
Stuart. There was a question mark over the procedure used to 
ascertain the views of the Cabinet, but there was no 
evidence to suggest that it affected the outcome. Kilmuir 
claimed there was no attempt ' to use what one might call 
a prefect's influence.' However, both he and Salisbury were 
Suez hardliners, and the views of their colleagues confirmed 
their own preference for Macmillan. Churchill also opted for 
Macmillan because he felt he was more decisive. Conflicting 
opinions surrounded the preference of the outgoing Prime 
Minister. It appeared that Eden's advice was neither 
requested nor offered, 
Butler would be chosen 
selection process.(81) 
but he shared the expectation 
despite his doubts about 
that 
the 
The views of the Cabinet were endorsed by the Chief Whip, 
the Party Chairman, and John Morrison, the Chairman of the 
1922 Committee, who found a ground swell of opinion among 
backbenchers for Macmillan, and a small minority who were 
implacably opposed to Butler at any price. The combination 
of these two factors secured the decision for Macmillan.(82) 
There was little doubt that they correctly interpreted the 
feelings of the Tory Party. Lord Boothby, himself an 
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opponent of Suez, claimed, 
There was no doubt the overwhelming majority of the 
party preferred Macmillan to Butler. If there'd been 
a vote it would have been exactly the same.(83) 
It was possible that if Butler had been requested to form 
an administration, the Party might have rallied behind him, 
but the prevailing atmosphere made Macmillan a less 
controversial and therefore more viable successor. Lord 
Kilmuir believed that had Butler been sent for, 
I am sure the great majority of the Cabinet would 
have agreed to serve under Butler out of loyalty, 
but there would have been some conspicuous and 
highly damaging resignations, and the parliamentary 
party might well have disintegrated in public. In 
the highly charged atmosphere which remained for 
several months after Suez a very serious schism 
might have developed as a consequence of Butler's 
accession, and the results would have been 
catastrophic for the Conservative Party.(84) 
Conclusion 
The years 1955-57 were ones of mixed fortune in Butler's 
career. His April 1955 Budget helped secure an unprecedented 
third successive Tory victory in the general election of May 
1955, but he was ill-rewarded when his colleagues refused to 
agree to his demands for a substantial cut in public 
expenditure to deal with renewed economic difficulties. His 
attempts to lead the way and set a new Conservative agenda 
were hampered by a poor working relationship with Eden and 
an intense rivalry with Macmillan, resulting in his 
humiliating removal as Chancellor. 
However, in his new role as Leader of the House of Commons 
he was able to step back from the everyday pressures of the 
Treasury and consider the development of future policies. As 
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Chairman of the Cabinet's Social Services Committee, he 
successfully ensured the containment of public expenditure 
as a proportion of GNP. He also took a new initiative in 
industrial relations. Butler urged the need for wage 
restraint and sought to educate public opinion on the 
dangers of inflation. He had put his finger on a fundamental 
problem in the British economy. He was also keen to 
emphasise the spiritual or moral aspects of Conservative 
policy as a way of discouraging the increasing preoccupation 
with materialist aspirations. Therefore, Butler was carving 
out a new role for himself with some success, although his 
reputation among Tory MPs remained poor, as the Suez crisis 
demonstrated. 
Butler was extremely unfortunate that events combined to 
produce a situation, Suez, in which his ambivalent and 
ambiguous attitude antagonised all shades of opinion in the 
Party, and also saw the emergence of a serious rival in 
Macmillan. Had there been no Suez it was possible that 
Butler would have gained the top job in the normal course of 
events. Butler's personal failings, which Tories were 
already familiar with - his reputed inability to make up his 
mind, his aloofness, his indiscretions, his pre-war record -
would not have come into such sharp focus, and been regarded 
by his colleagues as fatal weaknesses.(85) Butler's 
mishandling of the issue showed, above all, that contrary to 
popular opinion he did have the deviousness and guile 
required to further his own prospects, but that he faced an 
even more devious rival. 
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'Onward in Freedom' 
Butler under Macmillan, 1957-1959 
Introduction 
Butler kept his disappointment at being passed over for the 
Premiership private, taking consolation from the letters of 
support he received from constituents, MPs, civil servants, 
and ministerial colleagues. Many echoed the view that it was 
' .•. a terribly cruel price to pay for doing the right thing 
when you were left holding someone else's baby.' However, 
Party activists in all areas expressed broad approval for 
the choice of Macmillan, and ' ••• almost complete absence of 
comment regarding Mr Butler's position.'(1) The blow to 
Butler should not be underestimated, and he took some time 
to recover. He was later to complain, 'I couldn't understand 
when I had done a most wonderful job - picking up the pieces 
after Suez -that they then chose Harold.' Cynthia Jebb 
noted in March that Butler, 
•.• continues to talk of nothing else but how he had 
expected to be offered the Premiership, and whether 
he should have resigned ••.. Many people, including 
his admirers, think he should see a psychoanalyst. 
Yet the option of refusing to serve was not entertained by 
Butler. Party unity was his overwhelming priority in order 
to restore morale and confidence, and maintain the Party in 
office. Both Butler and Macmillan recognised that the future 
of the Government lay in their working closely together.(2) 
In the aftermath of Suez and the leadership crisis, the 
Conservative Party was in a state of acute dissension. 
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Macmillan revealed privately that he did not expect the new 
Government to last more than six weeks. While it was true 
that electorally the Conservatives were going through their 
worst period of the 1950s, Macmillan still had a majority of 
sixty and three years in which to put things right.(3) His 
overriding priority was to retain the support of disgruntled 
middle-class supporters and also attract the support of 
newly-affluent workers. It was a delicate balancing act to 
follow and required difficult policy decisions. 
Macmillan sought to reassure his Party and the country with 
his own appearance of decisiveness and confidence - his 
'unflappability' and 'Edwardian' style - which was in stark 
contrast to Butler's civil servant image. Macmillan's first 
act as Prime Minister was to celebrate his elevation with 
Edward Heath, the Chief Whip, with champagne and oysters at 
the Turf Club. As he wryly noted in his memoirs, 'In Smith 
Square - the Butler home - there would have been plain 
living and high thinking.' (4) From the outset there was a 
tension between Macmillan and Butler's style and concept of 
Conservatism. 
It was commonly believed that Macmillan and Butler shared a 
similar outlook on policy, despite the contrast between 
Macmillan's early radicalism and Butler's loyal service in 
the inter-war Governments. They had both worken together on 
the reformulation of Party policy after 1945. However, 
Butler had some doubts about Macmillan's policy outlook 
because of his spending spree as Minister of Housing, and 
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his willingness to consider unorthodox policies, such as tax 
increases and the introduction of a capital gains tax, as 
Chancellor. Paradoxically, Macmillan's succession to the 
Premiership was widely seen as a victory for the right wing 
of the Party. Unlike Butler he knew instinctively when to 
make right wing noises or put a right wing gloss on things, 
as the Suez episode had shown.{S) 
Even Butler was forced to concede his rival's political 
dexterity. He elaborated on his attitude in a letter to the 
former Chief Whip, Lord Hailes, in May 1958, 
This 
my description of the Prime Minister as being 
the restoration monarch of modern times is, I think, 
just •••• He has an infinite capacity for elasticity 
which might tire his friends if they did not realise 
that he is ruthless in his determination to carry 
the disaffected along with him at all costs ...• He 
is regarded with great confidence in the Cabinet and 
better supported than any other living person in our 
Party would be in the House of Commons.(6) 
elasticity was reflected in the formation of 
Macmillan's first Cabinet. The retention of Suez hardliners 
like Peter Thorneycroft, Duncan Sandys and David Eccles, 
while his own supporters were retired to the House of Lords, 
confirmed Butler's belief that they had helped to secure the 
succession for Macmillan. However, the right could take no 
comfort from having Butler at the Home Office, in addition 
to his duties as Leader of the House of Commons and Lord 
Privy Seal, where his liberal views further antagonised 
Party supporters. It was not his preferred job, but he did 
not feel able to resist Macmillan's wishes at a point when 
his own reputation was at a low point.(7) 
Despite being the dominant partner in their relationship, 
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Macmillan observed the formalities and, felt it 
necessary to clear most things with Butler, whom he also 
asked to deputise for him when he was away.' He clearly did 
not regard Butler as a threat to his leadership. Their 
relationship was based on mutual respect rather than 
friendship. Butler was later to comment, 'I couldn't deal 
with Eden, but I could deal with Macmillan ••. '(8) His 
loyalty to Macmillan helped him to rebuild his reputation in 
the Party, and, as the recognised number two in the 
Government, he was regarded as the heir apparent by public 
opinion, if not by Party activists. 
The fact that they operated in largely different spheres and 
therefore kept their distance, helped their working 
relationship. Macmillan's main interest was in international 
affairs, and he was never more than marginally interested in 
the affairs of the Home Office or the domestic front in 
general, save for the important exception of economic 
policy. He could say with equanimity, 'I left that side all 
to Rab and Henry Brooke.'(9) The common belief has been 
that, by maintaining a consensus on how the economy and 
welfare state should operate, policies desirable for the 
long term well being of the country were sacrificed in 
favour of electorally popular measures and temporary 
palliatives. The resignation of the entire Treasury team in 
January 1958 over the level of public expenditure might seem 
to confirm this view. In fact, it highlighted Butler's 
distinctive position.(10) 
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By reclaiming his control over the policy making process 
after Suez, Butler continued to pursue his own distinctive 
brand of Conservatism. This involved the targeting of 
welfare benefits, greater freedom of choice in the provision 
of services and a low tax, expanding economy. Butler 
portrayed this policy in terms of traditional Conservative 
values such as support for the family, and freedom of 
choice, hut it was more often expressed in materialistic 
terms. Its striking success helped ensure a third 
Conservative election victory in 1959, and restored Butler's 
prestige to former levels. 
Butler as Home Secretary 
The Home Office was very much a second best choice from 
Butler's point of view. He had set his heart on becoming 
Foreign Secretary, regarding himself as the ideal choice to 
mend Britain's fences with the world in the aftermath of 
Suez. In contrast, Macmillan denied him his wish in the 
false belief that the Foreign Office was an onus, ' ..• from 
which I think he rather shrank in today's 
circumstances.'(11) He clearly intended to be in charge of 
foreign affairs himself. Butler was not prepared to press 
his case for the sake of Party unity, and so set the 
pattern for his relationship with Macmillan. At least he now 
had the power and influence of a senior department at his 
disposal which he had lacked under Eden. The press welcomed 
Butler's appointment as it was felt it would make him more 
powerful and effective. He immersed himself in his new 
responsibilities, 
delighted that, 
and by August 1957 Cynthis Jehb was 
he had entirely got out of his usual 
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rut. There was no going over the past, no recriminations, no 
might have beens.'(12) 
Lord Swinton, the former Commonwealth Secretary, recorded 
that, 'Harold admired Rab's disinterested will to 
service and his administrative capacity.'(13) The Home 
Office was arguably the most unglamorous high Cabinet 
position, with a rag-bag of responsibilities. It was sorely 
in need of the skills which Butler provided. In a letter to 
the Prime Minister, he declared, 
I shall be unable to fulfil my mission here 
unless I find it possible to press forward a 
comprehensive plan of penal reform I am 
convinced that I must leave behind some permanent 
record of my period of office here or I shall feel 
not only that I have been disloyal to myself, but 
also that I have failed in my duty to you and the 
Government which you lead. 
Macmillan replied in a 'spirit of indulgent scepticism.'(14) 
The subsequent White Paper, Penal Practice in a Changing 
Society, was published in February 1959 after four drafts 
and numerous delays for various reasons, especially its 
unpopularity among the Tory rank and file. It was his most 
important achievement at the Home Office emphasising the 
need for research to increase knowledge both of the causes 
of crime and of the effectiveness of the various forms of 
treatment and training.(15) 
Butler had become Home Secretary at a time when there was 
growing concern at the increasing amount of crime, 
especially juvenile offences and sexual offences, about 
which he told his Permanent Secretary, Sir Charles 
Cunningham, there was 'a mild degree of hysteria.' As he 
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told the House of Commons, the rise in crime was no sudden 
crisis but reflected a deep-seated disorder in society, 
which had not been removed by increased prosperity. This may 
have reinforced Butler's concern about the dangers of making 
materialism the main theme of Conservative policy. He 
emphasised the limits of Government intervention, and the 
responsibilities of the Church, family and schools in this 
area, thereby upholding the traditional Conservative belief 
in individual responsibility. However, Butler rejected 
demands for increased police powers and tougher sentences, 
which he felt were adequate. Instead he placed his hopes for 
fresh progress on research into the causes of crime, such as 
that undertaken by the new Institute of Criminology at the 
University of Cambridge. Sound research and understanding 
was essential if punishment was to be suited to the 
criminal, as well as to the crime. Butler declared to the 
1958 Tory Conference that, 
My ideas are not conceived solely in idealism. They 
have a double objective ••. first, to create in 
criminals, and especially young criminals, a 
wholesome dread of punishment and then, when 
committed, to give prisoners a reasonable hope of 
redemption and not returning to prison.(16) 
Butler instituted a £20 million prison building programme 
the largest for one hundred years - to help ease the grave 
overcrowding of prisons, and to provide accommodation 
suitable for modern, humane training requirements. He was 
also keen to look at alternative forms of punishment to 
prison, particularly for young offenders, including the 
Borstal system and detention centres. He was concerned to 
avoid a situation in which prisoners of all types were put 
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together to form a 'university of crime'. Butler also aimed 
to take advantage of the new developments in treatment 
techniques, such as group counselling, attention to prison 
visitors and the co-operation of prisoners' families, better 
training for prison officers, and prisoners' feedback.(17) 
Butler's calm and measured response was not the sort to win 
approval from Tory Party activists. He had to answer '28 
bloodthirsty resolutions', tabled at the 1958 Conservative 
Party 
both 
Conference in Blackpool by, Colonel Blimps of 
sexes ••. who thought me soft in standing out against 
the 
MP 
reintroduction of corporal punishment.' Nigel 
remarked that there had been a reversion 
Nicolson 
to 'the 
Neanderthal period of Conservatism,' in which to be anti-
capital and corporal punishment was regarded as being soft 
on crime.(18) Butler rose to the challenge with great skill 
and courage in rejecting these demands. He stressed that the 
Government was not 'soft' on crime, and he made a strong 
appeal to, use this occasion not just to brand the 
Conservatives as wanting to flay people alive •.. '. Butler 
recognised the electoral risks of adopting a savage penal 
policy, with a possible loss of support in the middle ground 
of public opinion if the Party forfeited its 'humanitarian 
image'. As Butler recalled in his memoirs, ' •.. many members 
of the party continued to hold this stand against me.'(19) 
In his view, the fortunes of the Tory Party were more 
important than his own leadership ambitions. 
While Butler was prepared to take a stand on this issue, 
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there were indications of caution in other areas of policy. 
The Home Office was at the centre of much contentious 
legislation, and was noted for being the graveyard of many 
political reputations (including Butler's immediate 
predecessor and successor). He was prepared to take a stand 
against corporal punishment, yet felt unable to take a more 
progressive stance on capital punishment and homosexuality, 
yielded to the popular pressure for stricter measures 
against prostitutes, and failed to tackle the issue of 
Commonwealth immigration. 
Butler had inherited the controversial Homicide Bill of 
1956-57, from his predecessor. It restricted the death 
penalty to certain types of murder, where it was felt the 
deterrent effect of capital punishment was most likely to 
operate. Butler ensured that this compromise measure passed 
with a good majority, after the clash between the Lords and 
the Commons over abolition in the previous Session. The 
Spectator commented that his handling of the Bill had 
markedly increased his political stature, and paid tribute 
to, the moderation of his arguments and the care with 
which he has marshalled them.'(20) 
There is evidence to suggest that Butler came to believe in 
total abolition; he certainly agonised over each capital 
case.(21) However, he retained this compromise measure, 
because what Reginald Maudling described as 'blue blood and 
thunder' Conservatives made it impossible to get total 
abolition through parliament. Year after year resolutions 
demanding the extension of capital punishment were put 
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forward for Party Conferences by local constituency 
associations. Butler rejected them all, and displayed his 
exasperation in a private letter to Sir Eric Edwards, 
Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National Union, 
in July 1959: 
it is quite unrealistic for the Conservatives to 
introduce a new law on hanging •••. If the Walton 
Asssociation really think we shall win the next 
election by dividing the House of Commons again on 
hanging when we have not got a majority to put 
through any alternative policy, I think they had 
better think again •••• Politics is in fact the art 
of the possible.(22) 
Party workers added another issue on which Butler had upset 
them, whilst those who shared his liberal views were 
disappointed that he had not gone further. However, his 
partial abolition of 1957 had set a precedent, which in time 
paved the way for total abolition. 
The Government's response to the Wolfenden Report on 
Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, published in 
September, 1957, also reflected Butler's commitment to the 
'art of the possible'. It proposed that homosexual behaviour 
between consenting adults in private should no longer be a 
criminal offence, and recommended the imposition of higher 
penalties for the conviction of prostitutes parading the 
streets.(23) 
It took a year for the Government to formulate a response to 
the Report, an indication of the contentious nature of the 
proposals. Butler's instincts were, initially, to act on 
both parts of the Report. He accepted the Committee's view 
that homosexuality was a question of individual 
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responsibility, and that prison sentences were highly 
unsuitable in many cases for the ' .•• redemption of a person 
of this sort', which was in line with his views on penal 
reform. Legislation on the basis of individual 
responsibility, though being far from popular could have 
been defended on the grounds that individual rights and 
freedoms represented a fundamental tenet of Conservative 
thought. However, moral disgust and political timing 
conspired to make such action impossible.(24) 
There was a general feeling among Conservative MPs that 
public opinion was not yet ready for changes in the law 
relating to homosexuality. They were concerned that the 
Government should not find itself faced with a sequence of 
events similar to that which led to the Homicide Act of 
1957, especially with an election due in two years. It was 
easier to put the responsibility for the Government's 
inaction on to the shoulders of the general public's 
intolerance, by asserting that education and time were 
needed to get people to agree with the Report's proposals. 
Therefore, in November 1958 Butler told the House of Commons 
that, 
there is at present a very large section of the 
population who strongly repudiate homosexual conduct 
and whose moral sense would be offended by an 
alteration of the law which would seem to imply 
approval or tolerance of what they regard as a great 
social evil. (25) 
By contrast, the recommendations to clear prostitutes from 
the streets were to prove far more popular with 
Conservative supporters: 
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In fact the popular clamour here was all 
'common prostitutes' out of sight and, 
presumably out of mind. 
for getting 
therefore, 
The Government duly obliged with the Street Offences Act of 
1959, which substantially increased the penalties for 
soliciting, with imprisonment as a possible penalty for 
repeated offences, and increased the maximum prison sentence 
for those convicted of living on the immoral earnings of 
prostitutes. It somewhat tarnished Butler's liberal 
reputation as women's organisations were outraged that men 
customers would not be treated in the same way. He was 
forced to resign from the Association for Moral and Social 
Hygiene. However, the Act achieved what it set out to do, 
which was to clear the streets of some parts of London of 
prostitutes.(26) 
It was possible to detect a contradiction in Butler's 
response to these two issues. It hardly seemed right that 
practical arguments should only be valid with regard to 
prostitutes (clearing them off the streets), and totally 
ignored with regard to homosexuals (clearing them out of the 
prisons). Assuming that the two issues were equally wrong in 
terms of morality, the main reason for the different 
response had to be electoral. In the run up to the General 
Election it did the Conservative Party no harm at all to be 
seen as the Party of law and order and the family, by 
implementing a measure which was popular with most sections 
of the community. 
In another important area, that of Commonwealth immigration, 
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Butler preserved his liberal reputation by doing nothing 
which, though politically expedient, merely stored up 
trouble for himself and his Party at a later date. Proposals 
to limit immigration had first surfaced in Churchill's last 
administration and had continued under Eden, but they had 
been rejected by the Cabinet. A subsequent dramatic increase 
in the number of immigrants from the Indian sub-continent 
and the West Indies, and racial disturbances, largely caused 
by competition for housing and casual employment, had 
brought the question back on to the political agenda. Once 
again the Cabinet came to the conclusion, under the 
direction of Butler that legislation was not yet required to 
control Commonwealth immigration.(27) 
This view did not extend to delegates at Conservative Party 
Conferences. In 1958 Butler's plea to the Party to show 
itself 'worthy of its old traditions' went totally 
disregarded, and a resolution demanding that 'the 
immigration laws of this country should be revised,' was 
carried 'by a substantial majority.'(28) By July 1959 the 
Cabinet recognised that something would have to be done 
eventually since, 
unrestricted coloured immigration might have 
serious social consequences in the longer term, and 
although it would be desirable, if possible, to 
avoid legislation on this subject in the last full 
session of the present Parliament, the situation 
should be closely watched. 
The clear implication was that such legislation would have 
adverse electoral consequences for the Government. In 
February 1959 the Cabinet decided against legislation on the 
lines proposed as it, was not likely to be well 
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received by public opinion.'(29) 
Butler's stance 
Commonwealth. He 
was based on his strong feelings 
still believed in the right 
for the 
of every 
Commonwealth subject, regardless of race or colour, freely 
to enter and stay in Britain - which was prized as one of 
the most important things that bound Britain and the 
Commonwealth together. The extent of this feeling should 
not be underestimated. Even in 1961 a Gallup Poll recorded 
that twenty-one per cent of people in Britain still favoured 
the continuation of unrestricted entry. It was likely to 
have been much higher in the 1950s, when the number of 
Commonwealth immigrants from the undeveloped countries was a 
mere 21,000 (in 1959). Butler did not foresee the explosion 
in their number by over six times in two years (136,000 in 
1961), which made integration in terms of employment and 
social services so much more difficult. In 1962 he 
reluctantly introduced the Commonwealth Immigration Bill, 
when the problem was far more acute and required more 
drastic measures. Criticism applied not only to Butler, but 
the whole Government and politicians in general, who were 
unwilling to tackle such a contentious issue so near to an 
election when there were votes at stake.(30) 
As a result of his efforts, Butler had regained a good deal 
of his appetite for political life by 1959. He had managed 
to do himself no major damage at the Home Office and had 
done much to recover his reputation from its Suez lowpoint. 
In fact a Daily Mail poll on ministerial performance put 
Butler first with 38 per cent. The Home Office had not been 
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so unrewarding after all, although Butler felt that his 
reforms, while very necessary, were not as important in the 
vote winning sense as the economy and the social services. 
Butler's progress rested on his more general influence in 
the development of a Tory welfare policy which was distinct 
from that of the Labour Party.(31) 
Butler's role in policy making 
The Economist had expressed the fear that Butler's influence 
over policy making in general might decline: 
History will regard it as a strange waste of scarce 
resources that at this crisis of conservatism's 
history, Mr Butler should not be at either the 
Treasury or the Foreign Office. There can be no 
apter commentary on the mess in which the party has 
somehow embroiled itself than the fact that the 
thoughtful if introspective human drive which did 
more than any other single factor to guide the 
successful conservative revolution of 1952-55, is 
left to tick over, by its own volition or somebody 
else's, among the problems of prisons and punting, 
and prostitutes and queers.(32) 
However, Butler moved quickly to secure his hold over the 
policy making process after the lean years under Eden. 
Almost immediately after Macmillan's succession, 
preparations were under way for the next General Election, 
in which the work of the Conservative Research Department 
(of which Butler remained Chairman) was central to the 
restoration of Tory Party fortunes.(33) 
Butler also instigated the re-creation, in February 1957, of 
the Policy Studies Group, which had met before the 1955 
Election under Iain Macleod's chairmanship. Its task was, as 
before, to come up with and coordinate ideas on future 
policies. Butler was not a member of this group, but it 
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relied heavily on work by the Research Department, and 
included Michael Fraser and Peter Goldman among its 
members. Other members of Butler's erstwhile backroom staff, 
including Reginald Maudling and Enoch Powell, and Jocelyn 
Simon, his junior Minister at the Home Office, were also 
members. They had all been linked with the One Nation group, 
and could have been expected to share Butler's brand of 
Conservatism. However, the discussions did reveal 
differences of opinion with Macleod, which Butler overcame 
to retain his influence over policy.(34) 
The creation of a Steering Committee of senior Ministers 
under the Prime Minister, with Butler as Deputy Chairman, in 
December 1957 was less welcome. It opened up the area of 
policy formulation for the General Election manifesto to a 
wider group of people. Its task was to oversee all policy 
work, bringing the many disparate threads together and 
providing some unifying themes. Initially Butler was very 
suspicious of it, seeing it as a dilution of his role as 
Chairman of the Research Department. He wrote to Macmillan, 
As you know I have had a certain responsibility for 
this since 1945 under your two predecessors and was 
responsible for the policy statements which were not 
unattended by a mead of success. 
Yet in the event Butler retained a great deal of 
responsibility for coordinating the discussions on the 
future lines of policy with Ministers.(35) They were to 
reveal a difference of emphasis between Butler and Macmillan 
and Macleod, on how to ensure a Conservative victory at the 
next election. Although Butler recognised the need to secure 
the growth of working class affluence, he also emphasised 
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other and equally compelling reasons for voting 
Conservative. 
At a meeting of the Policy Studies Group in May 1957 Butler 
suggested that the Tories should base their philosophical 
appeal on 'the defence of the individual against the 
repositories of power' (the unions, monopoly capitalism, the 
nationalised industries and the state). By contrast Macleod 
was more concerned to increase workers' rights and 
protection in order to attract working class support. Butler 
felt rightly that such a policy 'did not seem in harmony 
with the mood of the Party.'(36) 
In a memorandum to Macmillan in February 1958 Butler 
proposed that Conservative policies should be encapsulated 
under a broad theme of opportunity and responsibility. 
Butler believed that the opportunity to get on and lead a 
fuller life highlighted the successes of Conservative 
policy, such as the encouragement of greater home and share 
ownership and educational progress, the removal of 
restrictive controls and the continuing progress towards 
lower taxation. In return, he believed that, 
the responsibility of the strong, the well-off, 
the fit and those in work for the old, the young, 
the sick and the casualties of life ••• (was) the 
condition of opportunity.(37) 
However, this did not mean that Butler was content to 
maintain the welfare policies of the previous Labour 
Government. He was particularly keen to set out long-term 
plans for making the structure of the social services 
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financially sounder. He believed that state expenditure 
should be switched away from those social services which 
people could obtain for themselves towards those services 
which could not be provided for individually. He agreed that 
in an age of affluence selective benefits to help those most 
in need, and increased social investment in schools, 
hospitals and roads was the best way forward. This policy 
consolidated the traditional Conservative belief in support 
for the family, freedom of choice and individual 
responsibility.(38) The paradox was as one commentator put 
it, 
The long innings of the present Conservative regime 
complicates the work of Conservative leaders. It is 
one thing for social changes to be accepted as an 
inescapable residue of a Labour Government, to be 
consolidated into the mainstream of British 
tradition, and, if especially popular, to be linked 
with a Tory of Victorian times. It is quite another 
thing politically for a Conservative Government to 
provide the reformist legislation which it later 
consolidates. In these cases such unpopularity as 
arises is earned by party leaders rather than by the 
extremely useful socialist bogyman.(39) 
Butler's influence was such that he was able to get his own 
way regarding the publication of a general re-statement of 
Conservative philosophy in 1958, despite opposition from 
Macleod. He told Lord Poole that, there is no doubt 
that people are absolutely wallowing through lack of 
knowledge of what we stand for.' Onward In Freedom was duly 
published in the autumn of 1958. It touched on the themes 
of opportunity and responsibility outlined above without 
going into detail. Above all, it stressed the need for the 
Conservative Party to show itself to be a national Party, 
respecting and balancing the interests of all sections of 
148 
society without subservience to any single group.(39a) 
However, the discussions on future policy took place in an 
atmosphere in which there was a strong undercurrent of 
opposition to the leadership's policies from Party activists 
and supporters. The 'middle-class revolt' by small business 
and professional people was in full flow. They found 
themselves particularly affected by inflation and high 
taxes, and resented the prosperity of organised labour. The 
campaign was reflected in the motions tabled for 
Conservative Party Conferences and letters to politicians 
from disgruntled supporters. The Government suffered a 
string of poor by-election performances at South Edinburgh, 
North Lewisham, Ipswich and Torrington, where habitual 
Tories either abstained or voted for the Liberals. One 
discontented supporter, Mr A. S. Broughton, complained that, 
If there were to be a General Election tomorrow we 
think Labour would win and some of us wonder whether 
it would matter if they did •.•• We don't want 
platitudes but help.(40) 
This disaffection was crystallised in new movements, such as 
The People's League for the Defence of Freedom and The 
Middle Class Alliance. Butler maintained that the 
Conservative Party was the middle classes' only hope. The 
Conservatives offered them the continuance and development 
of a society in which middle class values still had a 
chance. The Government was very conscious of middle class 
discontent, but politically they believed there was a limit 
to what they could do to ease their plight.(41) 
Government policies reflected the belief that they needed a 
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broad measure of working class trade unionist support to 
gain a reasonable majority. However, the deflationary 
economic policy followed since the autumn of 1955 had 
steadily lost the Tory Party the votes of the skilled 
working class, as they feared the prospect of unemployment. 
The Labour victory in the Rochdale by-election in February 
1958 seemed to emphasise this point. Therefore, the Party's 
electoral strategy was to assume that the vocal but not 
particularly numerous middle class would vote Conservative 
once inflation was checked, and to then pursue policies of 
economic expansion and prosperity, in order to attract newly 
affluent workers who regarded themselves as middle 
class.(42) However, in doing so the Government lost its 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
Cabinet crisis: the Chancellor's resignation 
This electoral strategy was clearly illustrated by 
Macmillan's expression of concern about the problem of 
inflation, and the continuance of the Government's 
deflationary economic policy throughout 1957. In the 
aftermath of Suez Peter Thorneycroft, the new Chancellor, 
produced a cautious Budget in April 1957, in which he cut 
taxes by only £100 million and slightly reduced the Bank 
Rate. However, inflation continued to rise as wages rose 
ahead of prices. Macmillan summed up the dilemma facing the 
Government and the country in a speech at Bedford in July 
1957. He warned that whilst, 
.•• most of our people have never had it so good ..•. 
Our constant concern today is - can prices be 
steadied while at the same time we maintain full 
employment in an expanding economy? Can we control 
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inflation? This is the problem of our time.(43) 
A sterling crisis in the summer of 1957, triggered by a 
limited devaluation of the French franc, caused a major 
difference of opinion between Thorneycroft and the rest of 
the Cabinet on how to achieve and maintain this aim. The 
Cabinet reluctantly accepted the need for further 
deflationary measures, including restrictions on public and 
private investment, restrictions on credit, and an almost 
unprecedented increase in the Bank Rate from 5 to 7 per 
cent. Devaluation was ruled out as yet another national 
humiliation after Suez, and in any case gradual moves 
towards convertibility were already successfully being made. 
In March 1957 Butler declared in a speech that the measures 
were merely, ' .•• a phase of consolidation, retrenchment and 
active preparation to pave the way for a great new surge of 
forward expansion.' They were not an end in 
the end of September the pound was at its 
themselves. By 
highest level 
since June, and had recovered its parity with the dollar of 
$2.80. The deflationary measures appeared to have worked 
and, as in 1952, Ministers' willingness to consider more 
unpopular measures declined.(44) 
However, Thorneycroft was not content with these measures, 
and he demanded action to restrain wage increases and 
stringent cuts in public expenditure to balance the demands 
made on the private sector, in order to maintain the value 
of sterling. A showdown was imminent between those wanting a 
more confrontational policy (Thorneycroft, and the 
Treasury), and those wishing to maintain a more flexible 
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policy with a view to the forthcoming election (the rest of 
the Cabinet). 
Thorneycroft was convinced that the solution to the sterling 
crisis lay mainly with tackling inflation at home. He was 
particularly concerned at the increase in wage costs, which 
he saw as the most significant cause in the fall in value of 
the internal purchasing power of sterling. His attempt to 
introduce an incomes policy by way of a 'guiding light', and 
the establishment of the Council on Prices, Productivity, 
and Incomes, met with little support from the Cabinet. 
Ministers were unwilling to sacrifice full employment and 
free collective bargaining in the interests of price 
stability. The electoral arguments were compelling and in 
August 1957 the Cabinet concluded that, 
A large section of the electorate now consisted of 
individuals who were members of trade unions; and 
the Government's victories in the elections of 1951 
and 1955 undoubtedly derived in part from the degree 
of support which they had obtained from this part of 
the electorate. It would be inexpedient to adopt any 
policy involving legislation which would alienate 
this support and divide, rather than consolidate, 
public opinion.(45) 
Macmillan insisted on facing down the bus strike in 1958, 
largely as a result of Butler's handling of the dispute in 
his absence on a Commonwealth tour. He refused to accede to 
Minister of Labour Macleod's request in January 1958 for a 
committee of enquiry to examine the pay claim, giving as the 
reason in a telegram to Macmillan his fear that, it 
would be interpreted by public opinion as the beginning of a 
surrender to the unions.' Yet the attitude of the Cabinet 
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towards most strikes was to concede an inflated wage 
increase rather than expose the economy to disruption, which 
would have been very damaging in electoral terms, quite 
apart from the impact on the balance of payments and foreign 
confidence in sterling. This policy was viable because from 
mid 1958 the economy did begin to expand, but it did not 
solve the underlying problems of industrial policy, which 
came to the fore in the adverse economic conditions of the 
1960s. Butler wrote to Lord Hailes that, 
The economic situation, while improving enormously, 
has in it seeds of trouble which were unresolved 
especially during the Labour Party and the Winston 
Churchill regime.(46) 
However, he regarded Thorneycroft's demand for a formal 
incomes policy as contrary to Conservative philosophy. 
Thorneycroft was also extremely concerned that social 
spending was getting increasingly out of control. As early 
as January 1957 he asserted that, 
In the longer term the financing of the 
State on its present basis would prove a 
liability than the economy could sustain. 
Welfare 
heavier 
By December he was still persisting in his demand (first 
made in July) that Government expenditure for 1958-59 should 
be kept at the same level as for 1957-58, in order to 
maintain foreign confidence in sterling and the Government's 
anti-inflationary policy. As prices had risen this meant 
cuts in expenditure in real terms amounting to E153 million. 
There was general agreement that economies in public 
expenditure had to be secured in order to reduce the size of 
the Budget deficit and safeguard the strength of sterling, 
but there were doubts about the consequences of some of the 
153 
more drastic cost-saving proposals. Macmillan noted in his 
diary that, 'The Chancellor wants some swingeing cuts in the 
Welfare State expenditure - more, I fear, than is feasible 
politically.'(47) 
The popular myth has developed that when faced with the 
rigid application of this policy Butler and Macmillan 
preferred the resignation of the entire Treasury team 
rather than accept electorally unpopular spending cuts. This 
event was represented as a victory for those who wanted to 
preserve the status quo as established by the Labour Party. 
However, Macmillan and Butler showed themselves willing to 
make sometimes unpopular changes to the post-war consensus 
of a mixed economy welfare state. In the quest for an 
'Opportunity' as opposed to a 'Welfare' State, the 
Government did seek bold policy changes.(48) 
There was general agreement on the need for a fully 
contributory National Health Service, and national insurance 
contributions were increased towards this end. Butler 
chaired a Ministerial Committee on Pensions which 
in July 1957 recommended the adoption of graduated pensions 
and a 'contracting out' provision, in order to relieve the 
impending deficit on the National Insurance Fund. The 
proposals formed the basis for the National Insurance Act of 
1959. It was welcomed by the One Nation group of Tory MPs as 
moving 
slightly but significantly away from a flat 
service, regardless of needs or means, and towards 
giving help where it is most needed. Socially it is 
just. Economically it is sound.(49) 
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In housing, Government subsidies for house building had been 
virtually abolished, and expenditure was concentrated on 
slum clearance, where it was needed most. The Local 
Government Act of 1958 replaced a number of specific or 
percentage grants with block grants to local authorities in 
order to encourage greater financial responsibility. The 
Rent Act of 1957 aimed to reintroduce market forces into 
housing to encourage the private rented sector, by allowing 
landlords to charge an 'economic' rent. It met with an 
enormous outcry, particularly in London where controlled 
rents were furthest out of line with market prices.(50) 
Education expenditure was the minimum possible to manage the 
largest ever number of pupils, and the service had been 
'running like mad to stand still.' Butler was prepared to 
consider the idea of keeping children longer in, primary 
schools as secondary education was more expensive.(51) 
However, Macmillan was careful to reassure the National 
Union in 1959 that, 
we are certainly determined to uphold 
grammar schools, which we regard as the 
guarantee for maintaining high standards 
secondary education. 
the 
best 
in 
Only a few comprehensive schools were introduced as 
experiments or in special cases. Ministers realised that the 
'11+' system of selection was a sensitive political issue, 
but they maintained that all children could not profit from 
the same type of education. They felt that the solution lay 
in improving secondary modern schools to provide just as 
good opportunities, in order to reconcile national need with 
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individual choice and achievement.(52) 
These policies represented the continuing Conservative 
belief in inequality as a means to greater wealth all-round, 
which was a fundamental difference between the Parties. Lord 
Hailsham, the Party Chairman, declared that, 
Conservatives believe that in a free 
incentives to make oneself unequal are 
part of the mechanism of creating new 
therefore new welfare.(53) 
society the 
a necessary 
wealth and 
Therefore, Ministers were already pursuing a distinctive 
welfare policy; the question was how far should it be 
pushed? 
By the first week of January 1958 Ministers had agreed to 
cuts amounting to £100 million, so that Government 
expenditure as a proportion of national income continued to 
fall. However, Thorneycroft reiterated his call for further 
cuts amounting to £50 million. He reverted to the 
traditional demands for short-term cuts in social 
expenditure, including cuts in school meals and family 
allowances, which Butler had so discredited in the Cabinet's 
Social Services Committee in 1955-56.(54) Ministers argued 
that, contrary to the Treasury view, any further cuts in 
social expenditure would be inflationary as they would lead 
to a renewal of inflated wage claims. It was arguable that 
foreign opinion would regard this as being at least as 
damaging to the potential recovery of sterling as a marginal 
increase in Government expenditure. Therefore, the Treasury 
demands were self-defeating in their aims, especially since 
some increases were beyond the Government's control such as 
156 
the increase in the number of schoolchildren and pensioners. 
Lord Hailsham had warned of the adverse electoral 
consequences of such measures in January 1957: 
It would be politically unwise if the first act of a 
Government favouring the Opportunity State was seen 
to be an attack on parenthood and education, which 
were the foundations of the future expansion of the 
economy.(55) 
The Treasury had failed to identify a strategy for welfare 
expenditure, that simultaneously was socially 
acceptable, electorally popular and economically efficient.' 
The Chancellor' ••• held to his view with almost fanatical 
rigidity,' in Macmillan's view, but the Cabinet stood firm 
and on 6th January Thorneycroft and his junior Ministers, 
Enoch Powell and Nigel Birch, resigned.(56) 
The extent of Butler's opposition to Thorneycroft's policy 
should not be underestimated. In his first speech in the 
aftermath of the Treasury resignations, to his constituents 
at Felstead on 7 January, Butler declared that, 
I for my part am not going to abandon the 
convictions of a lifetime. If we had to readjust and 
alter some of our social policy in the way suggested 
we should have had to do so without due regard to 
humanity or commonsense in facing the dual problem 
of inflation - limitation of money and limitation of 
the desire for rewards •••• It meant that the 
Government would have been asked to overturn, in the 
course of a few days, policies of social welfare to 
which some people have devoted the service of their 
lives. 
It was the clearest indication that Butler was prepared to 
resign had the Cabinet accepted Thorneycroft's proposals, 
and he would not have been alone.(57) 
Butler's handling of the aftermath of the crisis, in 
Macmillan's absence on a tour of the Commonwealth, was 
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regarded by The Economist as, the period of the best 
Prime Minister we haven't had.' He succeeded in uniting most 
Conservative MPs behind the Government's position, whilst 
his loyalty to Macmillan raised his own popularity. Tony 
Benn recorded that he, 
could 
Thorneycroft's 
spotted,' he 
victory •••• It 
scarcely forbear to cheer at 
disappearance. 'Nobody seems to have 
said, 'that this is a great Butler 
has been a wonderful week.'(58) 
Ministers refused to implement more cuts than were necessary 
to keep public expenditure under control or risk any 
significant rise in unemployment, and their adverse 
electoral consequences. Butler believed that gradual 
progress was being made towards his vision of Tory 
welfarism, as the Government preferred to follow a policy 
based on achieving a combination of solvency with social 
progress.(59) 
Recovery 
The way was cleared for the economic re-expansion so 
favoured by Macmillan and Butler, to take place from mid-
1958 onwards. By the end of 1958 the bank rate had been 
reduced to 4 per cent, hire purchase restrictions relaxed, 
and sterling made convertible. This progress was continued 
in the 1959 Budget, in which Derrick Heathcoat Amory, the 
new Chancellor, reduced income tax by 9d, restored 
investment allowances and cut purchase tax to the sum of 
£360 million. The subsequent reduction in unemployment from 
its peak of 620,000 in January 1959, and a consumer spending 
boom created an atmosphere of prosperity in preparation for 
an autumn election. Butler proclaimed his pride in the 
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Conservatives' management of the economy and their increased 
spending on education, housing, hospitals and pensions, 
compared to Labour's period of office. In a CPC pamphlet, 
Tomorrow Our Responsibility, he attacked the alternative 
Socialist policies of, extended nationalisation, 
excessive taxation and extravagant spending an 
infallible recipe for inflation.'(60) 
The Conservative manifesto, The Next Five Years, reinforced 
the Government's record of success whilst looking to the 
future. Butler liked the idea of stressing the continuing 
patterns of policy and projecting them forward, which he 
believed would carry added conviction with voters. He felt 
that the electorate would not be convinced by short term 
measures after eight years in office. Overall the manifesto 
was the most obvious symbol of the victory that had taken 
place eighteen months before, at the time of Thorneycroft's 
resignation. It declared, 
Conservative policy is to double the standard of 
living in this generation and ensure that all 
sections of society share in the expansion of 
wealth. (61) 
Opportunity came to be expressed in increasingly 
materialistic terms, as the electoral situation 
demanded. Behind much of the campaign lay the slogan 'You've 
never had it so good'.(62) Perhaps because of his misgivings 
about this strategy, Butler played a less dominant part than 
in the 1955 campaign. He may have recalled his own 
difficulties in maintaining the prosperity promised in the 
1955 election. However, Butler's first priority was the 
continuance of the Conservative Party in power. 
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The result of the general election, held on 8 October 1959, 
was by no means a foregone conclusion, and Butler predicted 
it would be a close finish. Opinion polls showed the 
Government's lead down to two per cent at one stage. The 
Labour Party pursued an adept campaign, outlining their 
ambitious plans for the social services, which had the 
Conservatives worried until Gaitskell's blunder about no 
increased taxes. The subsequent one hundred seat majority 
for the Conservatives surpassed even their own expectations, 
and gave them an unprecedented third successive victory.(63) 
The Conservative Party was given the credit for the 
prevailing sense of prosperity that pervaded the country, 
engendered by stable prices, low unemployment, and a 
consumer boom. One Labour activist commented, 
Once 
and 
done 
we made people think about pounds, shillings 
pence, they began to consider how well they'd 
in the last few years and to decide that the 
Tories were doing all right by them.(64) 
There was no positive reason to vote for the Labour Party, 
which was widely identified with the austerity and rationing 
of the late 1940s. It seemed that provided the Conservatives 
continued their successful administration of the economy and 
the welfare state, the opposition would wither away. 
Macmillan declared that the class war was over, and one 
commentator forecast the possibility of democratic one party 
government for Britain.(65) The Conservative Party 
maintained a strong lead among all sections of the middle 
class, despite grumblings of discontent, and acquired the 
votes of a larger proportion of skilled manual workers in 
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1959 than at any other Election since 1935.(66) It seemed 
that upwardly mobile workers had developed middle class 
voting habits to go with their middle class lifestyles. The 
Government's electoral strategy had succeeded beyond its 
wildest expectations, and it felt under no pressure to 
drastically alter its policies. 
Conclusion 
The restoration of Conservative Party fortunes after Suez 
was a remarkable achievement for which Butler deserved his 
share of the credit. It was the zenith of his concept of 
Conservatism, most clearly illustrated by the Treasury 
resignations in January 1958. Having secured his hold 
the policy making process Butler proved that he was 
prepared to defend the status quo. Whilst he was 
willing to accept a rigid implementation of spending 
c;:>ver 
not 
not 
cuts, 
regardless of the circumstances, he advocated policies which 
emphasised Conservative ideals of freedom of opportunity and 
responsibility. This involved reducing taxes to enable 
people to provide for themselves in terms of greater home 
ownership and private pensions. On the other hand, Butler 
regarded the provision of a decent state health service and 
selective education system as the foundations of opportunity 
and thus inequality, whilst welfare benefits were targeted 
to those most in need. A successful balance had been struck 
between the need for tax cuts to conciliate middle class 
supporters and a Tory welfare policy which was distinctive, 
but did not arouse fears of a return to the 1930s among 
potential working class supporters. As a result the Tories 
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maximised their support in a decisive victory in the 1959 
general election. 
Was the recovery of his reputation as complete as that of 
the Party? It certainly seemed so. He had re-established his 
position as heir apparent to Macmillan, whom he loyally 
supported, although he retained the enmity of those 
traditional Tories who had been antagonised by his Home 
Office reforms. His appointment as Chairman of the Party 
in October 1959 seemed to mark a further consolidation of 
his ideals within the Party. 
In the run up to the general election Butler was concerned 
that the emphasis on the materialistic aspects of prosperity 
was offering a hostage to fortune. He stressed equally 
compelling reasons for voting Conservative, but prosperity 
was the single most important factor in securing the 
Conservative victory in 1959. As Party Chairman Butler was 
saddled with the responsibility for maintaining Conservative 
success. He recognised that this involved a policy of 
continued economic expansion, in order to satisfy the 
disparate sources of Tory support with increased spending 
and lower taxes. Yet within months the joy of victory had 
turned to concern at the downturn in the economy, industrial 
unrest, and a big increase in welfare expenditure. The 
danger was that the new and transient sources of support 
gained before 1959 would leave the Party. With traditional 
middle class supporters antagonised by the leadership's 
policies, this created a very difficult electoral situation 
for the Conservatives and presented a fundamental challenge 
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4 
'Tomorrow Our Responsibility' 
Butler under Macmillan, 1959-1962 
Introduction 
The Conservative victory in the General Election of 1959 was 
a vindication of Butler's political philosophy. Increased 
Government spending on social services had pleased the 
Tories' new mass support, and lower taxes had ensured the 
grudging loyalty of their traditional supporters. Macmillan 
optimistically declared to the Queen that the British 
people, do not wish themselves to be divided into 
warring 
against 
classes or tribes filled with hereditary animosity 
each other.' For a time this seemed true, as 
economic prosperity continued. Throughout 1960 the polls and 
by-elections were still in the Tories' favour. They 
maintained a 3 to 6 per cent lead over the bitterly divided 
Labour Party. However, Macmillan warned in a letter to 
Butler that, 'English people are always easier to handle in 
adversity than in prosperity.' The Tories had raised 
expectations to a point where anything short of an economic 
miracle was viewed as failure. They were increasingly 
unable to satisfy voters' anticipation of continuous 
economic prosperity over the next three years.(1) 
The single most important factor in determining voting 
preferences was called into question after 1960, as the 
Government's economic policies met with less success. The 
danger was that the new and transient sources of support 
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gained before 1959 would desert the Party. With some of the 
Tories' traditional middle class support already antagonised 
by what they regarded as the Government's 'milk and water 
Socialism', this presented a fundamental challenge to 
Butler's brand of Conservatism, and an intractable electoral 
dilemma. ( 2) 
Butler's appointment as Chairman of the Conservative Party 
in October 1959, in addition to his existing 
responsibilities, reflected Macmillan's determination that 
the Party should, ' .•• remain progressive and not slide back 
into reaction.'(3) His task was hindered by the fact that 
the essentially cheerleading, combative job of Party 
Chairman conflicted with the traditionally non-partisan job 
of Leader of the House of Commons, and the political 
minefield that was the Home Office. More significantly 
Macmillan and Butler differed in their solution to the 
Tories' electoral dilemma. 
Butler had been uncomfortable with the materialist 'never 
had it so good' tone of the Conservative election campaign, 
which to some symbolised a smug contentment which 
ignores the perils of our own situa-tion ••• ' (4) As Party 
Chairman he sought to develop an alternative strategy based 
on the themes of opportunity and responsibility. However, 
this approach required increased expenditure on the social 
services at a time of economic difficulty. Macmillan's 
response was a shift towards more planning in the economy, 
and negotiations for entry into the European Economic 
Community (EEC). These policies represented a substantial 
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change from the philosophy of 'setting the people free' 
which Butler had espoused in the 1950s, and they reflected 
the degree to which he was now reacting to the political 
trend rather than directing it. However, he remained the 
most senior member of the Government after Macmillan. 
Selwyn Lloyd, the Foreign Secretary, observed that, 
Butler's ego is very satisfied with being 
Chairman of the Party as well as Leader of House and 
Home Secretary •••• He should be busy and at his 
best. His position as Crown Prince is, I think, 
impregnable, but there are some who say not.(5) 
From the outset Macmillan was determined that Butler should 
not succeed him, but he took advantage of his notion of 
service and duty to the Party and the country. Anthony 
Howard asserts that Macmillan, had come to regard Rab 
as a trout that he could tickle and play with at will.' By 
giving him the responsibility for defending every detail of 
Government policy to Party activists Macmillan tied Butler 
even more closely to his own fortunes. However, the Party 
Chairmanship was more important than Butler's official 
biographer makes out, as was illustrated by Macmillan's 
attempts to remove him in 1960 and 1961 .(6) His fears of a 
'palace revolt' led by Butler in 1961-2 forced him into the 
notorious 'night of the long knives', which marked a turning 
point in Butler's career away from domestic affairs and 
confirmed his decline in influence over policy making. 
The Conservative electoral dilemma 
As Party Chairman Butler saw it as his task to elaborate on 
the themes of opportunity and responsibility, which he had 
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outlined before 1959 as an alternative to materialism, 
while also seeking to ensure the economic prosperity that 
would provide these other benefits was maintained. 
Ultimately he was to achieve neither aim as Party Chairman. 
It was probably the one post of Butler's three that most 
suffered from his over-stretch. His image within the Party 
was that of a patrician elder statesman who had secured the 
Tories' acceptance of the post-war settlement, much to the 
chagrin of many activists. He was not the sort of platform 
orator who could inspire weary constituency workers in the 
hard times to come. There were no bell-ringing episodes or 
dips in the sea for Butler, and he found the public speaking 
required as Party Chairman an increasing strain. He later 
complained, 
Going to rallies at the weekend in distant parts of 
England and having to make speeches about how 
wonderful the Government was I found very hard and 
difficult- and not at all rewarding.(?) 
Butler preferred to use his administrative ability to deal 
with faults in the organisation, particularly in its social 
base, and the need to adapt to the changing electoral 
situation. He signalled the change of emphasis in a letter 
to local constituency chairmen in December 1959, in which he 
warned of the dangers of selfishness and complacency in the 
new atmosphere of prosperity.(8) He outlined three aims to 
Macmillan: an improved performance in the local government 
elections, a recruiting drive for the Young Conservatives 
and the encouragement of older members to transfer their 
activities to the senior organisation, and an increase in 
the numbers of Conservative trade unionists. Butler felt 
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that this was, a most valuable way of reaching the men 
in the factories and workshops with our propaganda and 
ourselves and learning the state of opinion in them.'(9) 
These aims were particularly important in the light of the 
interim findings of the Conservative Research Department's 
Psephology Group in the autumn of 1960. It found that there 
remained a large element of latent non-voting Labour 
support, sufficient, if activated, to cause heavy 
Conservative defeats. It also found that the youngest 
voters, particularly the 21-30 age group who were increasing 
as a proportion of the population, were among the most 
volatile, hence the need to attract their support. The key 
find was that though the divisions between the classes had 
narrowed, people were voting more by class than before the 
war. Voting intentions became most unstable when electors 
moved from working class to lower middle class, which was 
precisely the movement Conservative policies aimed to 
encourage. However, the report concluded that, 
the tendency towards a middle class society has 
a long way to go yet, and it is still from the 
working class two-thirds that we still get more than 
half our votes - and have to if we are to win an 
Election.(10) 
Butler considered that one of the best ways of doing this 
was to give such people an adequate voice within the 
councils of the Tory Party. This aim was a high risk 
strategy since the Conservative Party in the House of 
Commons and the Cabinet was overwhelmingly upper class and 
patrician. They were more inclined to attract working class 
votes by offering better public services and consumer 
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benefits. In contrast the middle classes, who dominated key 
positions in the Party hierarchy, demanded firmer controls 
on public expenditure and lower taxes. However, the 
leadership jealously guarded policy making which, Party 
deputy chairman Lord Aldington asserted, was ' .•. handed 
down from on top and not dictated from below.'(11) Butler 
was keen to maintain control over the development of policy, 
a role he already fulfilled as Chairman of the Research 
Department. 
Butler believed that most working class support for the 
Conservative Party was not based on ideals but on the 
acquisition and maintenance of prosperity. Social researcher 
Mark Abrams found that there were strong aspirations to a 
middle class lifestyle among manual workers. This was 
defined in terms of their possession of consumer durables, 
their children's attendance at grammar schools, and the fact 
that their homes were clean, warm and well stocked. It 
seemed clear from recent surveys that as people acquired 
these things or got within reach of them, they tended to 
vote Conservative.(12) However, Government policies were 
increasingly unable to fulfil the expectations of a middle 
class lifestyle. 
On the other hand, Butler also accepted Labour MP Tony 
Crosland's argument that prosperity was unlikely to be as 
decisive an electoral asset in the 1960s as it had been in 
the 1950s, and would be taken as much for granted as full 
employment. The Conservative psephology group came to the 
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conclusion that the assumption that working class support 
was wholly dependent upon, middle class consumption 
patterns and the ownership of durable consumer goods seems 
very doubtful.'(13) The public mood was increasingly 
idealistic yet cynical of the political process. In the 
early 1960s there was a spate of introspective literature 
and satirical critiques, which analysed the causes of 
Britain's difficulties and proposed various radical 
remedies. They received widespread attention.(14) 
In Government circles there was a belated acceptance of the 
need for a non-materialistic philosophy which Butler had 
been advocating since before 1959. Lord Kilmuir wrote that: 
This new feeling was extremely difficult to define. 
It was 'anti-Establishment', but not anarchic; it 
embraced no existing political philosophy; it could 
not be explained in class or economic terms; it was 
vague, unsubstantial, but very real, and we were 
absolutely baffled by it. From the immediate 
political point of view, it was strongly 
antagonistic to 'you never had it so good' as a 
political philosophy. The return of idealism caught 
both parties off-balance, and the Conservatives, as 
the Government party, suffered worse than our 
opponents.(15) 
The new feeling extended to Tory Party members. In May 1960 
the National Union debated a motion from the Federation of 
Conservative Students which criticised the 'never had it so 
good' slogan as an expression of Tory philosophy. Butler's 
emphasis on 'work' and 'duty', in his subsequent speech to 
the Party Conference, signalled a deliberate departure from 
it. Sir Edward Boyle, Financial Secretary to the Treasury, 
in a letter to Butler, expressed concern that, too 
many people seem to associate the Tory programme of 
prosperity and expansion, quite unfairly, with selfishness 
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and complacency.' In fact, the two concepts were 
complementary; a rising level of·material resources was a 
necessary pre-condition of social progress.(16) 
The dilemma facing the Conservatives was how to fulfil their 
pledges to improve services, when the built-in cost of those 
services was rising so dramatically and the economic boom 
went bust. Party managers held to their belief that the 
prosperous working classes wanted the better services 
associated with a middle class lifestyle, but traditional 
Tory supporters were not prepared to pay for them with 
higher taxes. The President of the Board of Trade, Reginald 
Maudling, was convinced that Britain was, suffering 
from the malaise of the affluent society.'(17) 
Welfare versus tax cuts 
Butler observed that Macmillan was determined to avoid the 
political implications of the deflationary measures demanded 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Heathcoat Amory. He 
feared that such measures would mean that, the new 
progressive Conservatism will turn out to be a policy of 
alternation between Benzadrine and Relaxa-tabs.'·(18) In the 
meantime, excessive demand for goods led to higher prices 
and rising wages ahead of productivity, and recurring 
balance of payments difficulties. The reluctance to restrain 
the consumer boom led to a continuing fall in the reserves 
which reached crisis point in July 1961. Butler was called 
into 'perpetual consultation' by Macmillan, but it was a 
reflection of his loosening grip over policy-making that the 
new policies were initiated by Macmillan and his new 
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Chancellor of the Exchequer, Selwyn Lloyd.(19) 
The Research Department had been urging on Ministers a more 
interventionist approach for some time since, 
virtually exhausted the Nee-Liberal seam in 
we have 
economic 
policy.' It was felt that Britain would be more successful 
in keeping demand and production in a proper relationship if 
there was a greater degree of planning, in the shape of 
coordinating forecasts of demand and investment plans 
between government, employers and trade unions, and the 
setting of target figures. This 'New Approach' reflected the 
apparent success of such policies in Europe, and was part of 
a programme to 'modernise' Britain. It was encapsulated in 
the creation of the National Economic Development Council 
(NEDC) in 1961. In addition, a loose form of wages policy 
was instigated to make clear the inter-relationship between 
wage increases and productivity. It was announced as a 'pay 
pause' by the Chancellor in his emergency, mini Budget on 
25th July, 1961, and was later formalised in the creation of 
the National Incomes Commission (NIC) in July 1962. The 
Government also accepted the recommendations of the Plowden 
Committee that public expenditure should be subjected to 
five year forecasts and related to the prospective growth of 
national resources.(20) 
The 'New Approach' was quite different to the policy Butler 
had instituted in 1951, when as Chancellor he rejected the 
planning policies of the previous Labour Government. Several 
Ministers, perhaps including Butler, thought that in the 
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long-term the balance of payments could only be corrected by 
floating the pound, but this perennial issue was not 
seriously considered. In the Cabinet, only Hailsham and Hare 
(Minister of Labour) supported Lloyd's proposals, but 
Macmillan ensured they were accepted. The fact that the new 
policy appeared to represent all the things that a Labour 
government might have been expected to embrace added to 
Butler's difficulties as Party Chairman. The Government 
quite suddenly appeared to be moving towards what The 
Economist described as a 'hands on' type of economic 
management, more interventionist than since 1951.(21) 
However, in the short-term, Lloyd was forced to rely on more 
traditional Conservative policies. He raised the bank rate 
to 7 per cent, increased consumer taxes, and imposed a much 
fiercer squeeze on Government spending and bank overdrafts. 
The measures represented the biggest immediate cut in 
purchasing power in peacetime. They succeeded in dampening 
demand and improving the balance of payments position but 
at a heavy price for the Government, as the Labour Party 
took a 5 per cent lead in the Gallup poll.(22) 
As a result of these economic difficulties the Conservatives 
were faced with the dilemma of how to increase Government 
spending and at the same time make tax cuts. After nine 
Conservative Budgets the tax structure was much more 
sensible and thus the scope for tax cuts more limited. 
Furthermore, the percentage of national income devoted to 
the social services was rising at an average rate of 180 
million pounds a year. In July 1960 Treasury Minister Sir 
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Edward Boyle warned Party officials that, people did 
not sufficiently realise how much more difficult in the 
1960s reducing taxation would be than it had been in the 
1950s.' He could foresee no major changes of policy which 
would enable significant savings to be made.(23) 
A clash was looming between Conservative pledges in the 
social service field and the manifesto commitment to 
'reducing wherever possible the burden of taxation'. The 
Research Department warned of the danger of tax increases 
which would, result in increasing hostility to any of 
the Government's policies that involve higher expenditure.' 
It was clear that the Government could no longer ignore the 
problem, and Butler posed the fundamental question as to, 
whether we are going to go on living on surgery 
or whether we can supplement this by a regime of 
nee-Conservatism. One field in which we can find 
much grist for the latter is in reforming the 
Beveridge Welfare State and getting away from 
universality, thus helping to reduce total cost and 
fitting the service to the wearer. Up to now there 
has not been much hope along these lines.(24) 
Butler set up a research group to report into the long-term 
future of the social services. It argued that it was very 
important to broaden the opportunities of the 'new middle 
classes' to pay for certain services, such as pensions, 
education, housing, and medical services, themselves. To 
encourage self-reliance and independence was in line with 
Conservative philosophy, and would release funds for further 
expansion of the social services or reducing taxation. 
Butler declared that, 
The function of politics today must be to ensure 
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that full employment, generous social services and 
modern comforts become, in Sir Winston Churchill's 
words, 'a springboard and not a sofa'.(25) 
There was some talk in Party circles of a 'new Beveridge 
Report' to take account of the changes in British society. 
However, Butler's research group concluded that much 
progress in this direction had already been made, and it was 
felt that more radical proposals would be bound to raise 
widespread public suspicion. He accepted that the 
maintenance of state services should remain the immediate 
objective, especially since a large proportion of the 
population continued to benefit from them.(26) 
The paradox was that as Chancellor Butler had been 
responsible for delaying expenditure on the social services. 
Government spending in the 1950s had been the minimum 
necessary to maintain the existing services. In the 1960s 
this was no longer a feasible policy as the maintenance of 
services required long overdue improvements, which were 
expensive. These changes were unable to reconcile the 
expectations of the disparate sources of Tory support. 
There was a general feeling that Conservatives were losing 
the initiative on the housing front, which was apparently 
most important in changing voting habits. There was still a 
housing shortage, and greater prosperity led people to 
expect higher standards of housing and amenities. Although 
60,000 slum dwellings a year were being cleared, half a 
million remained. The Research Department concluded that 6 
million new houses would be needed over the next 20 years -
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an average house building rate of at least 300,000 a year. 
This involved big increases in Government expenditure for 
council house building, similar to the burden which Butler 
endured as Chancellor in the 1950s.(27) 
In contrast the electoral value of increasing home ownership 
was hampered by the economic necessity for rising interest 
rates, the maintenance of Schedule A tax on owner occupiers, 
and the effects of rating revaluation. The discontent of 
home owners was matched by widespread discontent about the 
Rent Act, which had failed to increase the supply of private 
rented accomodation, yet the incentive for unscrupulous 
landlords to get rid of old tenants was highlighted by the 
activities of Peter Rachman in London.(28) 
In education rising expectations led to demands for ever 
higher expenditure. The Government had made important moves 
towards improving educational opportunities at the secondary 
level, in response to the Crowther and Newsom Reports, both 
by increasing the number of teachers and the scale of the 
five year capital investment programme for school 
building. However, it had been forced on to the defensive in 
the face of the unpopularity of selection, and the belief 
that secondary modern schools were inferior to grammar 
schools. The Conservatives sought to distance themselves 
from their previous adherence to the 'rigid bipartitism' of 
secondary selection and grammar schools. Sir Edward Boyle, 
the Minister of Education from 1962, defended grammar 
schools but was sympathetic to means which would remove the 
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need for selection. In contrast, the Research Department 
pointed out the electoral risk in merging established 
grammar schools in the pursuit of 'desegregation'. His 
junior Minister, Christopher Chataway, has taken the view 
that Boyle's, 
cautious and agnostic position did not win him 
many plaudits. The supporters of reorganisation were 
unimpressed by his hesitancy, while the defenders of 
the grammar schools had the distinct impression that 
a pass was about to be sold. 
At best Butler must have been ambivalent at this shift away 
from his Education Act of 1944.(29) 
Both within the Party and outside it a 'New Right' opinion 
developed which was hostile to ever increasing Government 
expenditure and high taxes, liberal policies on crime and 
immigration, and the withdrawal from Empire. As Chairman 
Butler's liberal instincts in all these areas were more 
likely to antagonise than conciliate them.(30) 
The 'middle-class revolt' 
The middle classes were in what Iain Macleod described as a 
'revolt of the unorganised against the organised'. 
'Disgruntled true-blues' complained of lack of leadership, 
the high level of Government spending, high interest and 
hire purchase rates, and rising transport fares.(31) There 
was a widespread feeling that Conservative economic policy 
should pay more attention to their interests. The 
implementation of the pay pause in the public sector, 
aroused highly articulate groups of critics, who saw their 
differentials eroded as pay in the private sector raced 
ahead. In practice, the TUC and the FBI were unable to do 
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more than merely advise their organisations to pay heed to 
the new planning bodies, and the TUC refused to co-operate 
with the NIC. As a result, Kenneth Morgan has written that, 
'This was planning without teeth, let alone penal or legal 
sanction.'(32) 
The Government's refusal to legislate against the trade 
unions did not satisfy a large section of public opinion 
which felt that some counter to the bargaining power of the 
trade unions in a period of full employment was necessary. 
It included 103 Tory MPs who in November 1962 signed a 
Commons motion in favour of legislation against unofficial 
strikes. Macleod advised Macmillan that he believed they 
were, 'typical of the widest sort of Conservative opinion.' 
Many felt that the Party was being too liberal, and was out 
of touch with the concerns of Tory supporters. Butler noted 
MPs' concern at the Prime Minister's admission, repeated to 
a meeting of the 1922 Committee in July 1962, that post-war 
Labour ideals were being realised in the Tory Party.(33) 
Butler's policies on crime and immigration as Home Secretary 
also antagonised traditional Tory supporters. The Government 
was determined to deal with the 'unparalleled' crime wave 
through the programme of measures outlined in Butler's White 
Paper, Penal Practice in ~Changing Society. This position 
did not satisfy many Tories, especially women, and the force 
of their pressure seemed to suprise Butler who wrote to 
Macmillan that, 'There is no logic in politics, so one just 
has to accept issues as one finds them.' However, he stood 
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his ground.(34) The passage of the Criminal Justice Bill in 
1961 contained no return to birching or flogging, to the 
disgust of many Tories who made their feelings known at the 
1961 Party Conference at Brighton (69 Conservative MPs voted 
for an amendment demanding their return). Party unity was 
maintained on the leadership's terms after a successful 
speech by Butler, but it was another blight on his leaderhip 
hopes.(35) 
Tory activists were more successful in their demands for 
immigration controls. The number of Commonwealth immigrants 
from under-developed countries rose from 21,000 in 1959 to 
58,000 in 1960, and 136,000 in 1961. It was increasingly 
difficult for them to be absorbed into the labour force in 
the harsher economic climate of the 1960s, and the strain on 
local services in particular areas provoked isolated racial 
incidents. A Gallup poll in the summer of 1961 showed that 
67 per cent of people advocated the imposition of some 
restrictions. Butler was reluctantly persuaded that 
immigrants could be integrated into the community with 
tolerance and without friction, only if the potential size 
of the social difficulties involved was anticipated and 
reduced. The result was the Commonwealth Immigrants Bill of 
1962 which controlled entry by a system of labour permits. 
In practice the rate of net immigration was approximately 
halved.(36) 
The Bill was viciously attacked by the Labour Party and by 
the quality press as 'cruel and brutal anti-colour 
legislation' which tarnished Butler's liberal reputation. 
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However, it did nothing to endear him to Tory right wingers, 
as he made his lack of enthusiasm for some aspects of the 
measure all too evident, in the view of his junior Minister, 
David Renton. Both sides in a contentious issue tended to 
think the worst of him. Macmillan thought he had made a 
mess of it, noting in his diary that, 'He has brought much 
of his trouble on himself by an appearance of vacillation. ' 
The issue reflected an increasing divergence between Party 
opinion and Government action.(37) 
'From three bats to one' 
These difficulties highlighted the essential incompatibility 
of Butler's role as Party Chairman with those as Home 
Secretary and Leader of the House of Commons. There were 
indications that Macmillan was concerned about this 
difficulty as early as 1960. He noted in his diary that, 
'Rab's weakness and oddness seemed to grow not lessen.'(38) 
The issue of a change was the subject of much agonised 
correspondence, and reflected a preoccupation with his 
personal position in the race for the succession. Michael 
Fraser, Director of the Research Department, advised Butler 
that it was too early for him to move from the Home Office 
or the Party Chairmanship without serious damage to his 
reputation and, 
without at best giving the impression of having 
started a lot of enterprises without having seen 
them through, or, at worst, giving rise to rumours 
either of failure or of having taken on too much. 
Equally you cannot give up the Leadership of the 
House without losing seniority, and a good deal of 
influence on future Government policy to someone 
else.(39) 
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In the Cabinet reshuffle of July 1960 Selwyn Lloyd's 
appointment as Chancellor meant that there was a vacancy at 
the Foreign Office, which Butler would like to have taken. 
He claimed in his memoirs that he would, like to have 
gone there and assumed one hat instead of three.' (40) 
However, at the time he, ' .•. accepted that, if my excellent 
relations with HM were to continue, I had better not move.' 
Butler recognised that, given Macmillan's interest in 
foreign affairs, the Foreign Secretary would merely be an 
agent of the Prime Minister.(41) It was also the reason he 
gave for twice declining Macmillan's offer of the 
Commonwealth Relations Office, which would have been 
interpreted as a decline in his influence and prestige (as 
he would have succeeded Lord Home who was promoted to the 
Foreign Office). In a letter to Macmillan which was never 
delivered, he decided that, 
I would rather not move from my present position 
except to somewhere in which I felt unconstrained 
and which we were both happy about and absolutely 
free to give uninhibited service.(42) 
Butler was determined to' •.• continue to contribute to 
Party thought and policy,' as the basis for any future 
leadership bid. He was probably satisfied with Home's 
appointment as Foreign Secretary as it meant that none of 
his potential rivals for the leadership such as Iain Macleod 
got it. However, in May 1960 Macmillan told Selwyn Lloyd 
that, ' .•• he was sure that Butler could not lead the party 
-he would not hand over to him.'(43) 
Macmillan returned to the issue again in 1961 when the 
Conservatives were in further difficulty, and he felt 
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insecure about his own position as leader. Polls still 
showed Butler as most favoured successor. He became 
increasingly concerned about the threat of a 'palace revolt' 
led by Butler over the unpopularity of the 'New Approach' 
and the European issue.(44) 
This time he insisted upon Butler's removal as Party 
Chairman. He saw it as a chance to defuse the friction that 
had built up between the Party and the Home Office, 
reflecting his concern for the electoral situation. He told 
Butler that he wanted a younger, post-1945 entrant Chairman, 
with 'more fire' than Butler had recently displayed, to 
prepare for the next general election. Butler noted that, 
He seemed comparatively indifferent to my regrets at 
no longer serving the Party intimately. He said 'you 
can sell the home farm or let it and still take an 
interest in the Estate' .(45) 
Butler was, in the words of Selwyn Lloyd, 'deeply wounded'. 
He felt that he had achieved his objectives as Party 
Chairman to increase the Party's membership, albeit a 
temporary recovery on what was in fact a steady decline from 
1960 onwards, and to get the organisation in good shape to 
fight the next election. As part of his aim to widen the 
social base of the Party, there were now 14,000 trade 
unionist members, including an increase of 4000 in one year. 
The Young Conservatives were doing very well in their 
membership campaign, and in local government the Party had 
regained control of Lancashire, Middlesex and Essex.(46) Yet 
his removal came at a time of a Gallup poll slump in the 
Party's fortunes which was none of his making. Butler 
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complained to Lord Home that he was, not responsible 
for the policies which have caused only a temporary 
decline.' He had warned Macmillan in July of his belief that 
there had been a decline in the high morale of Party workers 
due to, ' •.• uncertainty as to where we are going in certain 
major issues.' By this he meant the failure to maintain 
economic prosperity, and the shift towards more planning in 
the economy which was the antithesis of his aim to 'set the 
people free'. An important distinction between the Parties 
had been blurred, and at least Butler's removal meant that 
he no longer had to publicly defend the changes.(47) 
Macmillan also saw it as a chance to promote Macleod away 
from the Colonies where he had antagonised the right wing of 
the Party. However, Macleod would only accept the 
Chairmanship if he became Leader of the House as well, 
thereby defeating Macmillan's desire to separate Party from 
Government. In fact Butler was to be as much a victim of 
Macleod's ruthlessness as of Macmillan, who had to go back 
on his argument and demand that Butler gave up the House too 
as it was too much of a 'treadmill'. Butler wrote that, 'He 
[Macmillan] thought 6 years was enough and the fact that I 
had shown a certain virtuosity did not necessarily do me any 
good with the Party.' The loss of this post was particularly 
hard for Butler since he thought it important for 'dynastic 
reasons', in the sense of being well placed to succeed 
Macmillan .(48) 
Butler, who had first heard of these plans second hand, was 
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advised by Michael Fraser to hold on to all his existing 
appointments at least until after the Party Conference to 
avoid creating the wrong impression. Assuming that Macmillan 
would carry on for some time to come, Butler should carry on 
as Leader of the House, as it was a convenient position for 
a deputy to hold, it was in the middle of the Cabinet 
committee structure, and enabled useful contacts. On the 
other hand, he believed there was a fair case for giving up 
the Home Office, as 
The Party reactions to the crime wave are likely to 
continue to be on balance harmful to you. The fruits 
of your policies will probably take a long time to 
ripen - too long to be personally useful. 
Fraser urged Butler to retain the Party Chairmanship, 
because it was doing him good rather than harm. It enabled 
him to keep close contact with the Party in the country, and 
for them to get to know him. He even suggested the 
possibility of Butler being appointed Deputy Prime 
Minister.(49) 
There were several meetings between the two, so it seemed 
that Butler resisted the proposed changes. Macmillan had to 
offer additional inducements to make the idea of Butler 
helping him more of a reality, including the Chairmanship of 
the Cabinet Committee overseeing the Common Market 
negotiations. He even offered Butler a peerage, a measure of 
his determination to get his way. Butler demanded the formal 
title of Deputy Prime Minister in return for his sacrifice, 
and in this he was supported by the Chief Whip. However, it 
was dropped, at Macmillan's insistence, on the advice of Sir 
Norman Brook, the Cabinet Secretary, who advised that no 
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such position existed constitutionally. Macmillan wanted to 
avoid any presumption of succession in favour of Butler, but 
he reassured him that the changes would not affect the 
choice of his successor. Butler noted Macmillan's assertion 
that he would, 
have a far better chance of succeeding him if 
the issue lay with the Crown before the Election, 
than if the choice were to be left to a Party 
meeting after the Election when we had lost.(SO) 
In the face of this opposition Butler somewhat 
unexpectedly bought the formula,' and accepted Macmillan's 
wishes. This confirmed Macmillan's suspicion that he lacked 
the necessary drive and ruthlessness to become leader. The 
changes were interpreted by the press as representing the 
advance of one of the younger generation of Ministers into 
the leadership stakes, albeit one of Butler's proteges. The 
Times wrote that, 
One important effect of Mr Macmillan's 
reconstruction of his Ministry is to leave Mr Butler 
with one hat instead of three and to give Mr Macleod 
three hats instead of one. 
However, Butler later felt that this, must be the 
beginning of what we wanted to see in the end, namely my own 
success in the Party and lain following me.' Macmillan must 
have been frustrated by the ease with which Butler appeared 
to bounce back from such a reversal of fortune.(51) 
The changes had been announced on the eve of the 
Conservative Party Conference at Brighton in October 1961. 
Butler was forced to face it, shorn of two plumes and 
retaining only the Home Office, which is the one hot 
potato.' In the event he scored a striking success in the 
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debate on law and order which, gave me considerable 
acclaim and helped re-establish my position.'(52) Opinion 
polls continued to show Butler as Macmillan's most favoured 
successor. Harold Evans, Macmillan's Press Secretary, 
observed that, 'Rab is having to steer delicately at the 
moment when leadership questions are being so freely 
discussed.' In the press Henry Fairlie argued that the 
changes had enhanced Butler's power, as he now possessed a 
power of veto within the Party because he had made himself 
indispensable to it. Butler regarded his appointment to 
chair the Common Market negotiations committee as, a 
strategic position of great political interest.' It appeared 
to put him at the forefront of the Government's 
modernisation strategy.(53) 
The 'great reappraisal' 
The changes marked the beginning of Butler's shift away from 
home affairs, and the Government's increasing emphasis on 
Britain's entry into the Common Market, as the central plank 
of its modernisation policy.(54) Butler's involvement with 
the European question went back further than his appointment 
as Chairman of the Cabinet Committee with oversight of the 
Common Market negotiations, to the 'great reappraisal' of 
1960. He had chaired a Cabinet sub-committee, known as 
HOPS, which brought together the facts on the Common Market, 
and led to the Cabinet's decision that Britain should apply 
for entry in July 1961. Many years later Butler recalled the 
significance of his appointment: 
At that date the succession to the leadership was 
not settled; and at that date in many ways I was the 
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senior, right up to the end, in the succession.(55) 
Macmillan realised that, in terms of the Party and the 
country, Butler was a crucially important figure in any 
successful decision to head for Europe. He hoped this would 
give confidence to the Commonwealth and British agriculture, 
of whom Butler was a staunch defender, and make it more 
difficult for him to lead a revolt on the issue by involving 
him in the Government's change of policy.(56) However, it 
was arguable that Macmillan got more trouble than he 
bargained for, as Butler sought to make his views known. 
Butler remained a sceptic, largely due to his concern for 
the protection of British farmers. As MP for an 
agricultural constituency he even felt his ' ••. seat to be 
fundamentally at stake.' Macmillan recorded in his diary a 
rumour in the Sunday Express that, 
the Home Secretary, R A Butler, has definitely 
decided to play the role of Disraeli - break the 
Government and lead the orthodox 'Country Party' to 
the defence of British agriculture and the 
Commonwealth.(57) 
It was partly due to the doubts of Butler, Maudling and 
Hailsham, that the terms of the application were couched in 
such cautious language. Butler felt that the Government 
should not place all its hopes on one solution to Britain's 
problems, reflecting his innate attachment to the art of 
the possible. He was not prepared to come out decisively for 
or against entry until he could predict the likely outcome, 
and until then he hedged his bets in a display of the 
vacillation which Macmillan so disliked in Butler's 
character. On hearing that Butler was professing his 
sympathy with both the pro and anti-Europeans, Anthony Eden 
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declared to Selwyn Lloyd that, 'He does not seem to realise 
that the antis and the pros sometimes meet.'(58) Macmillan 
treated Butler's indiscretions as a real threat to his 
leadership and, coming on top of a nosedive in the Party's 
fortunes, this encouraged him to saddle Butler with a 
seemingly impossible task. 
The corollary of Britain's entry into the Common Market was 
the withdrawal from Empire. After 1959 the process of 
decolonisation was speeded up. The Government regarded the 
process as a conservative policy that had to be pursued in 
order to avoid something worse. However, it attracted the 
criticism of an increasingly vocal minority on the right of 
the Tory Party led by Lord Salisbury and the newly 
established Monday Club. The division over the speed and 
nature of decolonisation and transfer to black majority rule 
was highlighted by the controversy surrounding the future of 
the Central African Federation of Northern Rhodesia, 
Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. By appointing Butler to 
work out a solution as Minister for Central African Affairs 
in March 1962, Macmillan may have hoped to keep him busy and 
away from any significant influence over his European 
policy.(59) 
Many hours of thought went into Butler's decision, but 
Macmillan rightly counted on his sense of duty to persuade 
him to accept the post, even though he had not asked for it 
and had suggested other candidates. He decided to accept the 
job in the belief that, ' •.• if I did not I would be turning 
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back rather than forward in my own career.' Macmillan told 
him that it could make his reputation, but Butler did not 
underestimate the difficulties involved. Many commentators 
felt that there was a reputation to be lost, and Butler's 
second thoughts were evident in a series of worried 
telephone calls to Timothy Bligh, the Prime Minister's 
Private Secretary. He recognised that success or failure 
would be bound to antagonise different sections of the Tory 
Party. It was to take up much of his time and energy over 
the next eighteen months.(60) 
However, Macmillan had unwittingly put Butler at the 
forefront of a potential revolt based on a combination of 
opposition to the Common Market and defence of 
Commonwealth. In April 1962 Butler was advised that 
the solution of the Central African problem 
provided a wonderful opportunity of casting in with 
those Conservatives who might be instrumental in 
forwarding my own personal interests. 
the 
He had also yet to commit himself fully to Britain's entry 
into the Common Market. Harold Evans noted chief negotiator 
Edward Heath's irritation with Butler for giving pessimistic 
briefings to lobby correspondents. As late as July 1962 news 
was reaching Macmillan, 
that (a) if we reach agreement in Brussels, 
Butler will lead a revolt in the Party on the cry of 
'selling out the Commonwealth'; (b) if we fail, the 
PM's Common Market policy ••. will be humiliated and 
he must resign. 
As the Government was already deeply unpopular among all 
sections of its support because of the major upheavals in 
policy, such rumours may have partly caused him to lose his 
nerve and sack one third of his Cabinet. He later told 
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Selwyn Lloyd that, 'Butler had been plotting to divide the 
Party on the Common Market and bring him down.'(61) 
'The night of the long knives' 
In March 1962 Conservative grass-roots discontent revealed 
itself in a series of poor by-election performances. The 
biggest shock came in Orpington, previously regarded as one 
of the safest Conservative seats in the country, where a 
Tory majority of 14,760 was turned into a Liberal majority 
of 7,855. On average the Conservatives lost 20 per cent of 
their vote in each by-election in 1962. On 28th March 
National Opinion Poll's survey gave the Liberals 33.7 per 
cent, Labour 33.5, and the Conservatives in third place with 
32.8 per cent. Its detailed constituency survey confirmed 
Macleod's belief that, 'Incomparably the leading factor was 
the dislike of the pay policy and general dislike of the 
Government.' However, the real danger was the subsequent 
transfer of this swing to Labour rather than back to the 
Conservatives as in 1959. The Middlesbrough West by-
election in June, revealed a spectacular swing away from the 
Tories to the Labour Party.(62) 
Tory MPs and supporters saw economic expansion as the key 
to their electoral fortunes, and they were dismayed by the 
Chancellor's reluctance to embark upon reflation in the 1962 
Budget. Butler felt that the time had come for reflation to 
'set the people free' once more. Paul Channon, his 
Parliamentary Private Secretary, reported to Butler that, 
there is a general feeling that changes must be made 
quickly or if not Party loyalty will be strained to the 
195 
utmost.' (63) 
Butler urged Macmillan to give the Government a new look and 
to initiate the reflation of the economy. In a discussion in 
June 1962 Macmillan noted that Butler, 
••• feels that the present grave political situation 
is due entirely to the bad handling of the economic 
problem (or rather its bad presentation) by the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Treasury. He 
felt that drastic action was necessary to save the 
situation. This means the problem (an immense human 
and political problem) of replacing the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer. 
Butler pressed for Lloyd to be replaced by Reginald 
Maudling, the Colonial Secretary, who shared similar views 
about the need for economic expansion.(64) 
Macmillan may have accepted Butler's advice on this issue, 
but his decision to form virtually a new Government in a 
separate reshuffle during the summer recess aroused alarm. 
Butler was extremely unhappy about Macmillan's intention to 
remove him from the Home Office, leaving him only with his 
Central African responsibilities, which he had assumed in 
March 1962 and carried little chance of further political 
achievement. He admitted in a letter to Macmillan on 11th 
July that, 
I have been on a limb before with a minute staff and 
found it difficult to keep things going •••. I should 
lose a lot in precedence if I were simply associated 
with Africa, and a small piece of it at that. 
He considered that his proposed new posts as First Secretary 
of State and Deputy Prime Minister were roles he had in fact 
carried out for the past nine years. He knew that no 
gazetted position as Deputy Prime Minister was permitted 
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officially so there could be no presumption of succession. 
There were no defined responsibilities save for those laid 
down by Macmillan, and he doubted if this would convince 
public opinion that he was being promoted.(65) 
Butler's unhappiness with these changes led him into a 
customary indiscretion, which was designed to secure his own 
position in the Government and the leadership stakes. It was 
one of the few occasions on which Butler caused Macmillan to 
panic, as what was intended as one change initially, turned 
into the dismissal of one third of the Cabinet on 13th July, 
1962. 
Macmillan felt himself forced into action by a leak in the 
Daily Mail on 12th July, accurately predicting the sack for 
Lloyd and several other Ministers, and a major promotion for 
Butler. As Butler had lunched with the newspaper's owner, 
Lord Rothermere, the day before, it was clear that 'Rab had 
blabbed'. Macmillan was appalled and, fearing a conspiracy 
against himself led by Butler, and the prospect of another 
by-election disaster at Leicester North East, decided to 
merge his plans into one massive shake up. Selwyn Lloyd, 
Lord Kilmuir, Lord Mills, David Eccles, Charles Hill, Jack 
Maclay, and Harold Watkinson were all sacked within a few 
hours.(66) As Macmillan intended, Butler was appointed to 
the posts of First Secretary of State and Deputy Prime 
Minister. 
There was no opportunity for the further discussion or 
bargaining which perhaps Butler had hoped for as a result of 
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his indiscretion. There was no evidence on Butler's part of 
a conspiracy to remove Macmillan, merely to strengthen his 
own position. Selwyn Lloyd later noted that Butler, ' had 
known that changes were under consideration but he thought 
they were after discussion and that nothing would be decided 
for a month or two.' He complained that, 'I lost the Home 
Office without any discussion in fact without being asked.' 
His appointment to discuss the changes on 13th July had been 
abruptly cancelled. Macmillan had called his bluff.(67) 
The end result was the creation of one of the strongest 
young Cabinets of the century in Butler's view. However, 
this achievement was lost in the uproar over the method of 
the changes. The indecent haste in the spilling of so much 
blood did fatal damage to Macmillan's reputation for 
'unflappability'. The impression was one of panic and, on 
the other hand, of a ruthless attempt by the Prime Minister 
to save his own skin at the expense of his friends. 
Macmillan had made many enemies by his actions. The Press 
were almost universally 'sour', and there were rumours of 
revolt among backbench Tory MPs, urged on by his perennial 
critics, Nigel Birch and Lord Lambton.(68) 
Press reaction to the changes concerning Butler was on the 
whole favourable, partly as a result of the leaking of his 
interpretation of the changes before they had been made. 
Anthony Howard declared that, 
There can surely be little doubt that Mr Butler has 
now attained the formal recognition that he has 
always longed for precisely because at this 
particular crisis of the Conservative Party's 
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fortunes he was very much in command. 
The Statist asserted that Butler was now in an unassailable 
position as heir apparent and was accepted by the Party as 
such. It felt that Butler had emerged as the Minister 
and power, possessing the greatest personal influence 
thereby ensuring that there would be no 
'fundamentalist stock'. All the new men of 
return to 
of the Butler Academy of 
power were 
Modern Toryism', 'graduates 
including Maudling, Boyle, and Powell. Butler retained his 
public position as heir apparent, and showed no ill effects 
of losing the Home Office. The Gallup poll continued to show 
him as the most favoured successor. However, public 
perceptions of Butler's position differed from those within 
the Tory high command. His worst fears were confirmed.(69) 
Butler wrote in his memoirs that the post of Deputy Prime 
Minister was, ' ••. a title which can constitutionally imply 
no right to the succession and should (I would advise with 
the benefit of hindsight) be neither conferred nor 
accepted.' The posts were superficially important but they 
contained no particular responsibilities, save for those 
defined by the Prime Minister. He should have been wary of 
accepting the post of Deputy Prime Minister, because it had 
been denied to him only ten months before on the 
that there was no such job. For all his 
determination not to repeat the mistakes of the 
grounds 
apparent 
past he 
found himself in the same position as in 1955, in that he 
was without the power and independence of a big Department 
of State. Now, more than ever before, Butler's fortunes 
were inextricably linked to those of Macmillan. Futhermore, 
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as a result of the reshuffle Macmillan had pushed forward 
another potential leadership contender with the promotion of 
Reginald Maudling to the Treasury. However, Macmillan's 
preference at this early stage was for a person who was not 
even considered to be in the running. In November 1962 
Butler noted his belief that, 'There is only one Minister 
now who could replace me and that is Alec Home.' A personal 
friend warned that, 
Even now if Rab doesn't change his oblique style and 
be unequivocal he will again be beaten on the post. 
Note the outstanding regard for Alec. He reflects 
the frustrated nationalism/patriotism, contrasting 
with Harold's failing here - the principal cause of 
the Party's plight in the country.(70) 
The leadership race was wide open as Macmillan intended. He 
confided in Selwyn Lloyd at the time of his dismissal that 
he believed Butler 'would not last six months' if he became 
leader. The outlook seemed rather demoralising for Butler. 
Macmillan's declaration back in January that he intended to 
carry on until prevented by ill health and would decide his 
future, ... before the Election in which case it falls on 
you or else it will be a year or two after the Election in 
which case it will not be so certain,' now seemed rather 
hollow. In the aftermath of the 'night of the long knives' 
Macmillan told Butler, as recorded in the Tony Benn diaries 
that, 'I don't see why I should make way for you, old cock.' 
In October 1962 Selwyn Lloyd noted a conversation with 
Butler who had concluded that, 
the Prime Minister in his view had no intention 
of resigning. He was determined to fight the next 
Election. Butler felt that he himself could do 
nothing to change the situation. He had talked over 
with his wife the possibility of him starting some 
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new career.(71) 
Butler's demoralisation had been accompanied by an upturn in 
Tory fortunes. On 19th July Macmillan addressed the 1922 
Committee and formed the impression that, feeling was 
now moving definitely towards me and my action.' Apart from 
the inevitable instinct to pull together in a crisis, there 
was an increasing realisation that most of the changes were 
good ones. With Maudling at the Treasury Macmillan was 
confident that the Government was, now definitely set 
upon an expansionist course.'(72) By the autumn of 1962 cuts 
in purchase tax and the bank rate, and a new, permanent 
incomes policy had been instituted, and the Government was 
pressing ahead with negotiations for Britain's entry into 
the Common Market as the central plank of its modernisation 
policy. The prospects for the Conservatives did not seem too 
bleak. 
Conclusion 
The previous three years had witnessed a perceptible decline 
in Butler's influence over policy making. His attempt to 
formulate a non materialistic philosophy as Party Chairman 
was hampered by the Government's inability to maintain the 
economic prosperity necessary to pay for long overdue 
improvements in the social services and reduce taxes. Butler 
found it increasingly difficult to maintain an electoral 
balancing act between the demands of middle class supporters 
and newly prosperous working class supporters. As a result 
the Government initiated significant changes in policy, in 
the shape of more planning in the economy, and negotiations 
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for entry into the Common Market, with mixed success. These 
changes signalled a shift away from the policies espoused by 
Butler and reflected the degree to which he was now reacting 
to the political agenda not directing it. He continued to be 
publicly regarded as heir apparent, but Macmillan's actions, 
in removing him as Party Chairman and Leader of the House of 
Commons in 1961, and the loss of the Home Office in 1962, 
showed his determination that Butler should not succeed him. 
However, he still had the opportunity to make trouble for 
Macmillan through his oversight of the EEC negotiations, and 
the intractable problems of the Central African Federation. 
They marked the end of Butler's influential role in domestic 
affairs, for which the Government was to pay a high price. 
The failure of economic expansion to secure an upturn in 
Tory fortunes, the rejection of Britain's application to 
join the EEC, and the poor handling of a number of security 
scandals, gave the impression of a Government which was 
incompetent and increased speculation about Macmillan's 
future. It seemed that Butler might after all get the top 
job. Throughout the summer of 1963 he played a skilful 
waiting game, which looked as though it would succeed when 
Macmillan was taken ill in October. Yet Butler showed 
himself unable to take advantage of the situation to advance 
his own ambitions for the leadership. A mixture of fatalism 
and Macmillan's determination that he should not succeed 
him, combined to deprive him of his inheritance once again. 
The Tory election defeat in October 1964 and Butler's 
retirement from politics a few months later were the 
unforeseen consequences of his failure. 
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5 
The Tory Leadership Crisis: 1962-1964 
Introduction 
Butler's removal from the Home Office in July 1962 left him 
shackled to Macmillan as Deputy Prime Minister and First 
Secretary of State. Without the power and independence of a 
big department of state Butler was left to oversee the EEC 
negotiations, regarded by Macmillan as the key to the 
country's economic prospects and the electoral fortunes of 
the Conservative Party. Butler's scepticism was probably 
more in line with the majority opinion both in the 
Conservative Party and the country as a whole, but he was 
unable to alter the Government's policy. Yet press rumours 
of Butler's machinations appeared real enough to Macmillan. 
Earlier, in March 1962 Butler had assumed responsibility for 
Central African affairs, with the task of preserving the 
federation in the face of African nationalism. In the event, 
his acquiescence in its break-up did his reputation immense 
harm among Tory traditionalists who felt it reinforced his 
appeasement past. However, he was never likely to have 
attracted their support, and the main detrimental effect of 
his preoccupation with Central African affairs was that he 
was sidelined from exercising a decisive influence in 
domestic affairs. 
Reflationary measures produced a marked improvement in the 
economy but they failed to satisfy a vague desire for 
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change amongst voters. The handling of the Vassall and 
Profumo security scandals gave the impression of an 
increasingly accident-prone, incompetent and tired 
Government. There was renewed speculation about Macmillan's 
leadership, and Butler did his best to put forward his 
candidature without forcing events, in the hope that he 
would emerge as leader in the traditional way. However, 
Macmillan's determination that Butler should not succeed 
him, and Butler's unwillingness to fight for the succession 
ensured his ultimate failure in the 1963 leadership crisis. 
Despite his disappointment Butler was still willing to give 
Lord Home's Government the benefit of his advice and 
experience, but his appointment as Foreign Secretary 
continued the process of marginalisation which had begun 
under Macmillan. In a real sense the 1963 leadership crisis 
marked the beginning of the end of his political career at 
the relatively early age of 60 years. 
Europe and Empire 
Butler did not offer his wholehearted support to Britain's 
application to join the Common Market until August 1962, but 
his argument in favour of entry was essentially negative in 
that, ' ••• if we are left outside we shall be isolated from 
the advantages of joining freely in Europe's development, in 
her politics and in her trade.' Macmillan noted that, 
inspite of (a) the farmers; (b) the 
Commonwealth; (c) the possible break-up of the 
Conservative Party, he had decided to support the 
Common Market. It was too big a chance to miss for 
Britain's wealth and strength. But we must face the 
fact that we might share the fate of Sir Robert Peel 
and his supporters.(1) 
On this occasion, Butler's wariness was to prove more 
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perceptive than Macmillan's enthusiasm. 
In October 1962 the Conservative Party Conference at 
Llandudno delivered a massive vote in favour of joining the 
Common Market. In doing so the Tories had established a 
clear difference of policy with Labour. In the previous week 
Hugh Gaitskell, the Labour leader, had declared himself 
against entry citing as his reason Britain's thousand years 
of history as an independent state. Butler, having judged 
which way the wind was blowing, gave his public support to 
Britain's entry into the Common Market. He caught the mood 
of euphoria when he declared, 'For them, a thousand years of 
history books. For us, the future.'(2) It seemed that Butler 
was no longer making the political weather but following it. 
Such was the buoyant mood that Butler was particularly keen 
on an immediate election, but Macmillan decided to wait for 
the outcome of the EEC negotiations.(3) Given the 
Conservatives' dependence on the EEC as a solution to the 
country's problems, it may have been better to go to the 
country with it as a live issue which differentiated the 
main parties, rather than wait and risk the possibility 
that the neogotiations might fail. This was the scenario 
Butler had feared at the outset. 
The euphoria of the Tory Party Conference soon wore off. 
From then on there was nothing to cheer Conservative 
supporters and much to depress them. Unemployment soared to 
800,000 (the highest since 1947) as the economy remained in 
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a semi-stagnant condition, seemingly immune to Maudling's 
reflationary measures. In addition the Government's handling 
of the Vassall spy scandal antagonised the whole of Fleet 
Street. In international affairs the USA cancelled the 
Skybolt nuclear weapon, and the Common Market negotiations 
reached an impasse, confirming some fears that the 
Conservatives had overplayed the issue at Llandudno. These 
setbacks harmed the Government's 'competence image'.(4) In 
the 'little general election' of November 1962 the 
Conservatives performed poorly with Labour as the main 
beneficiary. Harold Evans, Macmillan's Press Secretary, felt 
it was, 
a setback, especially coming at a moment 
the Tories were telling themselves that they 
found their way back to the winning trail. 
when 
had 
There was renewed press speculation about Macmillan's 
leadership, but Butler observed that Tory MPs were ominously 
quiet; they were ' concerned for their own skin and are 
nervous ••. about doing or saying anything.' (5) 
President de Gaulle's veto on Britain's entry into the 
Common Market, and the eventual collapse of the 
negotiations, in January 1963 was a disastrous blow to 
Macmillan's modernisation strategy. Butler agreed that, ' ••• 
the engine had fallen out of the entire Government's 
strategy.' He had always been a reluctant convert to the 
Common Market, and given his tendency for ambiguity, had 
never favoured the Government putting all its hopes on one 
solution. He told Tony Benn that he had been, 
very doubtful about 
because of our exports. 
it we might have faced 
it and I only supported it 
If we had gone through with 
a real farmers' revolt .••• 
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but it may make it easier for us to win the 
Election.(6) 
However, relief at this outcome soon turned to anger at the 
humiliation suffered by the country and the Government. 
Public opinion polls which showed the public to have 
steadily moved against entry while it seemed probable that 
the negotiations would succeed, now blamed the 
Government.(?) 
The Common Market debacle forced Macmillan's critics out 
into the open. The right wing Monday Club called for his 
resignation, and he found the challenge from his enemies 
reaching quite formidable dimensions. ''Macmillan must 
go" is the cry.' A Sunday Telegraph poll in March found that 
nearly half of Conservative voters thought Macmillan should 
retire, a view shared by a sizeable chunk of the 
parliamentary Party. In March 1963 the Gallup poll showed 
the Labour under their young new leader, Harold Wilson, 15 
points ahead of the Tories - their largest lead in 17 
years.(B) 
Macmillan told Butler that he had no intention of retiring 
since there was no clearly agreed alternative. He felt that 
the younger men, Maudling, Heath or Macleod, were not ready 
to take over, and the criticisms covered Butler 'in their 
broad umbrella'. Butler had good reason to accept this view. 
He told Tony Benn in February 1963: 
Everybody always writes 
successor to Macmillan ••.• 
what I do. It's getting me 
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about me as 
Nobody ever 
down.(9) 
a possible 
writes about 
Butler was under pressure from Tory MPs because of his 
attitude towards the future of the Central African 
Federation. From the start he privately felt that the 
Federation was doomed, a view with which Macmillan 
reluctantly agreed. Having failed to obtain agreement for a 
new association, Butler concentrated on organising a 
conference which would bring the Federation to an orderly 
end with the co-operation of the three governments 
concerned. The peaceful dissolution of the Federation at 
the Victoria Falls Conference in June 1963 was a remarkable 
success which solved two thirds of the problem. In its place 
came the newly independent states of Malawi and Zambia 
(formerly Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia respectively). 
Butler had wanted to press the minority white government of 
Southern Rhodesia for constitutional amendments in favour of 
the Africans in return for independence, but Macmillan was 
fearful of the consequences for Tory Party unity, since over 
200 Tory MPs were adamantly opposed to any constitutional 
revision there.(10) 
Butler had been given the ' opportunity of casting in 
with those Conservatives who might be instrumental in 
forwarding my own personal interests.' Right wing Tory 
imperialists wanted to preserve the status quo, and were the 
subject of lobbying by _the Federation's High Commissioner in 
London.(11) Therefore, Butler's attitude was positively 
unhelpful to his leadership chances as it brought to the 
forefront once again his reputation for appeasement. They 
felt he had betrayed a great cause - that of the white man 
in Africa. As a result Butler did not receive adequate 
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credit for his achievement. The Times commented that, . . . 
there was little or no sign that the Tories value this tour 
de force of political management and accommodation.' Butler 
counted it as one of his greatest successes, especially 
since he shared the view of Roy Welensky, Prime Minister of 
the Federation, that Macmillan hoped the task would break 
him. However, he came increasingly to feel that he had had 
enough 'hot potatoes' to last a lifetime as his chances of 
becoming Prime Minister lessened.(12) 
Butler's preoccupation with the problems of Central Africa 
increased his isolation from domestic affairs. The 
Government had resorted to a 'dash for growth' as the key to 
its electoral fortunes. Maudling believed that the Budget 
would be, ' ••• the moment to launch the post-Brussels policy 
on the Home Front.' The dilemma was how to expand the 
economy, through increased public spending and tax 
concessions, without generating balance of payments 
difficulties.(13) Butler, 
took the firm view that a reduction 
standard rate would make a permanent mark 
reductions in the bands and allowances would 
lost sight of.(14) 
in the 
whereas 
soon be 
However, Maudling was concerned not to be too generous in 
the Budget so as to avoid, any suspicion that we were 
manipulating the economy for Party advantage.' Party 
officials believed that Butler's tax cutting strategy of 
the early 1950s had been so successful that, 
••• in recent years much of the urgency has gone out 
of the demand for the reduction of taxes and many 
people attach much more importance to increasing 
expenditure in one field or another. 
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It was a reflection of the decline in Butler's influence on 
the home front, that Maudling eventually decided to make tax 
reductions by increasing personal allowances rather than 
reducing the rates.(15) 
In fact the Government's reflationary measures produced a 
marked improvement in the economy over the next few months, 
but it continued to do badly in by-elections, and in the 
borough elections in May 1963, with Labour as the 
beneficiary. Harold Evans observed that the Gallup poll for 
May, did not reflect the feeling in Westminster that 
the Tories are pulling up fast.'(16) Economic prosperity was 
no longer enough, as a new mood of 'idealism' in the 1960s 
clashed with the materialist sentiment of the Government. 
However, it was the impression of an increasingly accident-
prone, incompetent and tired Government, which was to prove 
so deadly and made the 'time for a change' argument so 
compelling. 
The Profumo scandal 
On 5th June John Profumo, the Secretary of State for War, 
resigned from the Government and from Parliament after 
admitting that he had lied to the House of Commons about the 
nature of his relationship with a call-girl, Christine 
Keeler. She was also having an affair with a Soviet naval 
attache, thereby raising the question of national security. 
Butler had been in charge of the Government when the scandal 
broke, and accepted Profumo's resignation. When he called 
Macmillan back from Scotland Butler was amazed at 
Macmillan's complacency. He noted that he (Macmillan) was, 
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in a somewhat euphoric state, and .•• can hardly 
believe the trouble into which he was coming. It was 
only in the following week that he realised the 
extent of the tragedy that had occurred.(17) 
Coming on top of the Vassal! spy scandal the affair was a 
gift to the press which fed on the rumours of further 
scandal flying around Westminster. The Denning judicial 
enquiry subsequently cleared the Government of complicity, 
but by then the damage had been done.(18) 
Butler was appalled at how badly the situation had been 
handled, but it further reflected the decline of his 
influence in the Government. Macmillan rejected his advice 
to delay Profumo's statement denying any impropriety with 
Keeler in March 1963, when the allegations first arose, 
until an enquiry had been conducted. In the meantime, Butler 
felt that Profumo should have withdrawn from his post. This 
would have saved Profumo from lying to the House and would 
have protected the Government from considerable 
embarrassment.(19) 
In the censure debate on 17th June Butler felt that 
Macmillan's ' ••. lack of knowledge of what had happened made 
a disagreeable impression upon backbenchers,' and seemed to 
confirm the impression of him being out of touch, unworldly 
and incompetent. There were 27 Conservative abstentions from 
both the left and right of the Party, the most serious 
defection during Macrnillan's Premiership. There would have 
been more had it not been for the Whips' coercion, and there 
seemed no doubt that the Prime Minister's future lay in the 
balance. Labour raced to a 20 point lead in the Gallup poll, 
217 
their highest for 25 years. Macmillan told Butler that he 
was contemplating resignation, but he did not wish to go 
on the basis of this one sordid case but would wish to 
do it in an orderly manner.'(20) 
It was perhaps for this reason that Butler chose to keep his 
head well below the parapet. He was glad to be going to 
Africa, and getting out of much of the mud.' In an 
interview with Kenneth Harris about religion Butler 
distanced himself from the scandal. He had always disliked 
the moral decadence which the Profumo affair was portrayed 
as representing. He declared that he was, 
aware that the public is deeply concerned. And 
to do them justice, it's the right thing to be 
concerned. It shows that the nation is fundamentally 
moral at heart. 
Butler stressed the importance of his own Christian values 
in the conduct of his life. He felt that such values would, 
carry a great deal of public support especially 
in these difficult times when you have discussed 
materialism, when you have discussed the need for 
greater morality.(21) 
Butler had clearly not entirely abandoned thoughts of 
securing the leadership, particularly since he found the 
rumours circulating about Cabinet colleagues disturbing. His 
shrewd perception of Conservative opinion was reflected in a 
telegram from David Bruce, the US Ambassador, to the State 
Department in the aftermath of the scandal, in which he 
stressed that the Conservative Party felt the need for 
'morally impeccable leadership'.(22) However, his 
decision not to take any action or to agitate at all,' 
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proved to be the right one. He may have been exercised by 
the remark of Australian Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies 
that, 'he who sought to wear the lion's skin was often 
killed in hunting him'. Butler was anxious not to be cast in 
the role of executioner; any decision about the leadership 
had to be left to Macmillan's sole discretion.(23) 
The waiting game: June-October 1963 
Butler was conscious of his intense disappointment in 1957, 
and he sought to build up a protective shield in the event 
of his being unsuccessful again. It was in this mood that he 
played down his leadership ambitions, declaring himself to 
be, greatly calmer about it than some people 
imagine.' His ambivalence was best summed up in the view he 
expressed at the end of July 1963 that, 
It is no good thinking there is no life left if one 
is not elected Pope. One can always be a respected 
cardinal. On the other hand while there is a chance 
it is a good thing to be in for it ••• The important 
thing is not to regard the struggle as over at this 
stage.(24) 
Such a view has been described as, a fatal intimation 
of his own political defeat.' Tory MP Charles Fletcher-Cooke 
warned that Butler's support was growing albeit fitfully, 
and he was alarmed to hear of, 
rumours that he is talking defeatist talk about 
his chances. This will not do. It is an 
understandable piece of re-insurance against 
disappointment, but we who support him look for a 
little more attack.(25) 
There was a good reason for Butler's prudence. He had ' ••• 
been astonished ••• by the absolute rage of fire which worked 
through the Conservative Party in favour of a younger man.' 
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It was made clear to Butler in talks with Macmillan, Martin 
Redmayne, the Chief Whip, and John Morrison, Chairman of the 
1922 Committee, that, 
on 
should 
anybody 
regime. 
the 
jump 
too 
question of the next leadership they 
to a younger generation and not have 
closely associated with the present 
They felt he should be ready to serve whoever was chosen. 
Morrison's verdict that 'the chaps won't have you' was 
confirmed by Butler's soundings. The favourite to succeed 
was Reginald Maudling, who as Chancellor was benefiting from 
the expansion of the economy and, at the age of only 46, was 
regarded as better match for the young Labour leader, Harold 
Wilson.(26) 
In a Panorama television programme on 8th July, Butler 
accepted that, people want us to give a fresh 
impression of vigour and decision before the next election.' 
However, he did not feel that age alone should rule him out 
of the running, since at the age of 60 he was still younger 
than Macmillan was when he took over in 1957. He could only 
take comfort from his belief that, ' ••.• a younger man might 
be there too long and then might be hurt by the election.' 
He felt it would be far better for an older man to bear the 
consequences of an electoral defeat. This view gained 
increasing momentum over the coming weeks, although it would 
not be to Butler's advantage. Therefore, in a 'strange 
visit' at the end of July from Maudling, who sought his 
backing, Butler reserved his position.(27) 
Butler was critical of the 'herd instinct' of Tory MPs in 
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favour of a younger man, but the same instinct prevented any 
immediate change and enhanced his own chances. There was a 
unifying determination on the part of MPs that the 
Government should not be brought down by 'a woman of easy 
virtue and a proved liar'. In addition, news of the 
successful negotiation of the Test Ban Treaty earned 
Macmillan a good reception at the 1922 Committee on 26th 
July. The Gallup poll in August revealed that the Tories 
were only 6 per cent behind Labour, compared to the 18-20 
per cent lead of two months before.(28) However, Paul 
Channon, Butler's Parliamentary Private Secretary, 
found that members thought the Prime 
would nevertheless go before the election 
he might stay for several months. 
Minister 
although 
Butler was in a good position to bide his time, as Macmillan 
agonised over whether he should continue. Labour MP Richard 
Crossman felt that, 'There is now time to think, time for 
Butler to strengthen his position more and more.' At the end 
of June Harold Evans had noted, 
a brief encounter with a beaming R.A. Butler 
I found myself speculating about the reasons for his 
bonhomie.(29) 
It seemed likely that Butler did not consider Hailsham or 
Home a viable contender at this stage, despite his knowledge 
of Macmillan's preference. The Peerage Bill would have 
allowed existing peers to renounce their titles only at the 
moment of the dissolution of the current Parliament. In 
addition, he probably found it difficult to believe that a 
peer could become leader of a party emphasising the theme of 
modernisation. No peer had led the Party since 1902. 
However, Tony Benn believed that, 
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Macleod and Butler were both distinctly 
unenthusiastic about it [the Peerage Bill]. I am 
afraid, frankly, that for reasons of crude self-
interest neither of them wants Home or Hailsham to 
come back. 
Alarm bells should have started ringing for Butler when a 
House of Lords amendment to the bill was passed on 16th 
July, allowing any existing peer to renounce his peerage 
straight away within a period of 12 months of the passage of 
the Act.(30) Butler's delaying strategy became far more 
dangerous as the list of potential successors lengthened, 
thereby making it more difficult for one candidate to take 
the lead decisively. Even so, he remained committed to the 
traditional method of Conservative succession by which a 
leader 'emerged' out of a general consensus. Yet he did 
nothing over the summer recess to press his claims, so that 
by October there was still no clear successor and Macmillan 
had decided to carry on.(31) 
Butler's laid back attitude would not have been so damaging 
to his prospects had he not shared it with Macmillan, whose 
own conviction that Butler should not succeed him was merely 
reinforced. It confirmed Macmillan in his belief that Butler 
would not fight for the leadership. At the beginning of 
October 1963 Macmillan believed that Butler, would 
clearly prefer me to go on for - in his heart - he does not 
expect the succession and fears it.' Tory grandee James 
Stuart correctly summed up Butler's position as, 
relying on loyalty and fatalism to result in its "falling 
into his lap".' ( 32) Even some of Butler's natural 
sympathisers doubted his suitability to become Prime 
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Minister, primarily because of his tendency to sit on the 
fence when decisions had to be made. Although his post-war 
vision had inspired the One Nation group of backbenchers, 
they failed to back him for the leadership.(33) 
Against all the odds, Butler's waiting game looked as though 
it might ultimately be successful with the unexpected events 
of the 8th October. On the eve of the Party Conference 
Macmillan was taken ill with a blocked prostate. It soon 
became clear that he needed an operation, and Butler took 
charge of the Government as acting Prime Minister. With 
Macmillan likely to resign at some stage over the next few 
months, it gave him the opportunity to 'emerge' as the 
incumbent and automatic choice for the leadership. 
Complacency at Blackpool 
Lady Gladwyn, wife of former diplomat Lord Gladwyn (Jebb), 
noted that, ' ••. when the Butlers arrived at Blackpool they 
gave themselves airs and were very gracious, confident that 
Rab was to be PM.'(34) This view was borne out by his 
actions. He refused to fight or intrigue to get the job for 
himself. He made no attempt to get the support of Cabinet 
colleagues, backbenchers, activists, or journalists. John 
Junor, editor of the Sunday Express, recalled that, 
throughout the whole affair Rab made no attempt 
to influence or to square the newspapers. All the 
other candidates were practically queueing up to 
speak on the telephone to any political 
correspondent who would listen, whereas Rab, 
normally very friendly with the press, was being 
scrupulously correct. 
Perhaps he believed that it was enough to stand on his 
record or maybe he was deceived by his high ratings in the 
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opinion polls, which put him in the lead. At the height of 
the crisis he proudly noted that, he had ' ..• attempted to 
be as impartial as possible in running the business and have 
clearly not had any time to do anything about my own 
chances.' If the events of 1957 had taught Butler anything 
it should have been the need if necessary to fight for the 
job. He failed to learn this vital lesson, and it was clear 
that Macmillan took advantage of this fact. On reflection, 
even he was 'astounded' at Butler's failure as acting Prime 
Minister to do anything about the crisis.(35) 
Despite his inaction his prospects improved as other 
candidates failed to impress the delegates. Macmillan's 
original preference, dating from February 1963, was for 
Hailsham, but his exhibitionism aroused the hostility of the 
Tory establishment, including Butler himself. His campaign 
was doomed almost before it had started. Maudling's 
prospects had declined since the summer, and a lacklustre 
speech at the conference did not help his cause.(36) The 
stage seemed set for Butler to emerge decisively as the new 
leader, regardless of Macmillan's machinations. 
The shock came when Macmillan felt it necessary to announce 
his intention to resign almost immediately. Butler claimed 
that he was, 
keen 
have to 
invalid. 
to give him a chance to recover and not to 
take vital decisions when he was an 
He expected any resignation to come after the conference, as 
one did not take a serious decision at a rally.' 
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Initially this had been Macmillan's 
drafted a letter to Butler stating that, 
to announce this decision [to resign] 
intention. He had 
'I do not propose 
at this stage.' 
Nevertheless, Macmillan consulted Lord Home who, in his 
capacity as President of the National Union, insisted that 
the speculation over Macmillan's future had to be ended. 
Together they drafted a resignation letter for Home to read 
out at the Conference. It was hardly the action of a 
disinterested 
feel the 
friend, and Butler was not the only one 
Prime Minister had been unduly harassed 
to 
by 
certain Ministers to retire.(37) However, the image of a 
man being forced by his colleagues to resign was at var-iance 
with the tight control of events Macmillan maintained from 
his sickbed. He knew exactly what he was doing, as he moved 
to deny Butler the succession in the belief that he was not 
the right man for the job. The Party Conference now became a 
'beauty contest' for all the potential candidates. 
Butler had successfully fought to make the traditional 
leader's speech at the end of conference rally, against the 
wishes of some of his Cabinet colleagues. On hearing the 
news Macmillan instructed Home to bring forward his 
announcement from the end of the Conference on Friday to 
Thursday afternoon. Butler had created his opportunity to 
make a claim for the leadership as Anthony Howard asserts 
that, by the time he came to make the speech, he would 
inevitably be regarded as a declared candidate for the 
succession. ' He later claimed, 'I certainly put my hat in 
the ring and did my best to show that if I were wanted I was 
available. ' ( 38) 
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The tragedy for Butler was that he did not make a fighting 
speech to declare his determination and desire to become the 
next leader. Whilst the speech contained elements of his 
'Invest in Success' message and electioneering attacks on 
Labour's programme, his delivery, in a 'limp and faltering 
voice', was described in the Sunday Telegraph as flat and 
uninspiring. It seemed to confirm Tory MP Sir Gerald 
Nabarro's description of him as 'donnish, dignified and 
dull'. Lady Gladwyn observed that on television, 
He looked unattractive physically. Bald, rounded, a 
flabbiness of flesh, weary, rather old and tired, 
and an aura of sanctimoniousness.(39) 
Whilst the speech drew respectful applause, Butler had no 
appetite for the revivalist speeches expected of the Party 
rally which sent the delegates away full of enthusiasm for 
the year ahead. The substance of the headlines in the Sunday 
papers was, 'Butler Fails To Rouse Tories'. He had always 
had a love-hate relationship with the traditional Tory 
supporters who usually attended to criticise the progressive 
policies he espoused. His wife admitted, 
I knew that this was not the best that he could 
do. It was as though he was too fastidious to make 
the sort of speech which would arouse enthusiasm, 
set the delegates on fire •••• I knew in my heart 
that it was not what the rank and file in the hall 
wanted or what those on the platform hoped for. 
Something appeared to be holding him back from 
giving his real self.(40) 
Butler knew something they did not. Lord Home's revelation 
that he was a candidate came just before Butler was due to 
make his speech, and it must have had a considerable 
psychological effect on him.(41) 
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Once it had become clear that Hailsham could not command 
enough support, Macmillan had switched his support to Home 
in his determination to block Butler. Home's candidature had 
been encouraged since the summer by Duncan Sandys, John 
Hare, Edward Heath, Redmayne and Lord Dilhorne in the 
Cabinet, plus Morrison of the 1922 Committee, and senior 
Tory backbenchers including Selwyn Lloyd, and Nigel Birch. 
Home was prepared to accept the 'draft' only if it was clear 
he was going to win and not if he had to fight for it, 
although he was to display more firmness of purpose than his 
rivals. The irony of the situation was that this was 
precisely the way that Butler wished to claim the 
succession, and this prevented him from making it clear that 
he would refuse to serve Home early on to stop him from 
gaining momentum. The major difference was that Home had 
Macmillan who was prepared to manipulate the result of the 
soundings in his favour. Macmillan himself admitted in his 
memorandum of 15th October that, 
the important 
candidature has not 
merits but has been 
method of keeping out 
'Customary processes' 
fact is that Lord Home's 
been set forward on his own 
thought of as a last minute 
Mr Butler. ( 42) 
Macmillan initiated a far more extensive consultation 
process than in 1957 in order to ensure Butler's failure. 
There were four strands to this process, which involved 
canvassing the views of the constituencies, Conservative 
peers, MPs, and the Cabinet, from which Macmillan produced a 
memorandum for the Queen. It was significant that all of 
those who were to carry out the consultations (Lord Poole, 
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Lord St Aldwyn, Redmayne, and Lord Dilhorne respectively), 
the 'Magic Circle' as Macleod described them, were against 
Butler's succession and worked actively to prevent it. They 
were accountable to the Prime Minister only, who would then 
decide what action to take, not the Cabinet. Yet Butler did 
nothing to block this process which was sure to dilute his 
core support in the House of Commons and, more importantly, 
in the Cabinet. Macmillan noted in his diary that he 
seemed to acquiesce willingly enough,' as did the rest of 
the Cabinet. They were under the mistaken impression that 
the consultations would take some time. Butler hoped that 
the delay would allow Parliament to resume, where his 
supporters could rally more easily. In fact, Macmillan 
intended to resign and have his successor installed by the 
end of the week after the conference.(43) 
The rather hasty consultations revealed that in the 
constituencies 60 per cent were for Hailsham and 40 per cent 
for Butler, but with strong opposition to both. Opposition 
to Butler was particularly strong among women members 
according to Selwyn Lloyd, who believed this may have been 
caused by his liberal penal policies as Home Secretary. The 
ability to unify the Party was regarded as a higher priority 
than electoral appeal, and it was felt that Butler's 
appointment would be 'depressing'. Most of these soundings 
had been taken at Blackpool when Home was not thought to be 
a candidate. The peers were naturally supporters of Home, by 
a margin of 2 to 1, with Butler second and Hailsham third 
after his performance in Blackpool.(44) 
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Of the 300 MPs consulted the largest group, although not by 
much, 'supported' Home. Redmayne's report showed that only 
87 MPs had made Home their first choice, compared to 86 for 
Butler, 65 for Hailsham and 48 for Maudling, but Home had 
the highest number of second preferences and the smallest 
number of 'definite aversions'. As Macleod later pointed 
out, this was hardly suprising given the work of the Whips 
in his cause, and the considerable manipulation of the 
selection process. MPs were not only asked for their first 
preference, but who they would not accept, and whether they 
would be prepared to accept Home as a unity candidate. In 
fact, negative preferences were more important than positive 
ones, and senior MPs' advice was given greater weight than 
others by the Chief Whip.(45) 
A similar method was used by Lord Dilhorne, the Lord 
Chancellor, in his consultation of the Cabinet. It allegedly 
revealed an 'overwhelming consensus' of 10 votes for 
including Sir Edward Boyle and Macleod, with only 3 
preferences for Butler (Butler himself, Henry Brooke 
Enoch Powell), 4 for Maudling and 2 for Hailsham. 
Home, 
first 
and 
This 
seemed inconceivable given later events. Boyle was a clear 
Butler supporter, writing at the time to friends that 'I am 
personally for Butler and hope for both the Party's and the 
country's sake that he gets it.' Macleod had not enjoyed 
particularly good relations with Home ever since their 
disagreement over the pace of change in Africa. He 
charitably assumed that expressions of genuine regard for 
Home had become translated into second or first 
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preferences.(46) 
The key factor was that Ministers' pursuit of their own 
personal agenda at this stage ensured their eventual failure 
to stop Home. Maudling, Hailsham and Macleod were not 
prepared to give up their own leadership ambitions in favour 
of Butler. They only backed him when it seemed clear that 
Home would be successful. Richard Crossman noted that, 
'Macleod resolutely came down for Butler as a lesser evil 
than Hailsham.' This was hardly a ringing endorsement. 
Randolph Churchill was moved to declare that Macleod's 
conversion to Butler's cause was ' ••• as late in the day as 
that of Paul on the way to Damascus.' (47) 
The conclusions, however doubtful, confirmed Macmillan in 
his recommendation for Home, but when Butler heard of it on 
the morning of Thursday, 17th October, he did nothing to 
exert himself or organise his support. As acting Prime 
Minister he had the power to call a Cabinet meeting to pass 
on this information and give Ministers the chance to state 
'publicly' their opinions on the situation. Macleod believed 
that Ministers would have been able to reassert their 
control of events, by deciding whether they actually wanted 
Home as leader. Faced with the reality of a Home premiership 
Butler's 
However, 
sympathisers 
Butler may 
may well have asserted themselves. 
have taken the view expressed by 
political commentator Robert McKenzie that, on the 
occasion of the choice of a new leader it is the machinery 
of party and not of government which takes precedence.' 
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Therefore, he decided to keep the information to 
himself.(48) The crucial factor in Home's success was that 
there was no time for opposition to him to build up. In 
contrast, the opposition to Butler had had six years to 
build up since Suez. 
Butler did speak to John Junor, who recalled that he 
sounded indignant. The cock clearly at last was going to 
fight.' However, the task of mobilising the opposition to 
Home was left to Macleod and Powell at the infamous 
'midnight meeting' of 17th October. Macleod claimed that, 
Before long it was established that Maudling and 
Hailsham were not only opposed to Lord Home but 
believed Butler to be the right and obvious 
successor. The rest of us felt this understanding 
between those hitherto the three principal 
contenders was of decisive importance: the 
succession was resolving itself in the right way. 
As the position crystallised between Butler and Home at 
least eight members of the Cabinet (Boyd-Carpenter, Boyle, 
Butler, Erroll, Hailsham, Macleod, Maudling and Powell) were 
for Butler. There could hardly have been an 'overwhelming 
consensus' for Home. Enoch Powell concluded that, a 
Butler government enjoying general acceptance was available 
by the time Macmillan's resignation reached the Queen.' On 
receiving this news Butler phoned Lord Dilhorne to request a 
meeting of the contenders to sort out the difficulties. He 
agreed to ask the Prime Minister but received no reply. It 
was too late. By midday of Friday, 18th October, Macmillan 
resigned and Home had been asked by the Queen, even though 
she had been made aware of the opposition to him, to form an 
administration on the basis of Macmillan's advice.(49) 
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In theory the agreement reached between Butler, Hailsham and 
Maudling should still have been decisive, provided they all 
refused to serve under Home. Everything depended on their 
talks with Home, the determination of Butler's allies and, 
most importantly, the resolve of Butler himself. Initially 
Hailsham and Maudling, plus Macleod, 
declined to serve unless Butler did so. 
RAB .•. not to let us down.'(SO) 
Powell and Boyle 
Boyle 'appealed to 
Butler himself did not refuse to serve, but, reserved 
his position, intimating that he would not serve under Lord 
Home unless satisfied that it was "the only way to unite the 
Party".' In this statement lay the seeds of Butler's defeat. 
It seemed that this was the point at which he finally gave 
up any hope of becoming Prime Minister. Home was now in the 
driving seat as, even though he had not kissed hands as 
Prime Minister, he had the advantage of occupancy. Any move 
to prevent his succession was likely to be portrayed as a 
threat to Party unity, and Butler had no wish to be a second 
choice Prime Minister. Therefore, he sought consolation in 
his belief that Party unity should come before his own 
ambition. In his memoirs he declared that, 'One cannot 
alter one's nature. I had always worked for the unity of the 
party and I did so on this occasion.' (51) 
Whilst he felt that the whole process had been rushed, and 
was unhappy about the idea of an hereditary peer becoming 
leader as it spoilt the image of modernisation, he felt the 
only other legitimate reason for refusing to serve was a 
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difference on policy, but he felt there were none. These 
factors, added to his own personal friendship with Home, 
made him unable to take advantage of the 'loaded revolver' 
handed to him. As in 1957 the ruthless 'killer instinct' was 
missing from his character; in Enoch Powell's words, he 
could not stomach the thought of 'blood on the carpet'.(52) 
By reserving his position he was just delaying the 
inevitable. 
At the key quadrilateral meeting on the evening of Friday 
18th October, the opposition to Home began to crack. 
Hailsham intimated that he would be prepared to serve under 
Home, since refusal to do so would be portrayed as sour 
grapes. Butler wrongly felt that this amounted to an erosion 
of support for him, as ultimately the power to decide Home's 
fate still lay with him only by refusing to serve. The main 
problem was his own indecision. He refused to telephone 
supporters to urge them to stand firm, even though in the 
words of Hailsham aide Dennis Walters, 'Doing a bit more 
telephoning instead of 'dozing off' would hardly constitute 
force majeure.' Poole told Walters that he was, 'quite 
appalled; quite disgusted' at Butler's ' .•. dithering about 
in a gutless sort of way.' Butler's oldest friend, Geoffrey 
Lloyd, finally told him, 'If you're not prepared to put 
everything into touch, you don't deserve to be Prime 
Minister.'(53) He wasn't, and on Saturday morning he went 
to Downing Street and agreed to serve Home as Foreign 
Secretary. 
In any case Harold Evans expressed the view that, by 
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' ••• Saturday morning Home had made enough progress to decide 
that, if necessary, he would go ahead without Rab.' The 
Conservative Party was closing ranks behind the new leader, 
in the widespread recognition that a split now would be 
disastrous. Within a week Paul Channon was informing Butler 
that, 
There is no doubt that the whole Parliamentary Party 
now wishes to forget this distressing fortnight and 
even those who opposed him most strongly are now 
anxious to serve under the PM as loyally as 
possible .••• There is quite a new mood in the air 
and for the first time people think we might win the 
next election.(54) 
Foreign Secretary under Home 
The immediate crisis was over and Butler, denied the 
leadership for a second time, was destined to become the 
nearly man of British politics. Despite his intense 
disappointment the strongly held notion of service remained, 
and his acceptance of the Foreign Office was the 
gratification of a long held desire. Macmillan's preference 
had been for Heath, but securing Butler's participation was 
more important for Home.(55) He continued to see a role for 
himself as the 'elder statesman' of the Government, there to 
give the benefit of his advice and experience, but in a real 
sense, the 1963 leadership crisis marked the beginning of a 
twilight period for Butler. 
Initially, Butler was treated as a hero by Conservative 
backbenchers for his self sacrifice. Paul Channon assured 
him that his, 
••• own stock has never been higher and member after 
member have come up to me saying how wonderfully you 
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have behaved and how you have saved the party •••• 
They are all unanimous in your praise.(56) 
However, this sympathy did not last for long. Butler spent 
much time reflecting on the events of October 1963, and 
often sought reassurance that he had done the right thing. 
He was not alone in his preoccupation with such matters. The 
consequences for the Conservative Party were to reverberate 
for the next 18 months. The manner of Home's selection had 
totally discredited the customary processes. Paul Channon 
believed that the choice of Home when Butler was ahead in 
the opinion polls, 
will merely show 
government and party had 
can be expected in 1964 
under the 14th Earl 
understanding.(57) 
how decadent the Tory 
become in 1963 •••• How we 
to go forward to victory 
of Home passes all 
It aroused much recrimination and inflicted such irreparable 
damage on the Party that it was felt to be a major 
contributory factor to the Tories' election defeat in 1964. 
The publication of Randolph Churchill's book, The Fight for 
the Tory Leadership, and Iain Macleod's explosive response 
in the Spectator, in January 1964, shattered any semblance 
of Party unity.(58) Home's succession was just as 
problematic as Butler's might have been. 
The perceived wisdom has been that Butler treated his tenure 
of the Foreign Office as a period of self imposed exile, in 
which he provided the Party with little sense of direction 
in any context. He looked like a tired and disappointed man 
whose heart was not really in the job. Although his full 
programme of duties were adequately performed, he sometimes 
gave the impression of being inadequately briefed and 
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uninterested. He allowed Duncan Sandys, the Commonwealth and 
Colonial Secretary, to make the running on the two most 
pressing foreign policy issues, those of Cyprus and Yemen. 
He made only one major foreign policy speech in the House of 
Commons on 17 June, 1964, and it did not command much 
attention. Butler got high marks for his sense of duty, low 
marks for his commitment.(59) 
This was not the whole picture. Butler's tendency for 
ambiguity and indecisiveness found an ideal home at the 
Foreign Office. His Private Secretary, Sir Nicholas 
Henderson, recalled that, 
He never had a head-on collision. He rarely gave a 
firm or final rejection of anything. He always 
refrained from shutting the door ••.• But in bigger 
matters, not coming to a conclusion about a 
particular course of action was a positive decision. 
He did it deliberately and he had often found that 
he had avoided trouble that way. 
The result of this stance in Cyprus was the aversion of a 
threatened Turkish invasion, and the dispatch of a UN peace-
keeping force to protect the Turkish minority in March 1964. 
He was also successful in gaining US support for the British 
policy of defending the Malaysian Federation against the 
attacks of Indonesia, and an appreciation of British 
interests in southern Arabia.(60) 
There was neither time nor opportunity for great achievement 
in his year as Foreign Secretary. Butler recognised that it 
was the nature of foreign policy that it took a year or two 
to initiate decisive change and to set a firm imprint on its 
course. This was exacerbated by the 'wait and see' attitude 
of foreign governments, particularly in the USA and the 
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Soviet Union, due to the imminence of the general election. 
Butler himself admitted that his purpose was not so 
much to achieve as to probe,' which he did in trips to the 
USA and the Soviet Union in his attempt to further the cause 
of international disarmament.(61) 
Butler's relations with Home were cordial but somewhat 
strained. As the previous Foreign Secretary with many years 
experience it might have been expected that Home would seek 
to conduct foreign policy from Downing Street, much as Eden 
and Macmillan had done. Butler's Private Office felt that he 
was, content to let Home act as Foreign Secretary as 
well as Prime Minister.' However, Home was preoccupied with 
other matters, most notably the necessity of making himself 
known to the British electorate, in the run up to an 
election in which domestic issues would be of primary 
importance. He did so with mixed success. Whilst Home had a 
great appeal to the converted, it proved very hard for him 
to attract the support of floating voters.(62) 
The opinion polls continued to be unfavourable towards the 
Conservatives. Michael Fraser's reports to Butler on the 
state of public opinion confirmed his belief that the best 
hope of Conservative victory lay in delaying the election 
until the last possible moment in the autumn of 1964. This 
would allow other factors such as the return of economic 
prosperity and the modernisation theme to come to the fore. 
Home took this advice, despite Maudling's desire for an 
earlier election in February or June due to his concern for 
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the future state of the economy.(63) If Home took Butler's 
advice on this issue, he did so on few other domestic 
matters during his year as Prime Minister. Butler's 
appointment as Foreign Secretary formalised the move away 
from domestic affairs. He now sat on just one Cabinet 
Committee which directly related to his departmental 
responsibilities. 
Home's inexperience in domestic politics meant that, 
the party seemed to lose its sense of what 
centrist policies had meant, as if its members no 
longer believed that there was a single Conservative 
tradition or common culture.(64) 
In theory the presence of Maudling, Boyle, and Heath around 
the Cabinet table should have ensured the continued 
supremacy of Butler's brand of Conservatism. However, they 
sought to develop Conservatism along new lines. Butler did 
his best to keep up with the new trend in its early stages 
and to reconcile it with his own philosophy. However, he was 
not given the chance to give the Party a sense of direction 
in domestic matters and his public speeches were largely 
confined to his constituency. With Butler cast aside the 
Government lost his experience and skills in the art of 
politics, and in consequence made mistakes that could have 
been avoided. It was in this atmosphere that Butler first 
entertained the possibility of becoming Master of Trinity 
College, Cambridge.(65) 
The shift in power to the younger generation was most 
clearly indicated in the appointment of Edward Heath as 
Secretary of State for Industry, Trade and Regional 
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Development and President of the Board of Trade. The 
implication did not escape the cartoonist, Cummings, who 
drew Heath carrying an enormous brief case 
SOSFITARDAPOTBOT 
marked F0.(66) 
modernisation 
compared with Butler's small one 
Heath's brief was to promote 
and competition. However, it 
marked 
modestly 
economic 
had two 
contradictory 
economics in 
aspects, namely a shift towards free 
some areas, and a commitment to 
market 
State 
intervention in other areas. It left many Conservative 
supporters feeling ambivalent and confused. 
Its clearest illustration in 1964 was the Government's 
decision to abolish Resale Price Maintenance, the practice 
whereby manufacturers were able to fix the price of goods 
and prevent the slashing of prices by supermarkets. It 
exposed the historic tension at the heart of the Tory Party 
between protectionism and free trade. Butler had for a long 
time believed that abolition was in accordance with 
Conservative ideals of competition and consumer freedom, but 
had agreed with the Government's decision to refrain from 
action for fear of upsetting small shopkeepers, many of them 
prominent local Tories. The argument against abolition was 
therefore one of timing; that it was an unnecessarily 
divisive measure to bring forward a few months before the 
general election, and was best left until the new 
Parliament. It was a striking indication of the shift in 
power 
Quintin 
that in spite of the combined opposition of Butler, 
Hogg (formerly Lord Hailsham), Selwyn Lloyd, the 
Leader of the House of Commons, Redmayne, and Lord Blakenham 
(formerly John Hare), the new Party Chairman, Home, 'with 
239 
many misgivings', gave his backing to Heath and his 
supporters, Maudling, Boyle, Erroll, and Joseph. They 
regarded it as the only way to check an inflationary price 
spiral and to achieve faster economic growth, as part of a 
wider action against monopolies and restrictive 
practices.(67) 
There was an outcry within the Conservative Party, many of 
whose members were small shopkeepers who feared being put 
out of business by the onset of the supermarket age. The 
timing of the bill so close to an election was widely 
regarded as deplorable, and it was one of the many factors 
contributing to the Conservative defeat in 1964. Butler 
attempted to make the best of a bad job by using the issue 
to rubbish Labour claims that the Conservative Government 
was a weary one waiting for its time to run out, and 
outlining its benefits for consumers.(68) 
There was also a growing demand within the Party for trade 
union reform as strikes harrassed British industry. 
Government concessions to wage demands meant that, by 
the summer of 1964 top officials no longer bothered to 
pretend that an incomes policy existed.' Most notable among 
the conversions were Butler and Iain Macleod, both former 
Ministers of Labour. In a minute to the Prime Minister 
Butler argued that the Rookes versus Barnard legal 
judgement, regarding enforcement of closed shop agreements, 
provided an opportunity to establish a Royal Commission to 
revise the laws relating to trade unions. Such a move could 
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have been 
maintenance, 
individual, 
electorally 
tied in with the abolition of resale price 
as a recognised concern for the liberty of the 
and would have put the Labour Party in the 
damaging position of having to defend trade 
union abuses. Butler's suggestion would have given the 
Conservative Party an electorally popular initiative to 
promote during the election campaign. Party officials 
pointed to the conclusions of a major study of working class 
Conservatives, whose votes were vital if they were to be re-
elected, which showed that although most of them were 
members of trade unions, they disliked or distrusted them. 
However, Joseph Godber, the Minister of Labour, won the 
Cabinet's agreement that a review of the law affecting 
trade unions and employers' associations should only be 
undertaken early in the life of the next Parliament.(69) 
Although the proposal was included in the Party's manifesto, 
the lack of tangible evidence of immediate action robbed the 
Party of an important electoral advantage. 
Nevertheless, the 
Maudling's 'dash 
economy appeared to be performing well. 
for growth' had generated increased 
production, falling unemployment and a consumer boom. 
He sought to correct the consequent balance of payments 
difficulties with a mild increase in taxation in his April 
Budget. However, there was no serious attempt to hold back 
the accelerating trend of public expenditure, although 
Ministers were aware that there would have to be changes 
after the election. In April 1964 Sir Burke Trend, the 
Cabinet Secretary, predicted that, 
Whereas in the past the Government's spending 
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policies have been financed by taxing 
wealth at reducing rates, the finance of 
policies in future will involve taxing 
wealth at increasing rates.(70) 
Maudling felt the Government's spending 
growing 
existing 
growing 
plans were 
consistent with economic growth, and that they were a 
positive advantage in the battle with the Labour Party for 
the uncommitted votes. While Butler was concerned about the 
difficulties of reforming the welfare state, he told his 
constituents that, 
the past ten years have proved that sound 
Conservative policies have produced the great leap 
forward in living standards that Socialist theory 
sought but could not produce. In the same way, our 
present plans will show that Conservative prosperity 
can provide more social improvement, for example, in 
the fields of housing and education, than would ever 
be possible under Socialist direction.(71) 
The Government was attempting to tackle Labour on its own 
ground, and left itself open to accusations, like those of 
Enoch Powell, that the Party had allowed itself to drift 
into competition with Labour on the common ground of 
planning and social democracy, when it ought instead to have 
examined its overlong commitment to the welfare state and 
the post-war settlement. These views represented the first 
counterblast of the new right thinking.(72) His criticisms 
struck a chord with traditional Tory supporters, who 
disliked radical change. Such expenditure also invited the 
question as to what the Tories had been doing for the past 
thirteen years, thereby giving credence to the Labour Party 
slogan, 'thirteen wasted years', and accusations of 
electoral stunts.(73) Butler was one of the few Ministers to 
recognise the danger of such accusations in the run up to 
the general election. He sought to counteract them by giving 
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the Government's record an ideological coherence. 
Butler and the 1964 general election 
In the final months of the 1959 parliament Butler outlined, 
in a number of speeches in his constituency, what he called 
the 'third dimension of politics' - the political philosophy 
and values which formed the basis of Conservative policies. 
Whilst he rejected the 'laissez faire' philosophy of Adam 
Smith, which he felt paid no attention to the needs of 
people, he also rejected the Socialist desire to govern by 
direction and controls, which led to the expansion of 
bureaucracy and higher taxes, and the restriction of 
individual freedom. Butler advocated the middle way in which 
the role of the State was to create the conditions in which 
individuals could flourish.(74) 
Despite Butler's attempts to relate the Government's 
policies to the classical themes of Conservative philosophy, 
many people found it difficult to detect any major 
differences between the parties, and as a result the 
electorate was increasingly volatile with a large number of 
'Don't Knows'. However, Conservative support in the opinion 
polls began to rise so that by September 1964 the Parties 
were practically neck and neck. A Gallup Poll in the Sunday 
Telegraph on the 27th September, reported a Conservative 
lead of 0.5 per cent, and on the 30th September a Daily Mail 
poll gave the Conservatives a lead of 2.9 per cent.(75) 
Butler was clearly right to press for a late election. He 
warned the Executive Committee of the National Union that, 
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with the parties having approximately the same share of 
definite supporters, everything depended on the success of 
the campaign leading up to the general election on 15th 
October.(76) 
Butler suggested four main themes; more had to be made of 
the Conservatives' long record in Government in order to 
combat the 'time for a change' argument, by stressing their 
proven competence and experience. The emphasis had to be on 
the fact that people would continue to get what they wanted 
from the Tories - full employment, rising wages, good 
housing and education - and lose it under the Socialists. 
He feared that the public was now too used to better housing 
and schools, and more goods in the shops. Butler reiterated 
the warning he gave to his Saffron Walden constituents back 
in January that, 
the greatest difficulty facing the Tory Party 
today is the feeling that we are all prosperous now 
and so there cannot be much harm in giving the other 
side an innings. 
Therefore, it was important to emphasise the differences in 
approach between the Parties; the Conservatives were the 
Party of individual freedom and choice, whereas Labour was 
the Party of State conformity and control. Butler was 
particularly concerned that some normally stalwart 
Conservatives had suggested that a small Labour majority 
would not be a bad result, as it would give the 
Conservatives the chance to recharge their batteries. He 
argued that there was a great deal to be lost by a 
Conservative defeat at this moment.(77) Strangely, Home 
chose instead to concentrate on the theme that Labour were 
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not fit to govern because of their proposed abandonment of 
Britain's independent nuclear deterrent.(78) 
Butler was given very little encouragement to participate in 
the Party's electoral preparations and was an infrequent 
attender at Steering Committee meetings. According to one of 
his colleagues he had 'perceptibly lost status and heart' in 
the eyes of the Party organisation ever since his rejection. 
Butler spent most of the campaign in his constituency. He 
took part in only one Central Office press conference, and 
made a single fleeting appearance in one of the Party's five 
television election broadcasts. His major contribution to 
the campaign was an indiscretion. His remarks to George 
Gale of the Daily Express on 8th October, that things might 
slip away from the Tories in the last few days angered his 
colleagues for its defeatism.(79) However, it could be seen 
as a damage limitation exercise for the final result, which 
was as Butler had predicted. 
The decisive factor appeared to have been Butler's fear, 
expressed back in October 1959 and increasingly in 
that the public took affluence for granted and was 
first 
1963/4, 
more disposed to give the other side a chance. The 'time for 
a change' factor was very strong. For all his attempts to 
develop a non-materialist strategy, the main theme of the 
campaign from the vantage point of Conservative Central 
Office was economic prosperity. One Party official declared, 
'We fought it like '59, not because we wanted to, but by 
default, we didn't know what else to do.' Economic 
prosperity did succeed in winning back some Tory votes, but 
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the publication of adverse balance of payments figures, and 
doubts about the permanence of the recovery were seized upon 
by the Labour leadership which succeeded, unlike in 1959, in 
presenting itself as a viable and united alternative 
government.(80) 
In seeking to appeal to the widest possible cross section of 
voters it was arguable that the Conservatives fell between 
two stools. Home later felt that, 
we weren't able to make our policies sufficiently 
distinctive for the ordinary worker to understand 
the difference between Left wing Conservative and 
Right wing Socialist. There wasn't a clean enough 
cut. (81) 
Newly-affluent workers, were attracted by Labour's promises 
to do more on social issues, such as housing and pensions 
rather than the Tory commitment to Britain's nuclear 
deterrent. In contrast, discontented middle-class Tory 
supporters wanted lower taxes and restrictions on welfare 
spending. They had their revenge as the Liberal vote nearly 
doubled from 6 per cent to 11 per cent.(82) 
The Labour Party was returned to power after thirteen years 
with an overall majority of only four. As Labour had 
possessed a lead of 15 per cent in the polls in October 
1 963, the narrowness of the result overshadowed the 
'calamitous' collapse of 6 per cent in the Conservative 
share of the vote, a loss of almost 1,750,000 votes since 
1959.(83) For the first time in thirteen years the 
Conservatives were in opposition, and Butler was never again 
to hold Ministerial office. 
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Conclusion 
The previous two years had seen Butler deeply involved in 
controversial changes in Conservative policy on Europe and 
the Empire. He was ambivalent about the Government's 
application to join the EEC, but his responsibility for 
oversight of the negotiations showed his inability to affect 
the outcome· or advocate an alternative strategy in the event 
of Britain's failure. He was not directing policy anymore 
but reacting to events outside his control. The same was 
true, to a lesser extent, of his handling of the break-up of 
the Central African Federation. Both policies aroused the 
hostility of right-wing backbenchers and activists. Butler's 
preoccupation with foreign affairs meant that he was 
sidelined from exercising a decisive influence in home 
affairs, where the Government's poor handling of the economy 
and the Profumo scandal threatened its hold on power. 
However, Butler had not entirely abandoned his leadership 
ambitions. He hoped to 'emerge' as the automatic successor, 
but Macmillan ensured his eventual failure by taking 
advantage of Butler's indecisiveness and his unwillingness 
to jeopardise Party unity. As Foreign Secretary in Lord 
Home's Government Butler sought to carve out an influential 
role as an elder statesman, but he found that his advice was 
largely ignored. He was no longer regarded as indispensable 
to the Tory Party's electoral fortunes. 
Could the Conservatives have won the 1964 election with 
Butler as leader? Harold Wilson, the Labour leader, 
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certainly believed so. Butler's experience at home on 
domestic issues, and his public reputation was far greater 
than that of Home, who had to spend most of the year making 
himself known in the country. The mere fact of not having 
been an hereditary peer, would have made it more difficult 
for Wilson to portray the Tory leadership as a discredited 
'old guard' whose time was up. Butler would have been more 
likely to win back the votes of the uncommitted centre 
ground of politics. Home came to believe that, 
as the public had seen Rab Butler 
apparent, it might have been better in 
him to have had the job. Anyone else 
some sense as an 'unnatural' successor. 
as the 
the end 
was seen 
heir 
for 
in 
Butler also felt that he could have led the Party to victory 
and remained Prime Minister for three or four years before 
handing over to a younger person, probably Iain Macleod. 
Even Macmillan admitted that perhaps it would have been 
better for the Party if Butler had succeeded after all, ' 
then we could have won the election in '64 ••. though we 
would have lost the next one.'(84) 
Butler's trouble was not his lack of electoral appeal, but 
his lack of appeal within his own Party. He might not have 
been able to unite the Party and reassure the Party's 
traditional supporters as effectively as Home did.(85) 
However, the instincts of most Tories would probably have 
been to close ranks and unite behind Butler, and two of the 
Party's leading figures, Iain Macleod and Enoch Powell, 
would have remained in the Cabinet thereby avoiding a 
damaging split. 
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In defeat the descent from power was swift and painful, as 
Butler suffered his share of the blame for the Tories' 
defeat. He had hoped that his experience would prove 
valuable to his younger colleagues. However, no major role 
was envisaged for him since Christopher Soames had been 
promised the Foreign Office in a new Conservative 
Government. His desire to remain in the game, and his 
belief that he still had a contribution 
illustrated by his refusal of Home's offer of 
to make, as 
an Earldom, 
was soon disabused by his removal from the Chairmanship of 
the Advisory Committee on Policy (replaced by Edward Heath) 
and the Conservative Research Department.(86) The loss of 
the latter post must have been particularly painful for 
Butler after nineteen years which had ensured his rise to 
the top of Conservative politics, and the acceptance and 
electoral success of his brand of Conservatism. He disliked 
the rightward swing of Tory opinion and the way in which 
policy was developed through a vast complex of policy 
groups, frequently drawing their main strength from outside 
the party altogether, rather than through the medium of 
backbench committees in Parliament.(87) 
Nevertheless, it was a sign of his continuing authority, in 
image if not in reality, that Home did not feel able to 
appoint another politician to the post, which was allowed to 
lapse. Home was not strong enough to drop Butler completely 
and he continued as the senior spokesman on foreign affairs, 
although there was little inclination on the part of the 
leadership to make use of him. He had speech notes drawn up 
249 
for the debate on the Address, but was not called upon to 
speak. Reginald Maudling, who was to pay a high price for 
the 1964 defeat himself, was appointed deputy leader, 
although Butler retained the deputy leader's room in the 
House of Commons.(88) 
By the end of 1964, within two months of the Conservative 
defeat, Butler had suffered an irreversible decline in 
influence. He was by his nature unhappy in opposition for, 
his was essentially a creative nature, and the idea of 
opposing just for the sake of it was unattractive to him.' 
He soon came to the conclusion that there was no future for 
him at the top of Conservative politics, so he chose to 
leave the stage completely, by accepting the Mastership of 
Trinity College, Cambridge and a life peerage in January 
1965. Butler had accepted that, ' .•. there is a tide in the 
affairs of men,' and that his had passed.(89) 
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Conclusion 
RAB Butler's position at the summit of Conservative politics 
for a generation has been misunderstood. He has been 
presented as the leading Tory advocate of what has been 
called the 'post-war consensus', though as we have seen, he 
was nothing of the kind. It is true that as head of the 
Conservative Research Department he engineered the Party's 
acceptance of a more interventionist economic and social 
policy, engendered by the second world war and the Labour 
landslide of 1945. Yet the notion of consensus against which 
his career is measured is itself hotly contested in terms of 
its definition, extent, or even if it existed. What has 
emerged from this thesis is that Butler's position was more 
complex than has previously been assumed. 
It is clear that 
distinctive domestic 
the Conservative Party developed a 
agenda, which it hoped to put into 
practice after its return to office in 1951. This involved a 
shift away from the collectivist instincts of the previous 
Labour administration towards a society based more on 
individual 
there was 
outcomes. 
responsibility and free enterprise. However, 
necessarily a divergence between aims and 
Any clear-cut vision was blurred by the Tories' 
perception of their fragile electoral position, economic 
constraints, and the existence of disagreement at all 
levels within the Party on the best way forward. 
The problem of interpretation is compounded by Butler's own 
reputation for evasion, which exasperated colleagues and 
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makes it difficult for the historian to know where he stood 
on certain issues. Such evasiveness damaged his leadership 
hopes. Having said that there was a superficial, imposed 
consensus or middle ground as a result of these constraints, 
there is enough evidence to conclude that Butler played an 
at times limited but always reluctant part in it. Instead he 
initiated important incremental changes in economic and 
social policy. It is fair to say that Butler's reputation 
for consensuality among contemporaries was imposed upon him 
by his colleagues: Macmillan obviously, Macleod predictably, 
ann somewhat suprisingly, Churchill and Eden, and was then 
accepted uncritically by some historians. 
With a narrow Parliamentary majority to defend and a 
precarious economic situation to contend with, Butler's 
colleagues, in his time as Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
regarded the electoral arguments in favour of domestic 
continuity as compelling. However, Butler moved to 'set the 
people free'. In the four years after the 1951 victory he 
swept away thousands of controls on production and 
consumption, and made progress towards his aim of sterling 
convertibility. The ROBOT plan, though abortive, showed his 
true colours in terms of his basic political outlook. While 
the Conservatives showed that they were just as able as 
Labour to manage the welfare state, Butler ensured that the 
emphasis was on maintenance rather than expansion. Welfare 
spending was kept to the minimum possible, so that by the 
mid-1950s it occupied a decreasing proportion of GNP, and 
substantial progress was made in reducing the burden of 
taxation. Improving living standards all round led Butler to 
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predict the noubling of the British standard of living 
within twenty five years. His success was recognised by 
Labour MP Richard Crossman, who wrote that, 
By demonstrating... that free enterprise is 
compatible with full employment and inequality with 
the welfare state, he has not only saved the 
Conservative Party from a self destructive adherence 
to principle; he has also weakened the Opposition by 
driving a wedge deep into the Labour Movement.(1) 
Butler's rallying call to 'invest in success' was rewarded 
with an increased Conservative majority in the 1955 general 
election. 
Not everyone would have agreed with Crossman. There was 
still a consistent body of mindle class opinion which 
resented the high burden of taxation still falling upon 
them, in contrast to the advantage of higher wages steadily 
being gained by organised labour. The 'middle class revolt' 
was at its peak when in 1958 Chancellor Peter Thorneycroft 
and his Treasury team resigned over the Cabinet's refusal to 
agree to further spending cuts. Butler, being more of a 
pragmatist, was not prepared to accept the dogmatic 
implementation of electorally unpopular spending cuts. 
However, he did seek to make bold changes in the attempt to 
create an 'opportunity' as opposen to a 'welfare' state. He 
welcomed the Government's drastic reduction in subsidies for 
council house building and rents in favour of the private 
sector, and he continued to defend the principle of 
selective education. The introduction of graduated pensions 
and a 'contracting out' provision reflected Butler's belief 
in selective benefits to help those most in need, while 
encouraging those people who could to obtain services for 
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themselves. Individually such policies may not amount to 
much, but taken together they reaffirmed Butler's belief in 
traditional Conservative themes like freedom of choice, and 
individual opportunity and responsibility. The taking up of 
these policy positions should show that Butler's consensual 
reputation was unearned. He had used the mixed 
economy/welfare state, to maintain the differences of 
wealth ann status which are essential to stability.'(2) 
As Party Chairman after 1959, Butler became increasingly 
uncomfortable with the materialist 'never had it so good' 
emphasis of Conservative policy, which had secured an 
overwhelming 
election. Yet 
victory 
the 
for the Tories in the 
Government embarked upon 
1959 general 
an expensive 
modernistaion programme in health, housing ann education, 
combined with economic planning. It is possible that Butler 
changed his outlook and embraced this shift towards 
what has been called 'consensual' politics. However, on 
closer inspection this was more a shift of nuance than 
substance. He sought to develop an alternative strategy 
which emphasised individual responsibility and the 
'spiritual'side of politics. Continuity rather than change 
marked Butler's outlook. His marked lack of enthusiasm for 
the 'new approach' was matched by the slowly perceptible 
decline in his influence over domestic affairs. Arguably the 
Tories paid the price for such a substantial departure from 
'setting the people free'. 
Unsurprisingly this more interventionist policy was met with 
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hostility by traditional Tory supporters, who could detect 
little difference from Labour policies. It was somewhat 
unjust that Butler was forced to take responsibility for a 
slump in the Party's fortunes which was none of his making, 
and he was removed from the Party Chairmanship, the 
Leadership of the House of Commons and the Home Office in 
quick succession. Although the Government eventually 
embarked upon a 'dash for growth', after a disastrous run of 
by-election performances and the 'night of the long knives', 
the 1964 election defeat confirmed Butler's fear that 
economic prosperity alone was no longer enough to regain the 
voters' loyalty. 
Given this record it is hard to see how previous biographers 
have been able to label Butler as a consensus politician. 
Whatever 'consensus' might have been there were, as we have 
seen, better candidates who qualified for such a label. The 
most that can be said of Butler is that he was sensitive to 
the electoral implications of policies adopted, but that at 
heart he was a believer in the classic Tory themes of 
individual freedom and responsibility. This was not an 
unsubtle position, but it was difficult to perceive at the 
time, and was lost on many in his own Party (especially 
those on the right) due to his ambiguous character, his 
talent for indiscretion and mastery of the dubious 
compliment, which blurred his poltical positions. One much 
quoted Tory jihe went, 'Anyone who understands Rab Butler 
must be gravely misinformed.'(3) This damaged Butler most 
obviously over an issue of foreign policy, Suez, and 
contributed to Macmillan's accession in early 1957. Over the 
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longer-term his apparent failure to take up decisive 
positions on domestic policy also damaged his potential for 
becoming Party leader. 
Butler's pragmatism, his attachment to the 'art of the 
possible' as a political maxim, was held against him as 
evidence of a lack of political conviction. To many 
contemporaries his effortless rise up the political ladder 
appeared to confirm, wrongly, a lack of core beliefs or 
'backbone'. It seemed to explain the apparent ease with 
which he moved from Conservative orthodoxy in the 1930s, 
when he showed little interest in the interventionist 
economic policies propounded by Keynes, to apparent advocacy 
of more progressive ideas in the 1950s. There seemed to be 
no position which he believed was worth fighting for. Even 
his admirers, like Enoch Powell, were conscious that, 'He 
was not the kind of man for whom any cause - even his own 
was worth fighting to the death, worth risking 
everything.'(4) This goes far towards explaining why Butler 
was passed over for the leadership of the Tory Party, not 
only in 1957 but also in 1963. 
Given Butler's actual record in office, his problem should 
have been that of antagonising left wing, would-he 
progressive Tories. Actually, he usually managed to incur 
the resentment of right wing 'blue hlooc'l and thunder' 
Tories. Butler's pragmatism over the 1958 Treasury 
resignations was interpreted by some Tories as confirmation 
of his 'milk and water socialism'. In truth he was much 
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closer to the Thorneycroft position than his critics ever 
allowed, having rarely been an advocate of higher spending. 
It was unfortunate for his career that as Home Secretary 
Butler presided over a succession of liberalising reforms 
which, although they did not entail great expenditure, 
continued to antagonise the right. In foreign affairs, his 
opposition to the maintenance of white supremacy in the 
Central African Federation, and his role in its dissolution, 
reinforced right-wing misgivings and resurrected his 
'Munichois' past. Even on the issue of Britain's application 
to enter the EEC, where Butler's reservations were more in 
tune with the feelings of Party workers, his political 
manoeuvring aroused suspicion. Thus, when it came to 
fighting for personal advantage rather than a policy 
position, Butler was unable to overcome the contempt of the 
Tory right, which was implacably opposed to his succession, 
or win over other potential supporters who were contemptuous 
of his manoeuvrings. 
The importance of such hostility was evident not only when 
Macmillan succeeded Eden, but also when Macmillan chose to 
retire. The conventional view of the 1963 crisis has been 
that Butler abdicated from a job that was his for the 
taking. In reality, his intense disappointment in 1957 had 
encouraged a fatalistic streak in his character which 
countenanced the possibility of failure. There were more 
candidates than in 1957, which made it difficult to emerge 
decisively, and Macmillan did everything in his power to 
prevent Butler's succession. Had Butler refused to serve 
under Lord Home he might have secured the Premiership for 
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himself. However, his inability to be ruthless in his own 
cause meant that he was unwilling to force himself into the 
position against the clearly expressed wishes of many 
Conservative MPs. 
A few months after Labour won the 1964 general election, 
Butler retired from politics to the Mastership of Trinity 
College, Cambridge. He was not busy to any great effect in 
his thirteen years as Master, which he described as being 
'endless port and dignity'.(S) It is hard to avoid the 
conclusion that he was a disappointed man. In 1970 Cynthia 
Gladwyn observed that, 
Rab has to be seen to be believed: huge, shapeless, 
'mal soigne', brooding on whether, had he refused to 
serve under Alec, he might now be Prime Minister.(6) 
Butler's retirement at the relatively early age of 62 was 
the logical outcome of his rejection in 1963. As the 
momentum of Tory politics passed to a younger generation, 
Butler became something of a totem for those who felt the 
policies of Edward Heath, in his 'Selsdon Man' phase, and 
those of Margaret Thatcher, in all her phases, were too far 
to the right. His status as a left wing consensus politician 
was made. Seldom has a reputation been less well-deserved. 
In a rare foray into politics, just two years before his 
death, Butler helped to defeat the transport clauses of the 
1980 Education Bill. He declared that, 'Politics is not all 
intellect; politics is largely a matter of heart and people 
are feeling this deeply all over the country.'(?) This was 
characteristic of his political philosophy. While he was not 
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content to administer socialist policies, progress towards 
distinctive Conservative positions had to be balanced by 
their electoral consequences. It was perhaps for this reason 
that Butler always enjoyed greater support among the 
electorate than he did within the ranks of the Conservative 
Party, where such manoeuvring aroused suspicion and 
resentment. Had he become leader of his Party in 1963 this 
popular appeal - given the narrowness of Labour's victory 
may well have been decisive in winning the 1964 general 
election, and his historical reputation would have been seen 
in a more favourable light by the modern Tory Party. 
However, defeat led to the perpetuation of an image of 
Butler that has for too long gone unchallenged. He pursued 
policies of a radical nature, but whatever he did was 
tempered by the realities of the political situation. In so 
doing, he helped to shift the 'post-war settlement' in a 
Conservative direction, while at the same time helping to 
maintain his Party in office for thirteen years. Although he 
failed to secure the premiership, he was still a formidable 
political figure. In terms of influencing and shaping the 
political agenda he was, for much of the period between 1951 
and 1964 and despite numerous disappointments, 'the power 
behind the throne'. 
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